Zionism- The new imperialism

After reaching its zenith, classical imperialism may have declined but its institutions and traditions have remained for historians to study and understand. After evolving through different stages, its objectives were accomplished by justifying the process on moral, religious, political and economic grounds.

When the Europeans discovered the three continents — North America, Africa, and Australasia — they propagated that these were lands without people. It meant that the land was no one’s property and, therefore, could be occupied and used by the imperial powers.

In North America, the settlers occupied land by depriving native tribes of their property. This argument is advanced in the The Frontier Thesis by historian Turner. On the other hand, Australia became the dumping ground for convicts and criminals, who were transported from Britain to work as cheap labour. It was the government’s policy to shift its excess population to the newly discovered continents.

It is another historical epoch but Israel’s occupation of Palestine reflects how classical imperialism has been recreated for use in the modern world
Another policy of imperialism was to establish colonies in the conquered countries. After the conquest of Ireland, England settled its Protestant citizens there, with the objective of controlling the local population. As the landlords were Protestants who were supported and protected by England, the Irish peasants suffered exploitation and mistreatment. This conflict between Protestants and Catholics continues to the present day, especially in Northern Ireland. England adopted the policy of colonisation in North America and in the African continent, where the goldmines in South Africa and the diamond mines of modern-day Zimbabwe were an attraction for them.

As political power strengthened, English imperialism became responsible for committing atrocities using new technological weapons. In Africa, the tribal people lived a simple life when they encountered the white people. They fought with spears, bows and arrows, while the English fought with cannons, rifles and guns decimating the opposing forces easily. Terror and violence were used for political domination. Religious forces were also employed in order to further the stronghold of imperialism. Missionaries arrived to convert the heathens to Christianity in order to make them modern and civilised.

England and the European powers, including France, Germany and Belgium continued to exploit the resources of the African continent. Leopold II, the Belgian king is remembered for his shocking brutality and exploitation in Congo, which was also condemned by the Europeans. Joseph Conrad’s novel Heart of Darkness exposes the rapacity and cruelty of the Belgian forces and suffering of the Africans. The intervention of Europeans and the economic exploitation of the African natural resources became known in history as the ‘scramble for Africa’.

Africa was depopulated because of the slave trade, casualties, war and deprivation of their national wealth. Their peace and prosperity and their simple life was destroyed by the civilisation mission of the Europeans. Chinua Achebe in his novel, Things fall Apart, portrays the impact of colonialism on the traditional society of Africa which was destroyed as a result.

In the modern period, Israel is emulating the methodology of classical imperialism to strengthen its state. By propagating that Palestine was a land without people, it justified its occupation and use for cultivation as well as settlement. Israel also adopted the policy of terror on the Palestinians to appropriate their property. Its terrorist organisation is responsible for genocide of the Palestinians. In Deir Yassin (1948), the whole population of the village was massacred. This terrified the people from other villages and they fled from Palestine to take refuge in different Arab countries. As the Jewish population was not large enough to counter the Palestinians, the Israeli government encouraged the Russians, Eastern Europeans and the Middle Eastern Jewish communities to come to Israel and settle there. The policy of colonisation still continues.

After the 1967 war, Israel occupied East Jerusalem, West Bank and Golan Heights. Israel is systematically building new houses in the West Bank as well as expelling the Palestinians from East Jerusalem on a variety of different pretexts.

Israel also follows the policy of keeping the Palestinians subdued by raiding their villages, cutting olive trees and destroying their farmland. Over the years, Israel has become not only a military but a nuclear power. Its army is well equipped with new, technological weapons. Therefore, each year, it is a routine for Israel to invade Palestinian territories, kill thousands of Palestinians and demolish their infrastructure like schools, hospitals and libraries only to return after a ceasefire. The Palestinians live in prison-like conditions in constant fear and mental agony. Thousands of them are in Israeli prisons because of their resistance and endure torture which is legalised by the Israeli judiciary.

The question is how long Israel would continue to crush the Palestinians’ right for their homeland and how long it would spend its energy and resources to keep the Israeli State intact against any challenge. Israeli imperialism has already created a Palestinian nationalism which will fight against Israeli atrocities and harshness and finally emerge as a triumphant nation.

Zionism- The new imperialism
by Mubarak Ali, dawn.com

Counterterrorism consensus

AS Pakistan grieves the loss of its children in Peshawar, a national consensus has emerged to fight and destroy the TTP terrorists responsible for this latest atrocity. The Pakistan Army will no doubt intensify its ongoing campaign against these terrorists and should be extended all possible support. Hopefully, Pakistan’s political leaders will suspend their power games to address this clear and present danger to the country’s security and progress.

This massacre is another reminder that over the past 30 years, Pakistan has been the principal victim of terrorism. It experienced the Indian-sponsored bomb blasts in the 1970s; the Soviet-Najibullah attacks during the 1980s; Shia-Sunni violence during the 1990s; and Al Qaeda and TTP terrorism over the last decade.

Until the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan, terrorism was an ‘external’ threat for Pakistan; it was ‘internalised’ due to two strategic mistakes: Pakistan’s sponsorship of Islamic extremists against the Soviets, in collaboration with the US and its allies, and the subsequent decision to support religious militants, rather than the indigenous Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front, during the 1990s Kashmiri uprising against Indian occupation.

The ghosts of these strategic mistakes continue to haunt Pakistan in its current battle against the TTP. Al Qaeda emerged from the detritus of the anti-Soviet Arab and other foreign fighters. It has masterminded many of the worst terrorist attacks against Pakistan. It attracted rebellious militants from Uzbekistan, Chechnya and Xinqiang, and spawned several of the current components of the TTP.

Today, there is an opportunity to build a genuine global consensus to eliminate terrorism.
To eliminate the TTP and its ilk, Pakistan needs to implement a well-considered plan to capture or kill these terrorists. It must also take bold measures to counter the causes for the emergence and existence of violent extremism in Pakistan: ignorance, greed, fear and poverty.

The hate and bigotry being spread from Pakistan’s pulpits and madressahs; the corruption that allows terrorists to roam the streets and infiltrate institutions; the crimes that generate financing for terrorist organisations; the fear which provides them impunity from prosecution for their crimes, and the absence of employment which results in recruits for their ranks, must all be addressed through comprehensive and courageous policies.

Hopefully, the national unity generated by the Peshawar atrocity will enable the government and the security forces to formulate and execute such policies. As a first step, all political parties should be required to openly condemn the TTP and its associates and break any links they may have with them.

However, terrorism is not merely an internal social and political issue within Pakistan. It has a vital external dimension which requires to be honestly addressed by Pakistan and the ‘international community’.

To do so, it should be recalled that most of today’s terrorist organisations mutated from insurgent groups initially sponsored by one or more states against adversaries. This holds true for the Tamil Tigers, Al Qaeda, the TTP, the Haqqanis, the IMU, the Etim and the Islamic State. Both Western and domestic commentators often focus on Pakistan’s support to militant groups in Afghanistan and Kashmir. But this is a ‘game’ which several states have played or are still playing against each other.

Global efforts to eliminate terrorism have foundered so far as rival powers have sought to outlaw groups threatening them while excluding others they themselves sponsor or support. The UN has not even agreed on a definition of ‘terrorism’.

Today, there is an opportunity to build a genuine global consensus to eliminate terrorism from Pakistan, this region and internationally. Each of the major powers have a stake in combating terrorist groups that pose a threat to their national security. The Etim targets China; the IMU aims to destabilise Central Asia; the Chechens threaten Russia. The US is targeted by Al Qaeda, the IS and their associates. Iran faces IS and Jundullah. Saudi Arabia is battling Al Qaeda and potentially threatened by the IS. Pakistan confronts the TTP and the Balochistan Liberation Army, both supported by Afghan and Indian intelligence.

In building such a global consensus, there are new possibilities for agreements between Pakistan and Afghanistan and perhaps even with India.

President Ghani appears genuine in his desire to rebuild a close relationship with Pakistan. If so, Pakistan should do all possible to help in stabilising Afghanistan and supporting the Afghan ‘unity’ government. Pakistan has offered to help reconciliation in Afghanistan if Kabul desires this. In exchange, President Ghani (and the US) has offered to target the TTP’s safe havens in Afghanistan.

