911 Tradegy

As Pakistan’s ambassador to the United Nations, I happened to be in New York on that fateful day 13 years ago. I remember witnessing the ghastly disappearance of the Twin Towers from Manhattan’s skyline that was to change not only the world history, but also the global geopolitical landscape. We were in the middle of a prayer breakfast meeting at the UN Headquarters hosted by UN Secretary General Kofi Anan for the heads of diplomatic corps in New York as well as all UN agencies when all of a sudden the news of a plane crashing into the World Trade Center reached us. We were asked to evacuate calmly.

As we were going down, we saw on television monitors in the lower lobby another plane crashing into the second tower, putting it ablaze in an instant. It then became clear that it was not an ordinary plane crash. It was an act of a cold-blooded atrocity. No one knew what had happened, and why. All that one could see was an inferno of fire and smoke. “Bloody Tuesday,” “Act of war,” “Carnage,” “Catastrophe,” “Heinous Crime,” and “Unprecedented Tragedy in American history” were some of the headlines used the next day in the American print media to describe the terrorist attacks against the United States.

The ‘belligerent’ mood of the administration was evident in its first call to the world. “You’re either with us or against us,” was the message, loud and clear. Foreign nations were given an immediate ‘black-and-white’ choice in their relationship with the United States. No doubt, the sudden disappearance of the Twin Towers from Manhattan’s skyline was to change the global geopolitical landscape altogether. The world’s sole superpower was overwhelmed by anger and lost no time in determining the nature and scale of its response. At the diplomatic front, the US was quick to mobilise international support for building an ‘international coalition’ to combat terrorism. 

Besides enlisting Nato’s participation in this campaign, it got strong resolutions adopted overwhelmingly the very next day, i.e., September 12, in the UN Security Council and the General Assembly thereby paving the ground for the legitimisation of US military action against terrorists and their hideouts. Two weeks later, Washington was able to have a more specific and action-oriented resolution (UNSC 1373 of Sept 28, 2001) adopted in the UN Security Council on specific global measures to suppress terrorism through a UN Counterterrorism Committee. Since then, the world never recovered from the aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy. 

For Pakistan, the 9/11 was a moment of reckoning. On that fateful day, it faced the worst dilemma of its life. Its options were limited and bleak. General Musharraf was among the very first foreign leaders to have received a clarion call from Washington. The US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, telephoned him late in the evening on September 12, asking for Pakistan’s full support and cooperation in fighting terrorism. In a sombre message “from one general to another,” Colin Powell made it clear that mere condolences and boilerplate offers of help from Pakistan will not do. It had to play a key role in the war on terror that was about to begin.   

Facing domestic problems and regional challenges, General Musharraf took no time in pledging even more than the requested support and cooperation. On September 13, the US Secretary of State said that the United States was now prepared to go after terrorist networks and “those who have harboured, supported and aided that network,” wherever they were found. The same day, President George W Bush expressed appreciation for Pakistan’s readiness to cooperate and spoke of the chance that it now had to participate in “hunting down the people who committed the acts of terrorism.” The rest that followed is history. One doesn’t have to go into its details.

Thirteen years down the line, the Afghan war has yet to come to a formal closure. The world itself has yet to breathe peace. Throughout this period, the world media has had the challenging task of helping people understand the events, and in the ensuing war on terror played an important role to help provide wider perspectives of the aftermath of those attacks. The consensus has been that from being a ‘righteous war’ when it started, the US war on terror is no longer righteous as it still lingers on. Even the American media in due course of time felt that the Bush-Cheney decision to wage war was a big mistake. 

The Washington Post once said: “In the name of the war on terror, we have invaded and occupied a country that had nothing to do with the attacks of 9/11, we have emboldened our enemies, we have lost and taken many lives, we have spent trillions of dollars, we have sacrificed civil liberties, and we have jettisoned our commitment to human dignity.” 

But was it an honest mistake? Did President Bush and Vice-President Cheney declare war because they genuinely believed it was the best way to guarantee the safety of the American people? Or did they do it in a premeditated attempt to seize greater political and economic power globally? 

