A Net Assessment of the Middle East by George Friedman

The term "Middle East" has become enormously elastic. The name originated with the British Foreign Office in the 19th century. The British divided the region into the Near East, the area closest to the United Kingdom and most of North Africa; the Far East, which was east of British India; and the Middle East, which was between British India and the Near East. It was a useful model for organizing the British Foreign Office and important for the region as well, since the British — and to a lesser extent the French — defined not only the names of the region but also the states that emerged in the Near and Far East.

Today, the term Middle East, to the extent that it means anything, refers to the Muslim-dominated countries west of Afghanistan and along the North African shore. With the exception of Turkey and Iran, the region is predominantly Arab and predominantly Muslim. Within this region, the British created political entities that were modeled on European nation-states. The British shaped the Arabian Peninsula, which had been inhabited by tribes forming complex coalitions, into Saudi Arabia, a state based on one of these tribes, the Sauds. The British also created Iraq and crafted Egypt into a united monarchy. Quite independent of the British, Turkey and Iran shaped themselves into secular nation-states.

This defined the two fault lines of the Middle East. The first was between European secularism and Islam. The Cold War, when the Soviets involved themselves deeply in the region, accelerated the formation of this fault line. One part of the region was secular, socialist and built around the military. Another part, particularly focused on the Arabian Peninsula, was Islamist, traditionalist and royalist. The latter was pro-Western in general, and the former — particularly the Arab parts — was pro-Soviet. It was more complex than this, of course, but this distinction gives us a reasonable framework.

The second fault line was between the states that had been created and the underlying reality of the region. The states in Europe generally conformed to the definition of nations in the 20th century. The states created by the Europeans in the Middle East did not. There was something at a lower level and at a higher level. At the lower level were the tribes, clans and ethnic groups that not only made up the invented states but also were divided by the borders. The higher level was broad religious loyalties to Islam and to the major movements of Islam, Shiism and Suniism that laid a transnational claim on loyalty. Add to this the pan-Arab movement initiated by former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who argued that the Arab states should be united into a single Arab nation.

Any understanding of the Middle East must therefore begin with the creation of a new political geography after World War I that was superimposed on very different social and political realities and was an attempt to limit the authority of broader regional and ethnic groups. The solution that many states followed was to embrace secularism or traditionalism and use them as tools to manage both the subnational groupings and the claims of the broader religiosity. One unifying point was Israel, which all opposed. But even here it was more illusion than reality. The secular socialist states, such as Egypt and Syria, actively opposed Israel. The traditional royalist states, which were threatened by the secular socialists, saw an ally in Israel.

Aftershocks From the Soviet Collapse
Following the fall of the Soviet Union and the resulting collapse of support for the secular socialist states, the power of the traditional royalties surged. This was not simply a question of money, although these states did have money. It was also a question of values. The socialist secularist movement lost its backing and its credibility. Movements such as Fatah, based on socialist secularism — and Soviet support — lost power relative to emerging groups that embraced the only ideology left: Islam. There were tremendous cross currents in this process, but one of the things to remember was that many of the socialist secular states that had begun with great promise continued to survive, albeit without the power of a promise of a new world. Rulers like Egypt's Hosni Mubarak, Syria's Bashar al Assad and Iraq's Saddam Hussein remained in place. Where the movement had once held promise even if its leaders were corrupt, after the Soviet Union fell, the movement was simply corrupt.

The collapse of the Soviet Union energized Islam, both because the mujahideen defeated the Soviets in Afghanistan and because the alternative to Islam was left in tatters. Moreover, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait took place in parallel with the last days of the Soviet Union. Both countries are remnants of British diplomacy. The United States, having inherited the British role in the region, intervened to protect another British invention — Saudi Arabia — and to liberate Kuwait from Iraq. From the Western standpoint, this was necessary to stabilize the region. If a regional hegemon emerged and went unchallenged, the consequences could pyramid. Desert Storm appeared to be a simple and logical operation combining the anti-Soviet coalition with Arab countries.

The experience of defeating the Soviets in Afghanistan and the secular regimes' loss of legitimacy opened the door to two processes. In one, the subnational groupings in the region came to see the existing regimes as powerful but illegitimate. In the other, the events in Afghanistan brought the idea of a pan-Islamic resurrection back to the fore. And in the Sunni world, which won the war in Afghanistan, the dynamism of Shiite Iran — which had usurped the position of politico-military spokesman for radical Islam — made the impetus for action clear.

There were three problems. First, the radicals needed to cast pan-Islamism in a historical context. The context was the transnational caliphate, a single political entity that would abolish existing states and align political reality with Islam. The radicals reached back to the Christian Crusades for historical context, and the United States — seen as the major Christian power after its crusade in Kuwait — became the target. Second, the pan-Islamists needed to demonstrate that the United States was both vulnerable and the enemy of Islam. Third, they had to use the subnational groups in various countries to build coalitions to overthrow what were seen as corrupt Muslim regimes, in both the secular and the traditionalist worlds.

The result was al Qaeda and its campaign to force the United States to launch a crusade in the Islamic world. Al Qaeda wanted to do this by carrying out actions that demonstrated American vulnerability and compelled U.S. action. If the United States did not act, it would enhance the image of American weakness; if it did act, it would demonstrate it was a crusader hostile to Islam. U.S. action would, in turn, spark uprisings against corrupt and hypocritical Muslim states, sweep aside European-imposed borders and set the stage for uprisings. The key was to demonstrate the weakness of the regimes and their complicity with the Americans.