The extent of Pakistan’s influence over the Afghan Taliban, led by Mullah Omar, is uncertain, especially in the wake of Zarb-i-Azb, which has reportedly disrupted not only the TTP but also the Haqqanis. Any inter-mediation involving the Afghan Taliban should be made conditional on their openly breaking their links with the TTP, Al Qaeda and associated terrorist groups such as the Etim.

In any event, the ‘strategic value’ — if any — of the Afghan Taliban for Pakistan pales in significance when weighed against the importance of Islamabad’s strategic relationships with China, the US and Afghanistan.

Kabul’s cooperation will help to also end Indian support to the TTP and BLA. However, it would be wise for both countries to evolve an understanding for mutual restraint in Kashmir. If the Modi government holds back from the planned steps to change occupied Kashmir’s current status and allows genuine democratic rights to the Kashmiris, Pakistan should do all possible to restrain the ‘Kashmir Jihad Council’ from any provocative actions.

Such regional arrangements with Afghanistan and India could be broadened to include other ‘stakeholders’: Iran, Saudi Arabia, China, Russia and the US. Cooperation can be extended to jointly combating Etim, IMU and the IS.

The challenge cannot be underestimated. It is difficult for states to surrender tactical assets and advantages. It is even more difficult to eliminate groups motivated by local and national grievances and religious convictions, however misplaced. Today, all the major militant and terrorist groups feed off the same narrative: injustice and suppression of Muslims across several geographies. Part of a global consensus must offer an effective counter to this narrative and erode its appeal to disaffected Muslim youth across the world.

Counterterrorism consensus
by Munir Akram, dawn.com
The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.

More: We can defeat Terrorists 

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Let’s be honest, Islam has a problem right now by Fareed Zakaria

When television host Bill Maher declares on his weekly show that “the Muslim world . . . has too much in common with ISIS ” and guest Sam Harris says that Islam is “the mother lode of bad ideas,” I understand why people are upset. Maher and Harris, an author, made crude simplifications and exaggerations. And yet, they were also talking about something real.

I know the arguments against speaking of Islam as violent and reactionary. It has a following of 1.6 billion people. Places such as Indonesia and India have hundreds of millions of Muslims who don’t fit these caricatures. That’s why Maher and Harris are guilty of gross generalizations. But let’s be honest. Islam has a problem today. The places that have trouble accommodating themselves to the modern world are disproportionately Muslim.

In 2013, of the top 10 groups that perpetrated terrorist attacks, seven were Muslim. Of the top 10 countries where terrorist attacks took place, seven were Muslim-majority. The Pew Research Center rates countries on the level of restrictions that governments impose on the free exercise of religion. Of the 24 most restrictive countries, 19 are Muslim-majority. Of the 21 countries that have laws against apostasy, all have Muslim majorities.

There is a cancer of extremism within Islam today. A small minority of Muslims celebrates violence and intolerance and harbors deeply reactionary attitudes toward women and minorities. While some confront these extremists, not enough do so, and the protests are not loud enough. How many mass rallies have been held against the Islamic State (also known as ISIS) in the Arab world today?

The caveat, “Islam today,” is important. The central problem with Maher’s and Harris’s analyses are that they take a reality — extremism in Islam — and describe it in ways that suggest it is inherent in Islam. Maher says Islam is “the only religion that acts like the Mafia, that will [expletive] kill you if you say the wrong thing, draw the wrong picture or write the wrong book.” He’s right about the viciousness but wrong to link it to “Islam” — instead of “some Muslims.”

Harris prides himself on being highly analytical — with a PhD, no less. I learned in graduate school that you can never explain a variable phenomenon with a fixed cause. So, if you are asserting that Islam is inherently violent and intolerant — “the mother lode of bad ideas” — then, since Islam has been around for 14 centuries, we should have seen 14 centuries of this behavior.

Harris should read Zachary Karabell’s book “Peace Be Upon You: Fourteen Centuries of Muslim, Christian and Jewish Conflict and Cooperation.” What he would discover is that there have been wars but also many centuries of peace. Islam has at times been at the cutting edge of modernity, but like today, it has also been the great laggard. As Karabell explained to me, “If you exclude the last 70 years or so, in general the Islamic world was more tolerant of minorities than the Christian world. That’s why there were more than a million Jews living in the Arab world until the early 1950s — nearly 200,000 in Iraq alone.”

If there were periods when the Islamic world was open, modern, tolerant and peaceful, this suggests that the problem is not in the religion’s essence and that things can change once more. So why is Maher making these comments? I understand that as a public intellectual he feels the need to speak what he sees as the unvarnished truth (though his “truth” is simplified and exaggerated). But surely there is another task for public intellectuals as well — to try to change the world for good.

Does he really think that comparing Islam to the Mafia will do this? Harris says that he wants to encourage “nominal Muslims who don’t take the faith seriously” to reform the religion. So, the strategy to reform Islam is to tell 1.6 billion Muslims, most of whom are pious and devout, that their religion is evil and they should stop taking it seriously?

That is not how Christianity moved from its centuries-long embrace of violence, crusades, inquisitions, witch-burning and intolerance to its modern state. On the contrary, intellectuals and theologians celebrated the elements of the religion that were tolerant, liberal and modern, and emphasized them, while giving devout Christians reasons to take pride in their faith. A similar approach — reform coupled with respect — will work with Islam over time.

The stakes are high in this debate. You can try to make news or you can make a difference. I hope Maher starts doing the latter.

The latest story has provoked a lot of questions, objections and, sometimes, misunderstandings.
Fareed Zakaria: Let’s be honest, Islam has a problem right now
by Fareed Zakaria, washingtonpost.com

Pakistan’s Lessons for Turkey NY Times

Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, declared that Turkey is ready “for any cooperation in the fight against terrorism.” Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu argued that Islamic State militants pose a greater threat to Turkey and the Muslim world than to the West.

But Turkey’s dilemma is far more grave than its leaders realize. Indeed, Turkey’s current situation resembles the early years of Pakistan’s sponsorship of the Taliban. The Islamic State is recruiting militants in Turkey. And failure to clean its own house now could lead Turkey down the path of “Pakistanization,” whereby a resident jihadist infrastructure causes Sunni extremism to ingrain itself deeply within the fabric of society.

Although Turkey now recognizes the threat — the Turkish government voted to authorize military force in Iraq and Syria on Thursday — it has yet to come to terms with its own responsibility for helping to create it.

Turkey claims that radical groups grew stronger because moderates seeking the overthrow of President Bashar al-Assad of Syria were not given adequate aid. But that is not the whole picture. As Francis J. Ricciardone Jr., the former American ambassador to Turkey, has pointed out, Ankara supported radical groups, including the Nusra Front. Indeed, during the early days of Syria’s civil war, jihadist groups funneled fighters and resources through Turkey into Syria.

Turkey’s intervention in the Syrian civil war parallels Pakistan’s support of the Taliban to affect the course of the Afghan civil war. But the jihadism abetted by Pakistan did not remain across the Afghan border. Turkey may now be witnessing the beginnings of a similar blowback.

While the magnitude of Turkey’s recent engagement of jihadist proxies isn’t comparable to Pakistan’s long history of jihadist sponsorship, the late Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s ill-fated relationship with the Sunni extremists of Pakistan’s Deobandi movement is still instructive for Turkey. Pakistan’s Deobandis dedicated themselves to implementing “the system of the Caliphate of the Rightly Guided,” a Sunni sectarian state to serve as a South Asian stepping stone to a worldwide Islamic caliphate.

Pakistan’s experience with blowback began prior to Ms. Bhutto’s tenure, when General Zia ul-Haq’s regime backed mujahedeen militias as proxies to combat Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Organized by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence directorate with assistance from the United States and Saudi Arabia, the recruitment networks within Pakistan started a radicalization process among segments of Pakistan’s population. The most susceptible group was the more than three million Afghan refugees. (The I.S.I. in particular backed Hekmatyar Gulbuddin’s Hezb-i-Islami, which was part of a rival to movement to the Deobandis.)