These are questions that history alone will answer. For now, at least one thing is clear. The US invaded Afghanistan on the pretext of 9/11 by waging an unrelated ‘war on terror’ which is now seen as a “semantic, strategic and legal perversion”. It forced the Taliban out of power but never defeated them. Ironically, looking back in retrospect, one is intrigued by the thought, however unbelievable it may be, that the emergence of the Taliban in mid-1990s and the post-9/11 Afghan stalemate might both be linked to the same ‘great game’ in this region which is known for its huge hidden oil and gas reserves. The real stakes in this war can be summed up just in one word: Oil. 

As secretary general of the 10-member regional cooperation organisation called the Economic Cooperation Organisation which encompasses besides Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, six former Soviet republics of Central Asia and Afghanistan, I am familiar with blueprints of plans conceptualised during my period in early 1990s for an elaborate network of oil and gas pipelines within the region and beyond. Those regional plans remain unimplemented because of the ensuing war-led turmoil in Afghanistan. It is clear now that the Afghan war was never an end in itself. It was only part of a Central Asia-focused ‘Great Game’ that will perhaps go on with far-reaching implications for this vast region as a global hotspot. 

Published in The Express Tribune, September 13^th, 2014. 

Fighting the Islamic State

by Munir Akram, dawn.com
September 14 05:54 AM

The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.

PRESIDENT Obama announced a “strategy” to “degrade and destroy” the Islamic State (formerly, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham) on Sept 10. The announcement came scarcely two weeks after Obama had explained US reluctance to escalate military action against IS by admitting he did not have a strategy to deal with this challenge. He was roundly criticised by US politicians and pundits for his honest admission.

The announced strategy comprises four components: first, systematic air strikes against IS in Iraq , in coordination with Iraqi and Kurdish forces, and in Syria if IS there threatens Americans; second, increased support (training, intelligence, equipment) to those fighting “these terrorists”; third, improving counterterrorism capabilities: intelligence, counter-narrative, preventing the flow of Western jihadis and mobilising the international community; and four, continuing humanitarian assistance to civilians and threatened religious groups.

In fact, the announced ‘strategy’ looks very similar to what the US has been doing already for the past several weeks against IS. The two new elements are: the apparent US willingness to attack IS in Syria and the aim of building a broad coalition against it, including the major Arab states and Turkey.

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It is not wholly evident why IS has emerged as America’s top military target.

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It is not wholly evident why IS has emerged as America’s top military target. The head of US Homeland Security confirmed, before Obama’s speech, that there is “no direct threat from ISIS” to the US. There is no evidence of ISIS plans to attack the US or even the desire to do so. It poses a regional threat and may attack US targets there. The presence of ‘foreign fighters’ (3,000 from Europe and 100 from the US) is a possible future threat when they return home. The official said that the major threat to the US homeland still emanates from Al Qaeda and its affiliates.

Thus, superficially, Obama’s new anti-IS priority seems to have been driven purely by domestic considerations: on one hand, the growing criticism of his responses to foreign policy challenges, including IS successes, and, on the other, the higher US public support for action against the group after its brutal beheading of two American journalists.

There is no assurance the Obama “strategy” will be successful, especially without US “boots on the ground”. There may be unintended consequences. Attacking IS may create the very threat it is meant to avoid. It may make Sunni reconciliation within a united Iraq more difficult and enhance Kurdish capabilities to break away from Iraq. Degrading IS would also strengthen the Assad regime in Syria.

Yet, Obama’s ‘strategy’ could become the start of a broader plan to stabilise the region.

The 150-plus US air strikes against IS in Iraq have inevitably brought the US into operational alliance with Iranian military advisers known to be attached with the Iraqi army and Shia militias acting as its auxiliaries. Both the US and Iran have declared that there can be no direct cooperation with the other. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has indeed asserted that IS is an American creation.