This led to 9/11. In the short run, it appeared that the operation had failed. The United States reacted massively to the attacks, but no uprising occurred in the region, no regimes were toppled, and many Muslim regimes collaborated with the Americans. During this time, the Americans were able to wage an aggressive war against al Qaeda and its Taliban allies. In this first phase, the United States succeeded. But in the second phase, the United States, in its desire to reshape Iraq and Afghanistan — and other countries — internally, became caught up in the subnational conflicts. The Americans got involved in creating tactical solutions rather than confronting the strategic problem, which was that waging the war was causing national institutions in the region to collapse.

In destroying al Qaeda, the Americans created a bigger problem in three parts: First, they unleashed the subnational groups. Second, where they fought they created a vacuum that they couldn't fill. Finally, in weakening the governments and empowering the subnational groups, they made a compelling argument for the caliphate as the only institution that could govern the Muslim world effectively and the only basis for resisting the United States and its allies. In other words, where al Qaeda failed to trigger a rising against corrupt governments, the United States managed to destroy or compromise a range of the same governments, opening the door to transnational Islam.

The Arab Spring was mistaken for a liberal democratic rising like 1989 in Eastern Europe. More than anything else, it was a rising by a pan-Islamic movement that largely failed to topple regimes and embroiled one, Syria, in a prolonged civil war. That conflict has a subnational component — various factions divided against each other that give the al Qaeda-derived Islamic State room to maneuver. It also provided a second impetus to the ideal of a caliphate. Not only were the pan-Islamists struggling against the American crusader, but they were fighting Shiite heretics — in service of the Sunni caliphate — as well. The Islamic State put into place the outcome that al Qaeda wanted in 2001, nearly 15 years later and, in addition to Syria and Iraq, with movements capable of sustained combat in other Islamic countries.

A New U.S. Strategy and Its Repercussions
Around this time, the United States was forced to change strategy. The Americans were capable of disrupting al Qaeda and destroying the Iraqi army. But the U.S. ability to occupy and pacify Iraq or Afghanistan was limited. The very factionalism that made it possible to achieve the first two goals made pacification impossible. Working with one group alienated another in an ongoing balancing act that left U.S. forces vulnerable to some faction motivated to wage war because of U.S. support for another. In Syria, where the secular government was confronting a range of secular and religious but not extremist forces, along with an emerging Islamic State, the Americans were unable to meld the factionalized non-Islamic State forces into a strategically effective force. Moreover, the United States could not make its peace with the al Assad government because of its repressive policies, and it was unable to confront the Islamic State with the forces available.

In a way, the center of the Middle East had been hollowed out and turned into a whirlpool of competing forces. Between the Lebanese and Iranian borders, the region had uncovered two things: First, it showed that the subnational forces were the actual reality of the region. Second, in obliterating the Syria-Iraq border, these forces and particularly the Islamic State had created a core element of the caliphate — a transnational power or, more precisely, one that transcended borders.

The American strategy became an infinitely more complex variation of President Ronald Reagan's policy in the 1980s: Allow the warring forces to war. The Islamic State turned the fight into a war on Shiite heresy and on established nation states. The region is surrounded by four major powers: Iran, Saudi Arabia, Israel and Turkey. Each has approached the situation differently. Each of these nations has internal factions, but each state has been able to act in spite of that. Put differently, three of them are non-Arab powers, and the one Arab power, Saudi Arabia, is perhaps the most concerned about internal threats.

For Iran, the danger of the Islamic State is that it would recreate an effective government in Baghdad that could threaten Iran again. Thus, Tehran has maintained support for the Iraqi Shiites and for the al Assad government, while trying to limit al Assad's power.

For Saudi Arabia, which has aligned with Sunni radical forces in the past, the Islamic State represents an existential threat. Its call for a transnational Islamic movement has the potential to resonate with Saudis from the Wahhabi tradition. The Saudis, along with some other Gulf Cooperation Council members and Jordan, are afraid of Islamic State transnationalism but also of Shiite power in Iraq and Syria. Riyadh needs to contain the Islamic State without conceding the ground to the Shiites.

For the Israelis, the situation has been simultaneously outstanding and terrifying. It has been outstanding because it has pitted Israel's enemies against each other. Al Assad's government has in the past supported Hezbollah against Israel. The Islamic State represents a long-term threat to Israel. So long as they fought, Israel's security would be enhanced. The problem is that in the end someone will win in Syria, and that force might be more dangerous than anything before it, particularly if the Islamic State ideology spreads to Palestine. Ultimately, al Assad is less dangerous than the Islamic State, which shows how bad the Israeli choice is in the long run.

It is the Turks — or at least the Turkish government that suffered a setback in the recently concluded parliamentary elections — who are the most difficult to understand. They are hostile to the al Assad government — so much so that they see the Islamic State as less of a threat. There are two ways to explain their view: One is that they expect the Islamic State to be defeated by the United States in the end and that involvement in Syria would stress the Turkish political system. The other is that they might be less averse than others in the region to the Islamic State's winning. While the Turkish government has vigorously denied such charges, rumors of support to at least some factions of the Islamic State have persisted, suspicions in Western capitals linger, and alleged shipments of weaponry to unknown parties in Syria by the Turkish intelligence organization were a dominant theme in Turkey's elections. This is incomprehensible, unless the Turks see the Islamic State as a movement that they can control in the end and that is paving the way for Turkish power in the region — or unless the Turks believe that a direct confrontation would lead to a backlash from the Islamic State in Turkey itself.