Afghan refugee boys began attending Deobandi madrassas, and small numbers of teachers and students began joining militant groups to fight the Soviets. Upon the Soviet withdrawal and the fall of the Afghan Communist government, the mujahedeen turned on one another, prolonging Afghanistan’s civil war, and the presence of millions of Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

In 1994, Ms. Bhutto began to abet militancy to secure Pakistani objectives in Afghanistan. The Bhutto government facilitated a paramilitary force of thousands of madrassa students to cross the border and take control of Afghanistan’s Kandahar Province. With Pakistan’s help, this militia of “Taliban,” literally “students,” conquered large swaths of Afghan territory and declared its commander, Mullah Omar, to be caliph. Like the Taliban before them, the Islamic State has designated its commander, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, as caliph and calls the territories under its control a caliphate.

Their militancy soon crossed the border. After the initial stage of mobilizing volunteers and weapons for jihad in Afghanistan, a second phase developed in which Pakistan witnessed a wave of anti-Shiite violence, including bombings of Karachi’s major Shiite mosques by the Taliban’s sister organization in Pakistan, Sipah-e Sahaba.

The Turkish government’s decision to turn a blind eye to Islamic State activity within its borders has similarly led to the extremists’ increasing influence in certain areas of Turkey’s major cities. The recent and unprecedented arson attacks on Shiite mosques in Istanbul may indicate that Turkey is entering this second phase. Turkey is home to only a small Shiite community; but Turkey’s Alevis, a heterodox Muslim sect often regarded as heretical by Sunnis, constitute about 20 percent of Turkey’s population.

A campaign by Sunni extremists against the Alevi community could lead Turkey into a Pakistan-like vortex of sectarian violence and radicalization. The present government’s own politics of polarization, illustrated by Mr. Erdogan’s baiting of the opposition leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu due to his Alevi background during Turkey’s recent presidential election campaign, may further inflame sectarian tensions. And Islamic State militants will not hesitate to exploit the Sunni-Alevi fault line in Turkish society.

Pakistan’s final and most dangerous stage of extremism occurred when the flow of militants and resources was reversed. As the Taliban conquered most of Afghanistan, it provided training camps and other logistical support to its allies, making it harder for Pakistan to control militant organizations inside its borders. After 9/11, Gen. Pervez Musharraf attempted to crack down on militants inside Pakistan. His efforts culminated in the 2007 Red Mosque battle in Islamabad and the subsequent coalescing of militants into the movement known as the Pakistani Taliban.

Turkey has not experienced this stage yet. But the Islamic State may find fertile recruiting ground among Turkey’s 1.3 million Syrian refugees. And Turkish citizens may be drawn into the orbit of militancy just as segments of Pakistan’s population have been. If the Islamic State’s Turkish networks remain intact, Turkey runs the risk that homegrown militants will be empowered by the return of fighters from Islamic State territory in Syria and Iraq.

Ms. Bhutto’s strategy of employing militant proxies to create a client state in Afghanistan succeeded — but at a high price for Pakistan. That is a warning for Turkey, which must recognize that it cannot shield itself from Sunni militancy while pursuing a Sunni sectarian foreign policy in the Middle East.
Pakistan’s Lessons for Turkey
by MICHAEL M. TANCHUM and HALIL M. KARAVELI, mobile.nytimes.com

The social contract debate in Muslim Countries

CAN the prevalent political unrest and discontent in Muslim societies be regarded as a desire for change? In other words, are Muslim societies in search of new social contracts?

The militant struggle is all about a complete repla­cement of existing social contracts with an Islamic code of life. Both non-violent radicals and traditional religio-political forces are pursuing varying agendas ranging from Islamisation of their respective societies to reformation of and adjustments in constitutions in line with their perceived Islamic ideals.

Interestingly, these Islamist forces are not satisfied with the systems of democracy, controlled democracy or monarchies in their respective countries. Does the problem really lie with Muslim societies’ social contracts with their states, or is it the outcome of other pressures Muslim societies are subjected to?

Various religious agendas are competing with the state’s social contract with its people.
While identifying the underlying unrest in underdeveloped or developing societies, academicians usually factor in pressures of rapid globalisation and a sense of increasing aspirations among people. It may be true in case of diaspora communities. Others underscore structural social, religious and political narratives and behaviours of these societies, which they believe are not compatible with the pace of changes taking place in the world. No doubt global changes affect our daily lives, positively or negatively.

The emergence of a new middle class is another aspect of the debate. Middle classes want political empowerment in their respective societies. Governance issues and increasing non-functionality of traditional delivery systems in Muslim countries is another factor. These and other factors of growing resentment among Muslim societies with their respective states and constitutions have combined with a dearth of scholarship.

Another important question is, should these factors — structural, internal or global — raise the need for subversion of existing social contracts or constitutions?

A social contract ensures harmonious socio-economic and political balance in a society and provides a framework for the formation of a government and laws and their enforcement. The Arab Spring has not been successful in many countries in terms of the formation of new social contracts.

Failure to develop consensus among all segments of society on a new social contract has pushed Egypt again into an authoritarian regime. Tunisia provides an important example of drafting a new social contract, where unlike the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Islamist Ennahda Movement did not insist on enshrining Sharia in the constitution and forged an alliance with secular parties.

Yemen is experiencing a different challenge in the formation of a new social contract, which is giving rise to questions of tribal and geographical representations in the constitution. Indonesia and Pakistan are among the Muslim nations where the constitutional reform process is intact and keeps ethnic communities together and tied to the state.

Even Muslim clergy in these countries is in favour of a continuity of the incumbent constitutional and democratic processes. A recent moot of leading religious scholars in Islamabad noted that Pakistan’s Constitution is a national-level social contract and in the light of Islamic teachings every Pakistani is bound to abide by it. Scholars also asserted that national-level disputes and conflicts, which are shared by all and not linked to particular religious sects or communities, should be settled on the basis of majority opinion. A minority cannot be granted the right to impose its opinion on the majority.

Although religious scholars do not regard democracy as a complete, ideal form of government, most of them believe it can be useful and effective for ensuring peaceful coexistence and pluralism in society. Interestingly, some religious scholars argue that even if rulers impose excessive taxes and force people to pay without legal justification for this, it is better for people to defend themselves by adopting peaceful ways than by revolting against the state.

The militants have different opinions and want to impose their version of the Islamic state through the use of force. The Constitution provides shields against militant, religious, anarchist, ultra-nationalist or ethnic ambitions that might seek to create imbalances in society.

The problem arises when political forces start believing in the extra-constitutional solution of issues, which ultimately encourages militants and ambitious radicals and strengthens anti-constitutional and anti-democratic narratives. Especially in the context of countries such as Pakistan, which has a long history of military interventions and domination of political institutions by the military, such narratives provide support to the militants.

The extra-constitutional power struggle within elites and powerful institutions creates confusion about the basic concept of a social contract. The extremists are the beneficiaries of such confusion and they use it for expanding their support bases across the country.

A review of the militants’ arguments reveals that they advocate an alternative system on the basis of loopholes in existing power structures. Asmatullah Muawiya, leader of a major Punjabi Taliban faction who recently renounced terrorism, had joined Al Qaeda and the Taliban on similar grounds. Muawiya had written letters to the media before the 2013 general elections and raised questions about the democratic system, which, he felt, was not providing relief to the common man. One of the reasons behind his renunciation of violence in Pakistan, is the ongoing debate among religious scholars on issues like violent struggles, the Constitution, democracy and Islam, which has created an intellectual challenge for the militants.

Usually, when political actors fail to gain their share in power, they directly attack the Constitution and suggest extra-constitutional measures to fix problems, which fundamentally are not linked with the Constitution. At the same time, powerful institutions, which is the military in Pakistan though the judiciary has tried to assert itself of late, sabotage the social contract. This subversion turns the power balance in their favour but in the longer run causes structural problems. This discourse in many Muslim countries is a primary factor behind their decline.

Muslim countries, especially Pakistan, cannot afford the subversion of their respective constitutions as the social imbalances and rise of violent and non-violent radicalism can completely transform the situation, which the radicals have shown they can achieve without paying a high price.
By Muhammad Amir Rana, dawn.com
The writer is a security analyst.
Published in Dawn, October 5th, 2014

Only One Thing Will Make Israel Change Course by Noam Chomsky

Hi
On August 26, Israel and the Palestinian Authority both accepted a cease-fire agreement after a 50-day Israeli assault on Gaza that left 2,100 Palestinians dead and vast landscapes of destruction behind.

The agreement calls for an end to military action by Israel and Hamas as well as an easing of the Israeli siege that has strangled Gaza for many years.

This is, however, just the most recent of a series of cease-fire agreements reached after each of Israel's periodic escalations of its unremitting assault on Gaza.