But perhaps they protest too much. Iran’s foreign minister declared some months ago that Iran is prepared to cooperate with other parties to end the sectarian conflicts in the region. It is widely known that the US and Iran have held secret talks for several years which enabled them to reach the interim agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme. They also have had quiet contacts in Baghdad.

In exchange for American and Arab cooperation in degrading IS, which poses a threat to Iran’s allies in both Baghdad and Damascus, and a fair agreement regarding its nuclear programme, Tehran could help to ensure an inclusive government in Iraq, broker a political settlement between Assad and moderate insurgent groups in Syria, dampen the Shia opposition to the Sunni regimes in Bahrain and Yemen, restrain Hezbollah’s threat to Israel and end its support to Hamas.

It is possible that at least some aspects of such a ‘bargain’ have been discussed. Such discussions may have encouraged the Obama administration to launch the strategy against IS.

To be successful, the strategy would also require the support of the major Arab states. Saudi Arabia’s initiative to convene a meeting of 10 Arab states and Turkey in Jeddah is significant. Saudi Arabia and the UAE now consider the Muslim Brotherhood and related extremist groups a threat to their own stability and are determined to suppress them. A US strategy which both degrades IS and other Sunni extremist groups, including the Brotherhood, and secures Iran’s cooperation to contain Shia militias and insurgents across the region, would be doubly attractive. In turn, the contribution of these Arab powers would be essential to wean the Sunni tribes in Iraq away from IS and reach a political settlement in Syria.

As yet, Arab support to Obama’s anti-IS strategy is not universal. Egypt has its hands full with putting down the Brotherhood. Jordan fears the backlash from IS which now operates just across its borders with Iraq and Syria. Turkey is worried about the fate of its 49 diplomats captured by IS and averse to reinforcing Kurdish forces, which include the anti-Turkish PKK. Qatar’s closeness to the Brotherhood and other Sunni extremists has complicated its relationships with the US and its GCC neighbours.

A ‘grand bargain’ involving the US, Iran and Saudi Arabia and their respective allies and proxies would be obviously most difficult to construct and consummate. Proxies and puppets are not always easy to control. There is enormous and accumulated mistrust between the principal parties. And the sheer number and complexity of the local, sub-national and regional issues that need to be addressed is daunting.

Unless a comprehensive strategy is pursued, the fight against IS is likely to prove frustrating. Air strikes with ground support from unreliable local forces; eliminating IS’s financial sources and countering its brutal ideology will not be sufficient to destroy it. The legitimate grievances that attract its recruits will have to be addressed. Ultimately, eliminating extremism in the region will require the rapid generation of jobs and economic development.

stake is the present and future stability of the Middle East — a region in the midst of multiple and violent transitions — and its impact on the world order.

The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.

Published in Dawn, September 14th , 2014

http://www.dawn.com/news/1131800/fighting-the-islamic-state

The New Arabs by Juan Cole

SENIOR University of Michigan academician, Juan Cole, appears to have a twofold agenda in writing this book. On the one hand, he wishes to provide a comprehensive overview of the role and function of young revolutionaries central to the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. On the other, by doing the former, he attempts to give the reader an idea of the collective identity of (what he terms) the young millennial Arabs of the 21st century.

Cole’s tome is a breathtakingly detailed and comprehensive tour de force; lucidly written and extensively documented, over a tenth of the book is devoted to extensive explanatory notes and sources. He thus succeeds in achieving the first aim of his agenda, and while determining whether he creditably defines the millennials is ultimately up to the individual reader to ascertain, there is no doubt about the fact that his aspirations are valid and noble ones.

It should come as no secret to anyone even remotely familiar with the machinations of the Arab Spring that heads of state such as Mubarak of Egypt, Ben Ali of Tunisia, and Gaddafi of Libya, were displaced partly by means involving extensive internet networking by the revolutionaries within their respective countries. Indeed cyberspace (as opposed to ‘meatspace’) provided outlets for the restless energy and legitimate frustration of the millennials. Naturally, Cole consistently creates fundamental links between his perception of revolutionary activities and the widespread use and availability of social media in the Middle East.