The Islamic State's Role in the Region
The Islamic State represents a logical continuation of al Qaeda, which triggered both a sense of Islamic power and shaped the United States into a threat to Islam. The Islamic State created a military and political framework to exploit the situation al Qaeda created. Its military operations have been impressive, ranging from the seizure of Mosul to the taking of Ramadi and Palmyra. Islamic State fighters' flexibility on the battlefield and ability to supply large numbers of forces in combat raises the question of where they got the resources and the training.

However, the bulk of Islamic State fighters are still trapped within their cauldron, surrounded by three hostile powers and an enigma. The hostile powers collaborate, but they also compete. The Israelis and the Saudis are talking. This is not new, but for both sides there is an urgency that wasn't there in the past. The Iranian nuclear program is less important to the Americans than collaboration with Iran against the Islamic State. And the Saudis and other Gulf countries have forged an air capability used in Yemen that might be used elsewhere if needed.

It is likely that the cauldron will hold, so long as the Saudis are able to sustain their internal political stability. But the Islamic State has already spread beyond the cauldron — operating in Libya, for example. Many assume that these forces are Islamic State in name only — franchises, if you will. But the Islamic State does not behave like al Qaeda. It explicitly wants to create a caliphate, and that wish should not be dismissed. At the very least, it is operating with the kind of centralized command and control, on the strategic level, that makes it far more effective than other non-state forces we have seen.

Secularism in the Muslim world appears to be in terminal retreat. The two levels of struggle within that world are, at the top, Sunni versus Shiite, and at the base, complex and interacting factions. The Western world accepted domination of the region from the Ottomans and exercised it for almost a century. Now, the leading Western power lacks the force to pacify the Islamic world. Pacifying a billion people is beyond anyone's capability. The Islamic State has taken al Qaeda's ideology and is attempting to institutionalize it. The surrounding nations have limited options and a limited desire to collaborate. The global power lacks the resources to both defeat the Islamic State and control the insurgency that would follow. Other nations, such as Russia, are alarmed by the Islamic State's spread among their own Muslim populations.

It is interesting to note that the fall of the Soviet Union set in motion the events we are seeing here. It is also interesting to note that the apparent defeat of al Qaeda opened the door for its logical successor, the Islamic State. The question at hand, then, is whether the four regional powers can and want to control the Islamic State. And at the heart of that question is the mystery of what Turkey has in mind, particularly as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's power appears to be declining.

A Net Assessment of the Middle East
by George Friedman, stratfor.com

Imperial borders in Middle East not solution!

Journalist Robert Kaplan briefly broke the (national security) Internet with a Foreign Policy article that seemed to call for a return to imperial governance as an alternative to the “chaos” in the Arab world today. This is not Kaplan’s first attempt at making this case, and now, as then, his writing sparked withering and important rebuttals.

Yet Kaplan’s arguments still find avid readers. Both he and his critics have made deeply problematic arguments — not just about the nature of empire, but also about nationalism, borders, the course of history and the problems of politics and state formation in the modern Middle East. These arguments just don’t hold up against the facts, as plenty of political science research reveals in great detail. The facts matter because, unfortunately, these arguments about imperial history of the Middle East do not exist in a vacuum. They have been co-opted to promote various policy positions toward the region. We will explain below how this argument is flawed and how these falsehoods lead to unfortunate policy positions.

Imperial delusions

Kaplan argues that the current state of the Middle East and North Africa derives from the collapse of three imperial orders: The Ottoman Empire; the world defined by “borders erected by European imperialism in the Levant,” as Kaplan put it; and the erstwhile American role in ostensibly “organizing and stabilizing the region.” He also differentiates between states whose history supposedly stretches to antiquity (Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt) and supposedly artificial states (Algeria, Libya, Iraq, and Syria) without ancient historical predecessors. As these states have declined, he argues, “indigenous regional powers” like Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia have emerged, forming “nodes” around religious and ideological distinctions that could and should serve as poles for the new regional alignments needed to restore order in the Middle East.

Kaplan’s arguments substitute vague, inaccurate recollections of the past with outdated and essentialist ideas about geographical determinism and intra-Muslim conflict. He posits, for instance, that a history of ancient civilization and statehood has given countries like Morocco “sturdy forms of secular identity,” a claim that stands somewhat at odds with the Moroccan king’s title as Amir al-Mu’mineen, or Commander of the Faithful. He also argues that a lack of major Roman settlements in Libya and Algeria (which is just false: there were major settlements in today’s Constantine, Tipasa and elsewhere, and Roman provinces in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica) somehow calls into question whether a “state or central government is even possible” in these places. And yet Algeria’s northern borders have largely been defined for hundreds of years, while Libya’s current dysfunction stems primarily from decades of Mu’ammar Qaddafi’s family and tribal rule, which hollowed out or destroyed state institutions.

Artificial arguments about artificial borders

More troubling, however, are Kaplan’s claims about supposedly artificial borders and the “order” brought by colonial rule. The artificial borders argument is a common myth that sadly continues to pervade policy discussions of the Middle East. Kaplan simply regurgitates the claim that the Sykes-Picot Agreement was arbitrarily drawn, and did not conform to sectarian or national realities on the ground, implying that the “artificial” borders drawn by the agreement have contributed to the sectarian strife we see today.