Since November 2005 the terms of these agreements have remained essentially the same. The regular pattern is for Israel to disregard whatever agreement is in place, while Hamas observes it—as Israel has conceded—until a sharp increase in Israeli violence elicits a Hamas response, followed by even fiercer brutality.

These escalations are called “mowing the lawn” in Israeli parlance. The most recent was more accurately described as “removing the topsoil” by a senior U.S. military officer, quoted in Al Jazeera America.

The first of this series was the Agreement on Movement and Access between Israel and the Palestinian Authority in November 2005.

It called for a crossing between Gaza and Egypt at Rafah for the export of goods and the transit of people; crossings between Israel and Gaza for goods and people; the reduction of obstacles to movement within the West Bank; bus and truck convoys between the West Bank and Gaza; the building of a seaport in Gaza; and the reopening of the airport in Gaza that Israeli bombing had demolished.

That agreement was reached shortly after Israel withdrew its settlers and military forces from Gaza. The motive for the disengagement was explained by Dov Weisglass, a confidant of then-Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, who was in charge of negotiating and implementing it.

“The significance of the disengagement plan is the freezing of the peace process,” Weisglass told Haaretz. “And when you freeze that process, you prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state, and you prevent a discussion on the refugees, the borders and Jerusalem. Effectively, this whole package called the Palestinian state, with all that it entails, has been removed indefinitely from our agenda. And all this with authority and permission. All with a [U.S.] presidential blessing and the ratification of both houses of Congress.”

“The disengagement is actually formaldehyde,” Weisglass added. “It supplies the amount of formaldehyde that is necessary so there will not be a political process with the Palestinians.”

This pattern has continued to the present: through Operation Cast Lead in 2008-2009 to Pillar of Defense in 2012 to this summer's Protective Edge, the most extreme exercise in mowing the lawn—so far.

For more than 20 years, Israel has been committed to separating Gaza from the West Bank in violation of the Oslo Accords it signed in 1993, which declare Gaza and the West Bank to be an inseparable territorial unity.

A look at a map explains the rationale. Separated from Gaza, any West Bank enclaves left to Palestinians have no access to the outside world. They are contained by two hostile powers, Israel and Jordan, both close U.S. allies—and contrary to illusions, the U.S. is very far from a neutral “honest broker.”

Furthermore, Israel has been systematically taking over the Jordan Valley, driving out Palestinians, establishing settlements, sinking wells and otherwise ensuring that the region—about one-third of the West Bank, with much of its arable land—will ultimately be integrated into Israel along with the other regions being taken over.

The remaining Palestinian cantons will be completely imprisoned. Unification with Gaza would interfere with these plans, which trace back to the early days of the occupation and have had steady support from the major Israeli political blocs.

Israel might feel that its takeover of Palestinian territory in the West Bank has proceeded so far that there is little to fear from some limited form of autonomy for the enclaves that remain to Palestinians.

There is also some truth to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's observation: “Many elements in the region understand today that, in the struggle in which they are threatened, Israel is not an enemy but a partner.” Presumably he was alluding to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Emirates.

Israel's leading diplomatic correspondent Akiva Eldar adds, however, that “all those 'many elements in the region' also understand that there is no brave and comprehensive diplomatic move on the horizon without an agreement on the establishment of a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders and a just, agreed-upon solution to the refugee problem.”

That is not on Israel's agenda, he points out, and is in fact in direct conflict with the 1999 electoral program of the governing Likud coalition, never rescinded, which “flatly rejects the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state west of the Jordan River.”

Some knowledgeable Israeli commentators, notably columnist Danny Rubinstein, believe that Israel is poised to reverse course and relax its stranglehold on Gaza.

We'll see.

The record of these past years suggests otherwise and the first signs are not auspicious. As Operation Protective Edge ended, Israel announced its largest appropriation of West Bank land in 30 years, almost 1,000 acres.

It is commonly claimed on all sides that, if the two-state settlement is dead as a result of Israel's takeover of Palestinian lands, then the outcome will be one state west of the Jordan.

Some Palestinians welcome this outcome, anticipating that they can then engage in a fight for equal rights modeled on the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa. Many Israeli commentators warn that the resulting “demographic problem” of more Arab than Jewish births and diminishing Jewish immigration will undermine their hope for a “democratic Jewish state.”

But these widespread beliefs are dubious.

The realistic alternative to a two-state settlement is that Israel will continue to carry forward the plans it has been implementing for years: taking over whatever is of value to it in the West Bank, while avoiding Palestinian population concentrations and removing Palestinians from the areas that it is absorbing. That should avoid the dreaded “demographic problem.”

The areas being taken over include a vastly expanded Greater Jerusalem, the area within the illegal separation wall, corridors cutting through the regions to the east and probably the Jordan Valley.

Gaza will likely remain under its usual harsh siege, separated from the West Bank. And the Syrian Golan Heights—like Jerusalem, annexed in violation of Security Council orders—will quietly become part of Greater Israel. In the meantime, West Bank Palestinians will be contained in unviable cantons, with special accommodation for elites in standard neocolonial style.

For a century, the Zionist colonization of Palestine has proceeded primarily on the pragmatic principle of the quiet establishment of facts on the ground, which the world was to ultimately come to accept. It has been a highly successful policy. There is every reason to expect it to persist as long as the United States provides the necessary military, economic, diplomatic and ideological support.

For those concerned with the rights of the brutalized Palestinians, there can be no higher priority than working to change U.S. policies, not an idle dream by any means.

Noam Chomsky: Only One Thing Will Make Israel Change Course
by Noam Chomsky, inthesetimes.com

Kissinger's lessons for today's policymakers

Kissinger is not wicked, but a realist par excellence, writes Oskanian
As US President Barack Obama was outlining his strategy to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), I was finishing reading Henry Kissinger's new book "World Order".

It's a Kissinger book. It's insightful and to the point. He takes a grand view of how we got here. He is dispassionate about understanding and explaining the foreign policy decisions that have been taken and that continue to miss the mark of the all-important equilibrium among great powers. This has been the focus of his writings and speeches for four decades, beginning with his first book, "A World Restored", describing such efforts in the 19th century.

The bear knows seven songs and they are all about honey - I don't know if that's an Armenian saying or a Russian one, but it's true for Kissinger as well. All of his songs are about understanding Europe's path to a balance of power and the ways to apply the lessons of those experiences to contemporary conflicts. It is remarkable how consistent he has remained over the decades.

Kissinger's fascination with this period lies in his hope to find insights on the exercise of power by statesmen such as Castlereagh and Metternich for the development of an international structure that contributed to peace in the century between the Congress of Vienna and the outbreak of World War I.

Fundamental problem

"The most fundamental problem of politics," wrote Kissinger, "is not the control of wickedness but the limitation of righteousness".

This is how Kissinger summed up the essence of the "idealism versus realism" debate in his earliest work - his dissertation.

Obama is an idealist, a righteous man. Kissinger is not wicked, but a realist par excellence. His early academic convictions and on-the-job experience as national security adviser to President Richard Nixon and later secretary of state under Presidents Nixon and Gerald Ford, makes him the quintessential realist and the exemplary practitioner of balance of power plays in our time.

At the infancy of the Syrian conflict three years ago, when Obama rushed to declare that Bashar al-Assad must go, Kissinger was quick to call the pronouncement premature and a mistake for not knowing who will fill the vacuum created by Assad's departure.

At 91, his "World Order" may be his last appeal for pragmatism and realism in the face of an increasingly interdependent world with a disintegrating world order.

Today, that realism is more than necessary in the Middle East where the nation-state system is shattered by those who, under the guise of religion, wish to take and wield power in ways that are incongruous with a 21st century world. This dangerous chaos is at least partly the outcome of strategically uncertain, albeit morally laudable, US policy in the larger Middle East.

Kissinger looks at the world, in whole or in parts, from the perspective of a desirable balance of power and the US role in securing it. This policy tool provides the anchor for his realism and allows him to see world events not purely from the point of view of ideology, but rather from a more pragmatic, result-driven perspective.

When in 1973 it became clear that the Vietnam War is not winnable, Kissinger looked for a graceful way out. He forged a detente with the Soviet Union and an opening to China, and then played off both to create a triangular balance of power that preserved US influence after its retreat from Vietnam.