The first half of the book delineates precisely what Cole means by the terms “Arab millennials” and “Republican monarchs”. He also painstakingly underscores the manner in which the post-revolution, New-Left parties within these countries struggled to cope with the confusion and fallout that inevitably arise when any regime (no matter how oppressive) is left without a central leader.

The latter half of the text details the revolutions of the three countries within the precincts of separate chapters. The number of courageous individuals listed by Cole is too numerous to dwell on here at length, but special mention may be made of a few that stand out as having been particularly significant. One of these is the Egyptian blogger Wael Abbas, another is the tragic figure of Tunisian Tariq Bouazizi, and last but not least, the Tunisian activist Zouhair Yahyaoui.

Given the immense amount of internet information about the revolutions to which one can have access, and which invariably tends to overwhelm as opposed to instruct, Cole’s book (though dense and difficult) provides a welcome sense of anchorage. This is primarily because it focuses on that which is both genuine and important. Had it not been for the heroic and systematic blogging of Wael Abbas, many Egyptian youth who wished for reform would have found themselves to be politically rudderless in the second decade of this century. Fortunately for Abbas, he was a survivor. Creator of the dissident internet magazine TUNeZINE, his counterpart Zouhair Yahyaoui attempted to co-ordinate and stimulate Tunisians in a similar manner, but his is a sadder case than that of Abbas. Though Yahyaoui achieved some of his aims, the stresses of rigorous imprisonment resulted in his health collapsing fatally when he was still in his thirties.

Bouazizi’s case appears to be the most depressing. Consistently denied the ability to put his education and personal resources to good use, in a last act of desperation he immolated himself, thereby (almost literally) beginning the conflagration that set Ben Ali’s corrupt government ablaze. One of the most vital aspects of Cole’s text is that he never places a hero before the audience, unless that individual has truly earned the dignity of being regarded as one. He is just as measured in documenting their polar opposites — for example, individuals such as the post-Mubarak president, Mohammed Morsi, whose firm personality but conservative and myopic views resulted in the Egyptian economy being affected detrimentally. Even a substantial infusion of funds by Morsi’s main benefactor, Qatar, was unable to salvage either the economy or even, ultimately, his position.

Perhaps the only major criticism of Cole’s work that jumps out at any reader is that it lacks information about some key points, such as international sentiment regarding the new millennials, and portrayals of heroic female figures of the revolutions.

This may have been because Cole’s intensely honed focus necessarily excludes such elements, or at least a detailed discussion of them, resulting in an unevenness that is understandable but can hardly go unnoticed. He feels compelled to offer thumbnail sketches of several family members of the Gaddafi ‘cartel,’ but is oddly silent about points such as Christiane Amanpour’s historic and exclusive interview with Mubarak during the early days of the Egyptian revolution. This is surprising since the author’s respect for Western journalism subtly fuels much of his own documentation.

Equally puzzling is why Cole seems so quick to view these revolutions as similar to the French one of the 18th century; that the writer is an expert on Napoleonic Egypt does not automatically mean that one should dispel a healthy personal sense of scepticism and subscribe to this viewpoint. To do so would result in an undercutting of the imperative need to see each Arab revolution as unique and non-Western.

To be perfectly fair, however, Cole never claims to be writing from a quasi-indigenous, or even empathetic, perspective, although he is both linguistically and geographically well-versed when it comes to his knowledge of the Middle East.

Deeply sobering though the book is, perhaps it would not be inappropriate to end with a fantastical but apt quote from the science-fiction novel, Star Wars: A New Hope, where Princess Leia notes: “They were in the wrong place at the wrong time. Naturally, they became heroes.” The saying fully applies to key millennial figures of the Arab Spring.

The reviewer is Assistant Professor of Social Sciences and Liberal Arts at the Institute of Business Administration.

The New Arabs: How the Millennial Generation is Changing the Middle East

(POLITICS)

By Juan Cole   Simon and Schuster, US  ISBN 978-1451690392   348pp.
The New Arabs by Juan Cole
by Nadya Chishty-Mujahid, dawn.com