Complaints about artificial states imply that borders can ever be natural. While nationalist elites may like to portray borders as natural to their kin groups, around the world, states were formed through social processes involving conflict and negotiation to create the borders we see today. That’s true whether those borders have expanded, contracted, or been drawn by outsiders or insiders, but in all cases they are socially constructed and no more artificial than any other borders. To hold up some imperial divisions (like Ottoman borders) as “natural” while calling more recent colonial borders “artificial” greatly confuses the extent to which all borders are drawn through social processes, politics and violence.

Moreover, supra-national entities, like the United Arab Republic in the Middle East and the Mali Federation in West Africa, fell apart under local and national political constraints. This suggests that, counter to Kaplan’s claims, national distinctions matter, even when colonial powers drew the borders of what became postcolonial states. And Marc Lynch and others have recently demonstrated the ways in which national identity remains highly salient in the Middle East. Kaplan’s “artificial” nations can in fact show a high degree of coherence and nationalist sentiment, even in the face of ongoing political, social and economic turmoil.

While the Sykes-Picot agreement is an easy example of an arbitrary European delineation of borders, colonial borders were not always quite so “artificial.” Camille Lefebvre notes in her recent book and in scholarly and public articles that a number of African borders — such as in Niger — emerged from existing political, military and social realities that involved more than just European pens tracing straight lines on maps. Of course, colonial and neocolonial crimes and misdeeds have fed contemporary problems, but so have local political realities. Attributing postcolonial violence and disorder only to purely outside factors – whether those might be colonial borders or neoliberal economic reforms – ignores the actual people and power struggles on the ground.

Is empire really better? Ask the colonized.

The crux of Kaplan’s neoimperial argument is that imperial control over the Middle East promoted more social order and less conflict. This rosy view of imperialism misses the various forms of resistance to foreign rule and the incredible violence of colonial conquest. This is most obvious in areas that faced the most intense forms of settler colonialism, such as South Africa, Kenya or Algeria. In these countries, British and French colonial governments alike faced repeated uprisings. They regularly resorted to brutal and horrific repression and awful legal regimes like the corvée or the indigénat in North and West Africa, statutes that forced colonized peoples to provide labor for the colonial government or gave colonial officials enormous latitude to criminalize many aspects of daily life. Both existed at least in part to regulate labor and exert greater control over colonized peoples.

Even in places where European colonialism was less omnipresent, people rebelled violently against colonial rule — as when northern Moroccans rebelled against Spanish and then French forces in the 1920s. The colonized revolted against non-European colonizers, as well. Ottoman rulers faced many revolts, such as the First Serbian Uprising in 1804 and the Albanian Revolution of 1844. Imperial “order” often involves almost ceaseless bloodshed and repression, something the United States learned after “liberating” Iraq.

What do we talk about when we talk about “empire”?

Anyone trying to justify short-term policy in the Middle East by referring to a political order that lasted for centuries will inevitably be able to find some historical episode to support the argument. But empires vary, and they’ve varied tremendously during different times and in different places. Even within any single empire, political realities vary incredibly over time. Political scientist Paul MacDonald has argued that preexisting networks of local actors are key to explaining successful imperial domination, while political sociologist Michael Hechter explains that resistance to imperial rule varies depending on the imperial structure. Adria Lawrence also illustrates how nation-states that emerged out of colonial rule were one of several possible outcomes in Morocco and Algeria, while Frederick Cooper notes how African politicians proposed a multiplicity of political arrangements and orders in late-colonial French West Africa that were different from today’s nation-states. All this research illustrates how empires can greatly differ from one another, both in the type of order they provide, and in the reactions and resistance they inspire in the colonies.

“Empire” is not one constant thing; it’s an idea, acted out by people, in very different ways. And imperial rule doesn’t necessarily deliver stability. The Italians struggled to consolidate rule over Ethiopia, the Ottomans faced resistance in the Balkans, and the British stumbled seriously in attempting to govern Iraq after World War I.

Kaplan and others call for imperialism-lite — without acknowledging that empires aren’t always sunny, stable and successful. Policymakers and scholars alike need accurate historical examinations of imperial rule, and need to stay alert to the ways in which local politics, outside political forces and military intervention affect countries in untold and infinitely complex ways.

This is not the Middle Eastern order you are looking for by Benjamin Denison, washingtonpost.com

Benjamin Denison is a PhD student in political science at the University of Notre Dame. Andrew Lebovich is a PhD student in African history at Columbia University.

Indo-Pak relations, Heating up again by Munir Akram,

AS an extreme summer engulfs the Indo-Gangetic plane, the political temperature is also rising. The Indian defence minister’s extraordinary statement about “fighting terror with terror” amounts to an open admission of India’s role in sponsoring terrorism in Pakistan and confirms the Pakistan Army’s accusation of India’s role in the Balochistan insurgency. The Pakistan army chief’s remarks calling for a solution for Kashmir on the basis of UN resolutions was an obvious reminder that India should not forget its own vulnerabilities.

India’s pronouncements have become increasingly strident. The Indian foreign minister has reiterated the refusal to resume a dialogue with Pakistan unless India’s preconditions are met. The defence minister, apart from the terror gaffe, has revived the far-fetched concern about Pakistan’s nuclear weapons being captured by extremists, in this case by the largely absent extremists of IS or the ‘Islamic State’. Indian officials have also floated the ludicrous claim that Saudi Arabia intends to buy nuclear weapons “off the shelf” from Pakistan. Notably, India launched a protest with China regarding the plan for an ‘economic corridor’ from Gwadar to Khunjerab.