More recently, when the US Senate ratified NATO's expansion to Eastern Europe in May 1998, Kissinger knowingly wrote: "Russia is bound to have a special concern for security around its vast periphery and the West needs to be careful not to extend its integrated military system too close to Russia's borders."

And at the infancy of the Syrian conflict three years ago, when Obama rushed to declare that Bashar al-Assad must go, Kissinger was quick to call the pronouncement premature and a mistake for not knowing who will fill the vacuum created by Assad's departure.

Obama lacks this mastery. Obama's equivalent move to Kissinger's Vietnam balance of power play could be the triangulation between Shia Iran, the Sunni-dominant Gulf region and, Syria and Iraq. This requires a transcending of previously drawn lines and an ability to artfully skew the line between ideology and values.

Broad reconciliation

First, a broader region-wide process of Sunni-Shia reconciliation must begin and it must involve Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. For the common good, this requires understanding and compromise from all involved on issues from territorial disputes, nuclear proliferation and support to different group on both sides of the Sunni-Shia divide.

Second, the West and Iran must redouble their efforts to overcome the last hurdles to reach a sustainable deal on Iran's nuclear issue. Iran has consistently said that it wants to develop uranium enrichment technology for industrial use. Everyone agrees that Iran has the right to do so. The Iranians have also said that they will continue to honour their commitments and open their doors to observation as members of the non-proliferation community. The West must be more respectful of Iran's current industrial aims if it wants Iranian cooperation. That cooperation is critical not just to eliminate ISIL's threat, but for crucial longer term peace and stability in the region.

Third, just as an inclusive government in Baghdad is necessary so is a stable government in Damascus. The United States must recognise that its half-hearted support of the moderate opposition has been a failure and has made things worse for everyone, except ISIL. To train and arm the illusive Syrian moderate opposition to fight ISIL in Syria is too little and is a recipe for prolonging the Syrian civil war by continuing to breed extremist groups. The Syrian conflict and its possible resolution need to be framed differently and need to transcend Assad's person.

An opening to China, too, seemed unreal. But it happened and it worked. It was not a policy driven by morals, yet did no evil, was pragmatic and despite the earlier policy errors, brought stability to an unstable part of the world.

Kissinger's lessons for today's policymakers
by Vartan Oskanian, aljazeera.com
Vartan Oskanian is a member of Armenia's National Assembly, a former foreign minister and the founder of Yerevan's Civilitas Foundation.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.

Confronting the IS — preventing more Frankensteins

The forces of revenge, phobia and senseless bloodletting unleashed by the preposterous invasion of Iraq in 2003 continue to ravage the region and its people. An equilibrium, howsoever unjust, once knocked out, produces a whirlpool of cycles of violence that are not amenable to any quick resolution. This is especially true in a situation where the rationale for military intervention was a fabricated lie — a deception. The alleged existence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was the sole basis for launching the attack on a sovereign country and that too without any UN authorisation. Paradoxically, both George W Bush and Tony Blair, having said lies about the alleged existence of weapons of mass destruction in the ‘deadly’ arsenal of Saddam, not only survived but were re-elected by supposedly the most ‘enlightened’ electorates of the world.
The US occupation of Iraq although camouflaged under the perceived existence of WMDs was intended to destroy the biggest military machine in the Middle East — one that could pose a danger to the state of Israel. The destruction of the country’s infrastructure was also accompanied by an irretrievable shift in its political and sectarian landscape.
This void, left behind by the removal of a regime, the systems which held the country together, was filled by the emergence of groups, mafias that were on rampage — plundering, attacking and looting with no fear of retribution. The regime of Nouri al Maliki began to advance a ‘sectarian’ agenda. This is the worst thing that could happen to a country already under foreign occupation. Polarisation followed and soon there was a collapse of order on a gigantic scale. A many-dimensional conflict ensued that would not only sap the vitality and strength of a country and its populace but also generate a whole series of ethnic and sectarian battles plunging the country and the region into a war with no goals and no strategies.
A somewhat similar catastrophe was being enacted in Syria. The Western countries, principally the US, had this paranoid mindset that the toppling of the Assad regime would help resolve most of the regional security issues besides, of course, making Israel safe from the assaults of Hezbollah, whose patrons and financiers are Iran and Syria. It was not realised that the very forces that were sponsoring would sow the seeds of discord and spread mayhem and anarchy that could pose a potential threat to their ‘vital’ interests in the region.
The IS phenomenon was almost a natural consequence of the vacuum, the atrocities of the factional militias inflicted upon one another under the watch of the diabolical Nouri al Maliki regime, the destruction of villages, towns, the displacement of millions from their ancestral homes. In the milieu in which the IS (formerly ISIS) was born, there was no room for concepts like tolerance, accommodation and understanding. The group soon challenged and swept away the vestiges of a broken order in parts of Syria and Iraq.
The group comprised frustrated and deeply-troubled Sunni extremists who were on the margins of a socio-economic and sectarian order that did not hold any promise for the majority of the people in the region. They soon began to espouse a philosophy of hatred based on the exclusion of those who did not share their ideals and goals. As they embarked upon a policy of challenging and confronting the state authority in both Syria and Iraq, they found whole bands of new adherents to their purported cause of ‘restoring the ethnic and sectarian balance that has been shattered by the upheavals of the last 11 years’. Muslims from different parts of the world began to flock to the region to enlist in what they thought a noble cause. They thought justice would soon prevail and the injustice would end.
The IS took control of banks, industries, oil wells and refineries, weapons, transport and military hardware, etc. That made them independent as far as resources are concerned. It declared one of its leaders ‘Amirul Momineen’ — the commander of the faithful. This was done to convey the message that a new Islamic State is born which would demand allegiance from all Muslims. Owing to the rallying cry of faith, many began to support this movement.
But soon there were many disappointments. The beheading of opponents and journalists caused a stir in the ranks of the movement for Islam does not permit such killings. Then the Kurds were targeted and there were huge displacements of people. This further alienated many well wishers of the movement. The destruction of property was without any valid reason. But more importantly, the supporters began to worry about the ultimate goal and objective of the movement. Because how could a movement that kills journalists, female professionals and causes the expulsion of innocent Muslims from their homes, claim to be heading towards the establishment of an egalitarian, welfare Islamic state? People soon began to break ranks with the movement.
The IS first generated hope, then disappointment. The Sunni Arab monarchies saw a threat to their fiefdoms. They rallied to oppose and confront the IS. They poured resources, mobilised their militaries, sought alliances in a bid to defeat the movement. That was understandable and natural. But people in distant lands were ‘alarmed’ — the United States began to see ‘mortal dangers’ from IS volunteers and decided to intervene to ‘save’ America from it.
The US and French bombing missions are obliterating whatever little is left of the infrastructure of the region. True, the bombs inflict damage on the movement’s arsenal and its treasure. That is one facet of the ‘second invasion’. But a deeper malaise is being caused yet again to the already tumbling political order. More zealots, more frustrated youth, more victims of the holocaust, would begin to emerge from the ashes of a collapsing IS, causing more violence, more instability and more chaos.
The regional countries which have a stake in the situation could have promoted a more harmonious response to the challenge the IS poses. With the West intervening in the crisis, suspicions are bound to be raised in Iran — a key ally of Bashar al-Assad. The West certainly does not want to give respite to the Syrian regime and yet that regime is also fighting the IS. Iran is supporting the Shia majority regime in Iraq which is also fighting the IS. The Sunni Arab monarchies are fighting against both IS as well as the Assad regime. Such a complex conflict would inevitably cause a stupendous and destructive reaction that will be immeasurably difficult to handle or contain .
The Middle East is in the grip of another fatal cycle of violence. The region and its people would bear the scars for generations. The only beneficiaries are Israel and the factories producing weapons in the West.
Published in The Express Tribune, September 29th, 2014.
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911 Tradegy

As Pakistan’s ambassador to the United Nations, I happened to be in New York on that fateful day 13 years ago. I remember witnessing the ghastly disappearance of the Twin Towers from Manhattan’s skyline that was to change not only the world history, but also the global geopolitical landscape. We were in the middle of a prayer breakfast meeting at the UN Headquarters hosted by UN Secretary General Kofi Anan for the heads of diplomatic corps in New York as well as all UN agencies when all of a sudden the news of a plane crashing into the World Trade Center reached us. We were asked to evacuate calmly.