The reasons for the escalating Indian rhetoric against Pakistan are not far to find. First, India is frustrated that Pakistan has not wilted under the pressure New Delhi hoped to generate by cutting off talks and ‘isolating’ Pakistan by its ‘terrorism’ accusations. On the contrary, Pakistan has evolved a more normal relationship with the US, obtained a major strategic commitment from China and opened a new chapter with Afghanistan.

Second, India is concerned that a Pakistan-Afghan normalisation will neutralise the western front India opened against Pakistan (through its support for the Balochistan Liberation Army insurgency and secret sponsorship of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan) and reduce Indian influence in Afghanistan. India worked hard with its friends in Kabul to generate opposition to President Ghani’s outreach to Pakistan and the putative deal for Kabul to act against the BLA and the TTP while Pakistan works to promote reconciliation between Ghani and the Afghan Taliban. India has had partial success. President Ghani visited India and has lately voiced discontent with Pakistan. Kabul’s cooperation against the BLA and the TTP also appears to have slowed down. The Pakistan Army’s open allegation of India’s role in Balochistan was also addressed to Kabul.

India is frustrated that Pakistan has not wilted under the pressure New Delhi hoped to generate.
Third, India opposes China’s rising role in the region, including in Afghanistan, and particularly its renewed strategic and economic commitment to Pakistan illustrated by the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor initiative. The realisation of this plan would be a major setback to India’s desire to dominate South Asia and isolate Pakistan.

Fourth, domestically, Modi’s ‘shine’ appears to be fading. So far, he has not delivered jobs or improved the lives of the poor. The BJP’s defeat in the Delhi elections to the Aam Aadmi party displayed its slide in popularity. Pakistan-bashing is the standard technique used by Indian governments to revive flagging domestic support. This is, of course, second nature to the extremists of the BJP and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh. Besides Modi, the defence minister, national security adviser and the RSS-linked army chief appear all too eager to prove their credentials to their core constituency.

It is difficult to predict how far India’s ‘fighting talk’ will remain just talk or escalate into another crisis with Pakistan. Unfortunately, there are no modalities in place between India and Pakistan for crisis prevention. There are several scenarios in which the two nuclear powers could find themselves engaged in a dangerous confrontation.

It seems certain that, following China’s commitment to CPEC, India ( and others) may see the fostering of violence in Balochistan not only as pressure point against Pakistan (to ensure its ‘good behaviour’ in Kashmir), but also as a means to prevent China’s direct access to the Arabian Sea, the Persian Gulf and West Asia. Indian (and other) mischief in Balochistan and other parts of Pakistan may escalate. President Ghani may be persuaded not to cooperate with Pakistan in eliminating the support base of the insurgency in Afghanistan. If Pakistan’s counter-insurgency measures in Balochistan are not successful, Kashmir may be brought back into the equation, setting the stage for another India-Pakistan confrontation.

A Kashmir crisis is possible, even without Pakistan’s intervention. The BJP government’s policies in Kashmir — settling Hindus in the Valley, eroding India-held Kashmir’s special status and continued suppression of dissent — have already provoked widespread protest from Kashmiri Muslims. A new Kashmiri revolt is probable. It would evoke popular support in Pakistan, leading to another India-Pakistan crisis.

The spark for such a crisis may be lit by another terror attack in India. Given the anti-Muslim postures of the BJP-RSS government, Muslim militancy is likely to manifest itself more strongly in India. Terror groups, like Al Qaeda or IS, have already declared their intention to instigate such terror attacks. India’s Pavlovian reaction would be to blame Pakistan.

Any one of these scenarios can lead to a disastrous conflict. While India may feel tempted to test its ‘limited war’ concept, Pakistan would operate under the assumption that India’s ‘Cold Start’ doctrine (of sudden and massive attack) is operational. A major military engagement is likely to rapidly involve a missile exchange, with Pakistan seeking to break up large Indian formations, and India responding with attacks on command centres and strategic assets. Since most missiles and aircraft are ‘“dual capable’ (they can be armed with conventional or nuclear weapons), the danger of a conflict escalating to the nuclear level is extremely high.

The destiny of billions cannot be left in the hands of leaders motivated by religious and historical antagonisms or to hope and chance. Over almost 70 years, India and Pakistan have been unable to resolve their disputes rationally. The international community, especially the major powers, must play a more active and responsible role in preventing another war whose catastrophic consequences could reverberate far beyond South Asia.

Heating up again by Munir Akram, dawn.com
The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.

Return to mainstream religious values: Jonathan Sacks

Jonathan Sacks: ‘I’m optimistic when I speak to young Muslims. They have incredible idealism’ by Peter Stanford, telegraph.co.uk

Former Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks - whose new book argues for a return to mainstream religious virtues - tells Peter Stanford how he thinks Isil can be beaten
Jonathan Sacks begins our conversation by issuing a stark warning. The former Chief Rabbi says that Isil and other current manifestations of extremist religion around the globe now pose the “greatest challenge facing us in the 21st century”.

It is a bleak, dark assessment from the man hailed by Prince Charles as “a light unto this nation”, now a member of the House of Lords, and a global campaigner for greater religious understanding between all the faiths. And Lord Sacks is using the term “us” in its broadest sense.

So he means not just his own community, or the countries of the Middle East, or even Western governments and armies. Unless both what he calls the “symptom” of Isil, and the factors that have caused its rise, are tackled and tackled effectively, he says, the murderous chaos seen from afar in Syria and Iraq will become an issue that impinges ever more on all our lives.

“Right now,” he urges, “Europe needs to join together to fight these extremists, not to talk of Jews and Christians, us and them. The challenge we all face is how to defend our hard-won freedoms and liberties. That is what’s at risk and why I am trying to widen the argument.”

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To that end, next week he is publishing Not in God’s Name: Confronting Religious Violence, his first book since standing down in 2013 as Chief Rabbi after 22 years in office. It is no use, he says, hoping the problem will go away, or relying on our political leaders in the West to sort it out.

“Their maximum length of concentration is until the next election, so there is a culture gap with these religious extremists. They are in a time system where the minimum unit of currency is a decade, and they are comfortable looking at things in centuries. Right now, a long-term problem is meeting short attention spans in the West.”

Jihadi John: Western Islamists are radicalised because of the secularisation of society, says Lord Sacks

The 67-year-old father of three, and grandfather of seven, is speaking from Jerusalem, where is giving a lecture at Israel’s National Library and receiving a medal from former president Shimon Peres – as well as attending a family wedding. His work now sees him travelling between America, Israel and his base in Britain, with Elaine, his wife of 45 years.

Lord Sacks describes his meetings with young British Muslims the same age as those lured by internet and social media grooming to head off to fight alongside Isil in Iraq and Syria. Why, he has asked himself, do they do it? The conventional socio-economic explanations don’t work for him.

“These are not the reasons European jihadist are going there to fight. They are not living in poverty. They can go to university and enter the professions, but that isn’t enough for some. They are in search of identity, and in Europe we have gone down the road of abolishing identity.”

It is the secularisation of Western society, he argues, and the resulting moral vacuum, that leaves idealistic youngsters without anything in which to believe and susceptible to radical voices. “Young people like ideals but we are very short of ideals right now, and that means they can be drawn to causes that are also very dangerous.”

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In the book, he coins the phrase “altruistic evil” to describe the appeal to such youngsters of Isil propaganda. It blends talk of high ideals and the sacred to justify what would otherwise be seen as murderous acts. “They are being offered an identity as part of the global nation of Islam which is presented in these social media outlets as being attacked and humiliated.”

The lack among these youngsters of a strong sense of British identity causes him to reflect on words he has often seen engraved on Jewish gravestones here. “They read ‘a proud Englishman and a proud Jew’. Do we understand any more what it means any more to be ‘a proud Englishman’? Many of the young people I meet don’t. There is no strong local identity, and so they seek it out where it is offered – on You Tube and social media.”

His argument is that a return to mainstream religion values is needed if we are to rediscover an identity that can counter the attraction of Isil for disillusioned young people. But can we have a British identity without religion?

“No,” he replies bluntly, “I don’t think you can. Religion gives us a real sense of the common good as members of a society rather than the self-centred ideas that are promoted elsewhere.”

And what of his own Jewish community? The rise of militant Islam has been accompanied by an upturn in reports of anti-Semitic incidents all across Europe, including, earlier this year, the murder of a synagogue guard in Copenhagen and the killing of four Jews in a kosher supermarket in Paris in the wake of the assault on the offices of Charlie Hebdo. Only this week, the former prime minister, Tony Blair, has been appointed to a European body charged with combatting rising anti-Semitism.

Former Chief Rabbi Jonathan Sacks (Photo: Warren Allott/Telegraph)

“It’s valuable,” he says of the Blair appointment, though without any great enthusiasm, “and it has my full support, but I am trying to focus on a bigger phenomenon. The anti-Semitism we are seeing is a symptom of something else altogether. I intend to fight with all my passion those who want only to see this as anti-Semitism.”

Including members of the Jewish community who feel increasingly unsafe in Western Europe? A poll in the wake of the supermarket and Charlie Hebdo attacks found 40 per cent of French Jews had considered leaving the country.

“Some people definitely feel like this,” Lord Sacks concedes, “but I am fighting hard against that feeling. This is not about Jews. It is about all our freedoms, about the sanctity of life. If Jews are not safe in Europe, then no one is. If Jews leave Europe, then we have all lost our freedoms, lost our soul.”

His book is one front in that battle. It is the distillation of a concern that has been growing inside him since 2001. “I have been feeling since 9/11 that we are not addressing the theological dimension of all of this, wrestling with the religious issues. It is sometimes said that weapons win wars, but ideas win the peace.”

Yet Lord Sacks’ solution to the problem – a reinforcing of “good” religious ideas of respect, tolerance and love of neighbour, better education, plus a coming together of all the faiths with the secular authorities to fight extremism – surely overlooks one crucial factor. Many people, especially in the West, take as read that all religion itself begets violence, not just the extremist forms.

“Religion is not the sole cause of violence in the world,” he says, with just a hint of the weariness in his voice that comes with having to defend his corner so often. “In the 20th century, it has been nation states, issues of race and political ideology that have nothing to do with religion, that have caused two world wars, the Holocaust and the gulags. Those who argue that if you get rid of religion, you will get rid of violence, have short memories.

“But, equally, the idea that religion is pacific is negated by history. All the major faiths have their violent episodes and their difficult texts. We have to be honest and candid about that.”

Former peace envoy Tony Blair is to take on a new role combating anti-Semitism (Photo: PA)

So why does he believe Islam is apparently in such turmoil now? One suggestion is to link everything back to the “humiliation” – to use his own word – that young Muslims feel is being visited on their Palestinian co-believers by the Israelis.