As we were going down, we saw on television monitors in the lower lobby another plane crashing into the second tower, putting it ablaze in an instant. It then became clear that it was not an ordinary plane crash. It was an act of a cold-blooded atrocity. No one knew what had happened, and why. All that one could see was an inferno of fire and smoke. “Bloody Tuesday,” “Act of war,” “Carnage,” “Catastrophe,” “Heinous Crime,” and “Unprecedented Tragedy in American history” were some of the headlines used the next day in the American print media to describe the terrorist attacks against the United States.

The ‘belligerent’ mood of the administration was evident in its first call to the world. “You’re either with us or against us,” was the message, loud and clear. Foreign nations were given an immediate ‘black-and-white’ choice in their relationship with the United States. No doubt, the sudden disappearance of the Twin Towers from Manhattan’s skyline was to change the global geopolitical landscape altogether. The world’s sole superpower was overwhelmed by anger and lost no time in determining the nature and scale of its response. At the diplomatic front, the US was quick to mobilise international support for building an ‘international coalition’ to combat terrorism. 

Besides enlisting Nato’s participation in this campaign, it got strong resolutions adopted overwhelmingly the very next day, i.e., September 12, in the UN Security Council and the General Assembly thereby paving the ground for the legitimisation of US military action against terrorists and their hideouts. Two weeks later, Washington was able to have a more specific and action-oriented resolution (UNSC 1373 of Sept 28, 2001) adopted in the UN Security Council on specific global measures to suppress terrorism through a UN Counterterrorism Committee. Since then, the world never recovered from the aftermath of the 9/11 tragedy. 

For Pakistan, the 9/11 was a moment of reckoning. On that fateful day, it faced the worst dilemma of its life. Its options were limited and bleak. General Musharraf was among the very first foreign leaders to have received a clarion call from Washington. The US Secretary of State, Colin Powell, telephoned him late in the evening on September 12, asking for Pakistan’s full support and cooperation in fighting terrorism. In a sombre message “from one general to another,” Colin Powell made it clear that mere condolences and boilerplate offers of help from Pakistan will not do. It had to play a key role in the war on terror that was about to begin.   

Facing domestic problems and regional challenges, General Musharraf took no time in pledging even more than the requested support and cooperation. On September 13, the US Secretary of State said that the United States was now prepared to go after terrorist networks and “those who have harboured, supported and aided that network,” wherever they were found. The same day, President George W Bush expressed appreciation for Pakistan’s readiness to cooperate and spoke of the chance that it now had to participate in “hunting down the people who committed the acts of terrorism.” The rest that followed is history. One doesn’t have to go into its details.

Thirteen years down the line, the Afghan war has yet to come to a formal closure. The world itself has yet to breathe peace. Throughout this period, the world media has had the challenging task of helping people understand the events, and in the ensuing war on terror played an important role to help provide wider perspectives of the aftermath of those attacks. The consensus has been that from being a ‘righteous war’ when it started, the US war on terror is no longer righteous as it still lingers on. Even the American media in due course of time felt that the Bush-Cheney decision to wage war was a big mistake. 

The Washington Post once said: “In the name of the war on terror, we have invaded and occupied a country that had nothing to do with the attacks of 9/11, we have emboldened our enemies, we have lost and taken many lives, we have spent trillions of dollars, we have sacrificed civil liberties, and we have jettisoned our commitment to human dignity.” 

But was it an honest mistake? Did President Bush and Vice-President Cheney declare war because they genuinely believed it was the best way to guarantee the safety of the American people? Or did they do it in a premeditated attempt to seize greater political and economic power globally? 

These are questions that history alone will answer. For now, at least one thing is clear. The US invaded Afghanistan on the pretext of 9/11 by waging an unrelated ‘war on terror’ which is now seen as a “semantic, strategic and legal perversion”. It forced the Taliban out of power but never defeated them. Ironically, looking back in retrospect, one is intrigued by the thought, however unbelievable it may be, that the emergence of the Taliban in mid-1990s and the post-9/11 Afghan stalemate might both be linked to the same ‘great game’ in this region which is known for its huge hidden oil and gas reserves. The real stakes in this war can be summed up just in one word: Oil. 

As secretary general of the 10-member regional cooperation organisation called the Economic Cooperation Organisation which encompasses besides Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, six former Soviet republics of Central Asia and Afghanistan, I am familiar with blueprints of plans conceptualised during my period in early 1990s for an elaborate network of oil and gas pipelines within the region and beyond. Those regional plans remain unimplemented because of the ensuing war-led turmoil in Afghanistan. It is clear now that the Afghan war was never an end in itself. It was only part of a Central Asia-focused ‘Great Game’ that will perhaps go on with far-reaching implications for this vast region as a global hotspot. 

Published in The Express Tribune, September 13^th, 2014. 

Fighting the Islamic State

by Munir Akram, dawn.com
September 14 05:54 AM

The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.

PRESIDENT Obama announced a “strategy” to “degrade and destroy” the Islamic State (formerly, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham) on Sept 10. The announcement came scarcely two weeks after Obama had explained US reluctance to escalate military action against IS by admitting he did not have a strategy to deal with this challenge. He was roundly criticised by US politicians and pundits for his honest admission.

The announced strategy comprises four components: first, systematic air strikes against IS in Iraq , in coordination with Iraqi and Kurdish forces, and in Syria if IS there threatens Americans; second, increased support (training, intelligence, equipment) to those fighting “these terrorists”; third, improving counterterrorism capabilities: intelligence, counter-narrative, preventing the flow of Western jihadis and mobilising the international community; and four, continuing humanitarian assistance to civilians and threatened religious groups.

In fact, the announced ‘strategy’ looks very similar to what the US has been doing already for the past several weeks against IS. The two new elements are: the apparent US willingness to attack IS in Syria and the aim of building a broad coalition against it, including the major Arab states and Turkey.

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It is not wholly evident why IS has emerged as America’s top military target.

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It is not wholly evident why IS has emerged as America’s top military target. The head of US Homeland Security confirmed, before Obama’s speech, that there is “no direct threat from ISIS” to the US. There is no evidence of ISIS plans to attack the US or even the desire to do so. It poses a regional threat and may attack US targets there. The presence of ‘foreign fighters’ (3,000 from Europe and 100 from the US) is a possible future threat when they return home. The official said that the major threat to the US homeland still emanates from Al Qaeda and its affiliates.

Thus, superficially, Obama’s new anti-IS priority seems to have been driven purely by domestic considerations: on one hand, the growing criticism of his responses to foreign policy challenges, including IS successes, and, on the other, the higher US public support for action against the group after its brutal beheading of two American journalists.

There is no assurance the Obama “strategy” will be successful, especially without US “boots on the ground”. There may be unintended consequences. Attacking IS may create the very threat it is meant to avoid. It may make Sunni reconciliation within a united Iraq more difficult and enhance Kurdish capabilities to break away from Iraq. Degrading IS would also strengthen the Assad regime in Syria.

Yet, Obama’s ‘strategy’ could become the start of a broader plan to stabilise the region.

The 150-plus US air strikes against IS in Iraq have inevitably brought the US into operational alliance with Iranian military advisers known to be attached with the Iraqi army and Shia militias acting as its auxiliaries. Both the US and Iran have declared that there can be no direct cooperation with the other. Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has indeed asserted that IS is an American creation.

But perhaps they protest too much. Iran’s foreign minister declared some months ago that Iran is prepared to cooperate with other parties to end the sectarian conflicts in the region. It is widely known that the US and Iran have held secret talks for several years which enabled them to reach the interim agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme. They also have had quiet contacts in Baghdad.

In exchange for American and Arab cooperation in degrading IS, which poses a threat to Iran’s allies in both Baghdad and Damascus, and a fair agreement regarding its nuclear programme, Tehran could help to ensure an inclusive government in Iraq, broker a political settlement between Assad and moderate insurgent groups in Syria, dampen the Shia opposition to the Sunni regimes in Bahrain and Yemen, restrain Hezbollah’s threat to Israel and end its support to Hamas.

It is possible that at least some aspects of such a ‘bargain’ have been discussed. Such discussions may have encouraged the Obama administration to launch the strategy against IS.