His reply is firm and short. “I simply think that Israel has nothing to do with the crisis in Iraq, in Syria, in Libya, in Somalia. It is a distraction to suggest otherwise. The situation between Israel and the Palestinians right now has no bearing on any of the major conflicts in the Middle East."

The causes of Islam’s troubles, he suggests, lie elsewhere. He sees a general “turning inwards” among Muslims – found in other faiths, too, he adds – “that emphasises difference not common ground, and that is anti-modern”. He is concerned, too, by its tendency to combine religious with political power: “I can’t think of a single instance in history when that has been a blessing.”

•Tony Blair's new role fighting anti-Semitism - a kick in the teeth for Palestinians?

•Tony Blair accused of trying to 'erase' his role in rise of Isil

His third culprit is what he calls “the destablising effect of the revolution in information technology. In the past, radical groups would be marginalised and largely unknown, but now they can instantly reach a global audience with their ideas.” Put these three factors together, he concludes, “and they represent a perfect storm”.

It sounds a gloomy assessment of heavy weather ahead. Lord Sacks, though, is unmistakably a man on a mission, and he is sure that there is plenty we can do, if we find the will. “I’m optimistic, in the sense that when I speak to young Muslims, they are hungry for rising to the challenge of religion bringing reconciliation not violence among people. They have incredible idealism.”

And, he adds, as a final thought, befitting of one whose voice is so familiar on Radio 4’s Thought for the Day, “I happen to believe in divine providence. God sends problems and God sends solutions.”

Jonathan Sacks: ‘I’m optimistic when I speak to young Muslims. They have incredible idealism’ by Peter Stanford, telegraph.co.uk
Not In God’s Name by Jonathan Sacks

Jews cursed rebuked in Bible

Peace-Forum

Muslims are blamed for cursing Jews:

“Those of the children of Israel who went astray were cursed by the tongue of David, and of Jesus, son of Mary. That was because they rebelled and used to transgress”.(Qur’an;5:78)

The Israelites Violated The Covenant with God and thus were disgraced, rebuked in Bible:

1) Became rebellious against God (Deuteronomy;32:15;9:7; Isaiah;1:2,Exodus;32:9)

2) The Israelites became unfaithful to covenant engagements (Jeremiah;3:6-8, 31:32; Ezekiel;16:59).

3) They were punished by God for; Idolatry (Psalms;78:58-64; Isaiah;65:3-7), Unbelief (Romans;11:20), Breaking covenant (Isaiah;24:5; Jeremiah; 11:10), Transgressing the law (Isaiah;1:4; 24:5-6), Changing the ordinances (Isaiah;24:5), and Killing the prophets (Mathew;23:37-38, 27:25).

4) They often displeased God by their sins (Numbers;25:3; Deutreronomy;32:16; 1Kings;16:2; Isaiah;1:4; 5:24-25). 5) They were scattered among the nations (Deuteronomy;28:64; Ezekiel; 6:8; 36:19).

6) Despised by the nations (Ezekiel;36:3), their country trodden under foot by the Gentiles (Deuteronomy;28:49-52; Luke;21:24).Their house left desolate (Mathew;24:38) and were deprived of civil and religious privileges (Hosea;3:4).

Rebelliousness of Jews has also been mentioned in Bible: “And the LORD said unto Moses, I have seen this people, and, behold, it is a stiff necked people: (Exodus; 32:9)”

“Understand therefore, that the LORD thy God giveth thee not this good land to possess it for thy righteousness; for thou art a stiffnecked people. Remember, and forget not, how thou provokedst the LORD thy God to wrath in the wilderness: from the day that thou didst depart out of the land of Egypt, until ye came unto this place, ye have been rebellious against the LORD. Also in Horeb ye provoked the LORD to wrath, so that the LORD was angry with you to have destroyed you.” (Deuteronomy; 9:6-8)

“Likewise when the LORD sent you from Kadeshbarnea, saying, Go up and possess the land which I have given you; then ye rebelled against the commandment of the LORD your God, and ye believed him not, nor hearkened to his voice. Ye have been rebellious against the LORD from the day that I knew you.” (Deuteronomy; 9:23-24) “Remember thy servants, Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; look not unto the stubbornness of this people, nor to their wickedness, nor to their sin”: (Deuteronomy; 9:27)

They taught about God but did not love God — they did not enter the kingdom of heaven themselves, nor did they let others enter. (Matt 23:13-14)

The Woes of the Pharisees is a list of criticisms by Jesus against scribes and Pharisees in the Gospel of Luke 11:37-54 and Gospel of Matthew 23:1-39. Mark 12:35-40 and Luke 20:45-47 include warnings about scribes. Seven are listed in Matthew, and hence Matthew's version is known as the seven woes, while only six are given in Luke, whose version is thus known as the six woes. The woes mostly criticise the Pharisees for hypocrisy and perjury. They illustrate the differences between inner and outer moral states. The seven woes of hypocrisy are:

They taught that an oath sworn by the temple or altar was not binding, but that if sworn by the gold ornamentation of the temple, or by a sacrificial gift on the altar, it was binding. The gold and gifts, however, were not sacred in themselves as the temple and altar were, but derived a measure of lesser sacredness by being connected to the temple or altar. The teachers and Pharisees worshiped at the temple and offered sacrifices at the altar because they knew that the temple and altar were sacred. How then could they deny oath-binding value to what was truly sacred and accord it to objects of trivial and derived sacredness? (Matt 23:16-22)