To be successful, the strategy would also require the support of the major Arab states. Saudi Arabia’s initiative to convene a meeting of 10 Arab states and Turkey in Jeddah is significant. Saudi Arabia and the UAE now consider the Muslim Brotherhood and related extremist groups a threat to their own stability and are determined to suppress them. A US strategy which both degrades IS and other Sunni extremist groups, including the Brotherhood, and secures Iran’s cooperation to contain Shia militias and insurgents across the region, would be doubly attractive. In turn, the contribution of these Arab powers would be essential to wean the Sunni tribes in Iraq away from IS and reach a political settlement in Syria.

As yet, Arab support to Obama’s anti-IS strategy is not universal. Egypt has its hands full with putting down the Brotherhood. Jordan fears the backlash from IS which now operates just across its borders with Iraq and Syria. Turkey is worried about the fate of its 49 diplomats captured by IS and averse to reinforcing Kurdish forces, which include the anti-Turkish PKK. Qatar’s closeness to the Brotherhood and other Sunni extremists has complicated its relationships with the US and its GCC neighbours.

A ‘grand bargain’ involving the US, Iran and Saudi Arabia and their respective allies and proxies would be obviously most difficult to construct and consummate. Proxies and puppets are not always easy to control. There is enormous and accumulated mistrust between the principal parties. And the sheer number and complexity of the local, sub-national and regional issues that need to be addressed is daunting.

Unless a comprehensive strategy is pursued, the fight against IS is likely to prove frustrating. Air strikes with ground support from unreliable local forces; eliminating IS’s financial sources and countering its brutal ideology will not be sufficient to destroy it. The legitimate grievances that attract its recruits will have to be addressed. Ultimately, eliminating extremism in the region will require the rapid generation of jobs and economic development.

stake is the present and future stability of the Middle East — a region in the midst of multiple and violent transitions — and its impact on the world order.

The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.

Published in Dawn, September 14th , 2014

http://www.dawn.com/news/1131800/fighting-the-islamic-state

The New Arabs by Juan Cole

SENIOR University of Michigan academician, Juan Cole, appears to have a twofold agenda in writing this book. On the one hand, he wishes to provide a comprehensive overview of the role and function of young revolutionaries central to the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. On the other, by doing the former, he attempts to give the reader an idea of the collective identity of (what he terms) the young millennial Arabs of the 21st century.

Cole’s tome is a breathtakingly detailed and comprehensive tour de force; lucidly written and extensively documented, over a tenth of the book is devoted to extensive explanatory notes and sources. He thus succeeds in achieving the first aim of his agenda, and while determining whether he creditably defines the millennials is ultimately up to the individual reader to ascertain, there is no doubt about the fact that his aspirations are valid and noble ones.

It should come as no secret to anyone even remotely familiar with the machinations of the Arab Spring that heads of state such as Mubarak of Egypt, Ben Ali of Tunisia, and Gaddafi of Libya, were displaced partly by means involving extensive internet networking by the revolutionaries within their respective countries. Indeed cyberspace (as opposed to ‘meatspace’) provided outlets for the restless energy and legitimate frustration of the millennials. Naturally, Cole consistently creates fundamental links between his perception of revolutionary activities and the widespread use and availability of social media in the Middle East.

The first half of the book delineates precisely what Cole means by the terms “Arab millennials” and “Republican monarchs”. He also painstakingly underscores the manner in which the post-revolution, New-Left parties within these countries struggled to cope with the confusion and fallout that inevitably arise when any regime (no matter how oppressive) is left without a central leader.

The latter half of the text details the revolutions of the three countries within the precincts of separate chapters. The number of courageous individuals listed by Cole is too numerous to dwell on here at length, but special mention may be made of a few that stand out as having been particularly significant. One of these is the Egyptian blogger Wael Abbas, another is the tragic figure of Tunisian Tariq Bouazizi, and last but not least, the Tunisian activist Zouhair Yahyaoui.

Given the immense amount of internet information about the revolutions to which one can have access, and which invariably tends to overwhelm as opposed to instruct, Cole’s book (though dense and difficult) provides a welcome sense of anchorage. This is primarily because it focuses on that which is both genuine and important. Had it not been for the heroic and systematic blogging of Wael Abbas, many Egyptian youth who wished for reform would have found themselves to be politically rudderless in the second decade of this century. Fortunately for Abbas, he was a survivor. Creator of the dissident internet magazine TUNeZINE, his counterpart Zouhair Yahyaoui attempted to co-ordinate and stimulate Tunisians in a similar manner, but his is a sadder case than that of Abbas. Though Yahyaoui achieved some of his aims, the stresses of rigorous imprisonment resulted in his health collapsing fatally when he was still in his thirties.

Bouazizi’s case appears to be the most depressing. Consistently denied the ability to put his education and personal resources to good use, in a last act of desperation he immolated himself, thereby (almost literally) beginning the conflagration that set Ben Ali’s corrupt government ablaze. One of the most vital aspects of Cole’s text is that he never places a hero before the audience, unless that individual has truly earned the dignity of being regarded as one. He is just as measured in documenting their polar opposites — for example, individuals such as the post-Mubarak president, Mohammed Morsi, whose firm personality but conservative and myopic views resulted in the Egyptian economy being affected detrimentally. Even a substantial infusion of funds by Morsi’s main benefactor, Qatar, was unable to salvage either the economy or even, ultimately, his position.

Perhaps the only major criticism of Cole’s work that jumps out at any reader is that it lacks information about some key points, such as international sentiment regarding the new millennials, and portrayals of heroic female figures of the revolutions.

This may have been because Cole’s intensely honed focus necessarily excludes such elements, or at least a detailed discussion of them, resulting in an unevenness that is understandable but can hardly go unnoticed. He feels compelled to offer thumbnail sketches of several family members of the Gaddafi ‘cartel,’ but is oddly silent about points such as Christiane Amanpour’s historic and exclusive interview with Mubarak during the early days of the Egyptian revolution. This is surprising since the author’s respect for Western journalism subtly fuels much of his own documentation.

Equally puzzling is why Cole seems so quick to view these revolutions as similar to the French one of the 18th century; that the writer is an expert on Napoleonic Egypt does not automatically mean that one should dispel a healthy personal sense of scepticism and subscribe to this viewpoint. To do so would result in an undercutting of the imperative need to see each Arab revolution as unique and non-Western.

To be perfectly fair, however, Cole never claims to be writing from a quasi-indigenous, or even empathetic, perspective, although he is both linguistically and geographically well-versed when it comes to his knowledge of the Middle East.

Deeply sobering though the book is, perhaps it would not be inappropriate to end with a fantastical but apt quote from the science-fiction novel, Star Wars: A New Hope, where Princess Leia notes: “They were in the wrong place at the wrong time. Naturally, they became heroes.” The saying fully applies to key millennial figures of the Arab Spring.

The reviewer is Assistant Professor of Social Sciences and Liberal Arts at the Institute of Business Administration.

The New Arabs: How the Millennial Generation is Changing the Middle East

(POLITICS)

By Juan Cole   Simon and Schuster, US  ISBN 978-1451690392   348pp.
The New Arabs by Juan Cole
by Nadya Chishty-Mujahid, dawn.com

A new challenge to Muslim world

The challenge to the Muslim world’s stability presented by the Islamic State, earlier known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), has become quite serious over the past few days.

Baghdadi’s organisation comprising the breakaway extremist faction of Al Qaeda has made significant gains in Iraq. Following its capture of minor oil fields and demolition of quite a few heritage monuments it has seized control of the large dam on the Tigris and the international media is now warning of the possibility of a catastrophic flood.

These fears may appear exaggerated but the conflict in Syria continues, an incident has been reported on the border of Lebanon and according to an agency report, Saudi Arabia is strengthening its defences along the border with Iraq. The Arab fratricide is obviously taking a heavier toll than expected earlier.

The people of Pakistan should be concerned that the slogan of caliphate has spread to India. NewAgeIslam, a well-known online forum for debate on Muslim affairs, has disclosed a charter of demands presented by a leading Muslim scholar, Maulana Salman Husain Nadvi, urging Saudi Arabia to establish a caliphate.

The people of Pakistan should be concerned that the slogan of caliphate has spread to India
Maulana Nadvi is reported to have pleaded for a world Islamic army and argued against branding the religious militants as terrorists. Instead, these “sincere Muslim youth fighting for a noble cause” should be united in a confederation of jihadi organisations for worldwide action under the guidance of the ulema.

Maulana Nadvi is quoted as saying: “As for the issue of Qadianis, particularly Safavids [meaning Iran?] and those who abuse the sahaba [meaning Shias], we should not be afraid of them and we do not need to go to the US or Israel to ward off threats from them. Just recruit the Ahle-Sunnah youth from the Indian subcontinent [does that include Pakistan?] and form a powerful Muslim army of the Islamic world. After that there will be no need of the so-called army of the sick youth of the Gulf states.

If you are sincere towards the true faith, true path, Sunnah and for the protection of the true path of Islam, then simply make an appeal, a call. Five lakh youth from the Indian subcontinent will be provided.”

Maulana Nadvi is also quoted as saying: “Military training among the Muslim youth should be stressed. Every effort should be made to save them from freedom and social evils.”

Pakistani religious circles should not be unfamiliar with Maulana Nadvi. His grandfather, Syed Suleman Nadvi, a close associate of Shibli Naumani, was at one stage adviser to the Pakistan government. It is not easy to believe that Maulana Nadvi is unaware of the contradiction between his call for an all-powerful khalifa and the Quranic dictum that Muslims decide their matters through mutual consultation, or that he does not realise the consequences of his posturing for the Muslim world, the Indian Muslims in particular.

The logic of Maulana Nadvi’s letter, if it has been correctly reported, leads to the politics of religious exclusivism that has already caused the Muslims of the subcontinent colossal harm. Regardless of their reading of the Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) rise to power the best course for the Muslims of India, as indeed for Muslims anywhere else, is to adopt non-theocratic, inclusive political ideals.

Apart from the fear that Maulana Nadvi’s policy will exacerbate Shia-Sunni differences in India and elsewhere, the Indian Muslims’ relapse into communal politics, and revival of their suicidal tendency to look for succour beyond the national frontiers, will strengthen the rabid communalists in India’s majority community, especially among the BJP and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh hawks, and further undermine the state’s secular assumptions. Any such development is bound to strengthen conservative and anti-democratic elements in Pakistan.

The need to repel the arguments of the new advocates of caliphate cannot be gainsaid. Unfortunately, the question of caliphate, its justification or otherwise, has not been seriously debated in Pakistan. The Muslims living in the Pakistan territories in the 1920s took the Khilafat agitation (1919-1924) perhaps a little more seriously than their co-religionists elsewhere in the subcontinent. They fought for the Turkish caliphate with more passion than reason and cursed the British for not heeding their prayers for saving the caliph though his own community had had enough of him.

The subject was discussed by Allama Iqbal in the last of his 1930 lectures, published under the title The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, and he defended the decision of the Turkish Grand National Assembly that the functions of the caliph could be performed by democratically elected representatives of the people.

Iqbal quoted Ibn Khaldun to argue that there was no unanimity among Islamic authorities on the idea of a universal caliphate; two other views were that caliphate was “merely a matter of expediency” and that there was “no need of such an institution”.

Allama Iqbal described Ibn Khaldun’s argument in favour of changes in the concept of caliphate as the first dim view of international Islam that was taking shape in the 20th century. The lecture was marred by some contradictions Iqbal did not notice but it did offer a memorable warning to Muslim scholars “that a false reverence for past history and its artificial resurrection constitute no remedy for a people’s decay”.

The point that needs to be grasped is that the upholders of liberal Islam, for which the subcontinent’s scholars used to enjoy a clear distinction, in both Pakistan and India, must equip themselves now to meet the challenge to peace, democratic development, gender justice and love of heritage the storm in Iraq and Syria is posing.

For all one knows, Baghdadi may have supporters in Pakistan too. This country is in no position to bear the cost, in lives and material resources, of an intra-religious conflict that is being extracted from the Arab family.
By I.A. Rehman    Dawn.com

Gaza blockade must end by Jimmy Carter and Mary Robinson

‘There is no humane or legal justification for how the Israeli Defence Force is conducting this war, pulverising with bombs, missiles and artillery large parts of Gaza, including thousands of homes, schools and hospitals.’ Photograph: UPI /Landov / Barcroft Media
Israelis and Palestinians are still burying loved ones killed during Gaza’s third war in six years. Since 8 July, more than 1,800 Palestinian and 65 Israeli lives have been sacrificed. Many in the world are heart-broken in the powerless certainty that and despite the latest ceasefire, it seems that more willcould die yet; that more are being killed every hour.This tragedy results from the deliberate obstruction of a promising move towards peace, when a reconciliation agreement among the Palestinian factions was announced in April.

This was a major concession by Hamas, opening Gaza to joint control under a consensus government that did not include any Hamas members. The new government also pledged to adopt the three basic principles demanded by members of the International Quartet (UN, US, Europe, Russia): non-violence, recognition of Israel, and adherence to past agreements. Tragically, Israel rejected this opportunity for peace and has until now succeeded in preventing the new government’s deployment in Gaza.

Two factors are necessary to make the unity effort possible: at least a partial lifting of the seven-year sanctions and blockade that isolate the 1.8 million people in Gaza; and an opportunity for public sector workers on the Hamas payroll to be paid. These requirements for a human standard of life continue to be denied. Instead, Qatar’s offer to provide funds for the payment of employees was blocked by Israel and access to and from Gaza has been further tightened by Egypt and Israel.

There is no humane or legal justification for how the Israeli Defence Force is conducting this war, pulverising with bombs, missiles and artillery large parts of Gaza, including thousands of homes, schools and hospitals, displacing families and killing Palestinian non-combatants. Much of Gaza has lost its access to water and electricity completely. This is a humanitarian catastrophe.

There is never an excuse for deliberate attacks on civilians in conflict. These are war crimes. This is true for both sides. Hamas’s indiscriminate targeting of Israeli civilians is equally unacceptable. However, two Israeli civilians and a foreign worker were killed by Palestinian fire as opposed to an overwhelming majority of civilians among the Palestinians killed more than 400 of whom were children. The legal need for international judicial proceedings should be taken seriously, to investigate and end these violations of international law.

The UN Security Council should vote a resolution recognising the inhumane conditions in Gaza and mandate an end to the siege. The resolution could also acknowledge the need for international monitors who can report on movements to and from Gaza, as well as ceasefire violations. It should then enshrine strict measures to prevent the smuggling of weapons into Gaza. Members of the Elders, a group of independent leaders working together for peace and human rights, hope that these will continue and reach fruition.

At the Palestinians’ request, the Swiss government is considering whether to convene an international conference of the Geneva Conventions’ signatory states. This could pressure Israel and Hamas into observing their duty to protect civilian populations under international law. We sincerely hope all states – especially those in the west, with the greatest power – attend and live up to their obligations to uphold the Fourth Geneva Convention governing the treatment of occupied territory.

Unity Between Fatah and Hamas is stronger than for many years. As Elders, we believe this is one of the most encouraging developments of recent years and welcome it warmly. This presents an opportunity for the Palestinian Authority to reassume control over Gaza – an essential first step towards Israel and Egypt’s lifting of the blockade.

The Palestinian Authority cannot manage that task on its own. It will need the prompt return of the EU Border Assistance Mission to cover not just Rafah but all Gaza crossings. Egypt and Israel would, in turn, cooperate with international monitors backed by a UN Security Council mandate to protect civilian populations.

The initial goal should be the full restoration of free movement of people and goods to and from Gaza through Israel, Egypt and the sea. And the US and EU should recognise that Hamas is not just a military force but also a political one.

It cannot be wished away, nor will it cooperate in its own demise. Only by recognising its legitimacy as a political actor – one that represents a substantial portion of the Palestinian people – can the west begin to provide the right incentives for Hamas to lay down its weapons. Ever since the internationally monitored 2006 elections that brought Hamas to power in Palestine, the west’s approach has manifestly contributed to the opposite result. Ultimately, however, lasting peace depends on the creation of a Palestinian state next to Israel.

Leaders in Israel, Palestine and the world’s major powers should believe that these policy changes are within their reach and would move Israelis and Palestinians closer to a day when the skies over the Holy Land can forever fall silent.
Gaza blockade must end
by Jimmy Carter and Mary Robinson, theguardian.com

• Jimmy Carter is a former US president. Mary Robinson is a former president of Ireland. Both are members of The Elders, a group of independent leaders working together for peace and human rights