They preached God but converted people to dead religion, thus making those converts twice as much sons of hell as they themselves were. (Matt 23:15) They taught the law but did not practice some of the most important parts of the law — justice, mercy, faithfulness to God. They obeyed the minutiae of the law such as tithing spices but not the weightier matters of the law. (Matt 23:23-24) They presented an appearance of being 'clean' (self-restrained, not involved in carnal matters), yet they were dirty inside: they seethed with hidden worldly desires, carnality. They were full of greed and self-indulgence. (Matt 23:25-26)

The Children of Israel as a community did not adhere to the Covenant in totality, though there were some exception. Some Exceptions:

They exhibited themselves as righteous on account of being scrupulous keepers of the law, but were in fact not righteous: their mask of righteousness hid a secret inner world of ungodly thoughts and feelings. They were full of wickedness. They were like whitewashed tombs, beautiful on the outside, but full of dead men's bones. (Matt 23:27-28) They professed a high regard for the dead prophets of old, and claimed that they would never have persecuted and murdered prophets, when in fact they were cut from the same cloth as the persecutors and murderers: they too had murderous blood in their veins. (Matt 23:29-36) http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Woes_of_the_Pharisees

“If they would have believed (in Islam) and kept themselves away from evil, there would have been a better reward from Allah, if they could understand it!”(Qur’an;2:103).

“There are some among the people of the Book who truly believe in Allah and what has been revealed to you, (Muhammad), and what has been revealed to them before you. They humble themselves before Allah and do not sell the revelations of Allah for a petty price. For them, there will be a reward from their God. Surely Allah is very swift in settling the accounts.(Qur’an;3:199). “Rest assured that the believers (Muslims), the Jews, the Sabians and the Christians - whoever believes in Allah and the Last Day and does righteous deeds - will have nothing to fear or to regret”.(Qur’an;5:69).

More: 

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·    Dialogue Children of Israel, Ishmael & Peace?

·    Are Jews & Muslims different Creed?

·    Zionism, Bible & Quran

·    The Thirteenth Tribe 

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India must change attitude towards Pskistan

India & Pakistan  have hurt each other incessantly through the past several decades and vested interests have formed, inevitably. A new beginning is needed. Modi should not allow himself to be taken in by the seductive cloak-and-dagger tales of the great game in the Hindu Kush, lest it became an entrapment of the mind and precluded new thinking. The AfPak buck stops at Modi’s desk, finally.
-------------------------
The Af-Pak buck stops at Modi’s desk:
By M K Bhadrakumar
Strange reports are filtering in from Kabul to the effect that the Afghan spy agency National Directorate of Security [NDS] and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence [ISI] have signed a memorandum of understanding to jointly fight terrorism. Some reports even suggested that the agreement envisaged that the ISI would train the NDS personnel equip them as well. (TOLO)

The reports as such have not been denied so far by Kabul or Islamabad, although the bit news about ISI training the Afghan spooks may be premature. At any rate, this becomes a momentous development in the politics of the region and in the tumultuous fraternal relationship between the two countries.

Looking back, the visit by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif earlier this month to Kabul, accompanied by army chief Gen. Raheel Sharif, has been a turning point in regional security. While in Kabul, Sharif had condemned in no uncertain terms, with Afghan President Ashraf Ghani standing by and listening in, the Taliban’s spring offensive, calling it in plain terms as terrorism, which was unprecedented.

Pakistan seldom, if ever, criticizes the Afghan Taliban publicly and Sharif did it in full view of the Afghan bazaar. For Ghani, any decision to engage the ISI directly would be a very pragmatic decision. He’d see three main advantages in doing so.

One, he will be conclusively addressing Pakistan’s number one concern, namely, the demand to shut down the Afghan-Indian intelligence tie-up. There is also a regional dimension to it, since Kabul is institutionalizing the cooperation with the the ISI at a time when Pakistan’s heightened sensitivities are bordering on paranoia lately.

Two, Ghani will be making Pakistan a “stakeholder” in Afghanistan’s counterterrorist capability. Cynics might say this is something like having the fox guarding the chicken coop, but then, the NDS also gets an opportunity to make the ISI accountable.

Three, in political terms, Ghani will be putting a ring of goodwill around Pakistan that the latter will be hard-pressed not to reciprocate — a benign version (in reverse) of Dritarashtra’s deadly embrace in the Indian epic of Mahabharata.

But what highlights the “upgrade” of the Afghan-Pakistan security cooperation is that it also happens to coincide with the first-ever visit by the Afghan Minister of Interior Noorulhaq Olomi to Beijing. Olomi disclosed in Beijing on Sunday that his visit related to the signing of an agreement between the Afghan and Chinese intelligence to expand their cooperation in the fight against terrorism.

Indeed, these developments in rapid succession within the space of a few weeks follow Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Pakistan last month. Xi had announced $46 billion worth Chinese investment to build an Economic Corridor across the Karakoram connecting Xinjiang with the Arabian Sea.

Pakistan understands that China has thrown in its direction a vital lifeline, which it must clasp gratefully with both hands. Pakistan is getting the opportunity of a lifetime to become a thriving economy and to emerge as the economic hub of the region, which would enhance its status manifold as a major regional power in South, West and Central Asia.

But then, China has added the caveat that Pakistan needs to get its act together first and cleanse the region of the terrorist groups so that the Silk Road projects involving the deployment of hundreds (or thousands) of Chinese personnel can get implemented. Sharif’s visit to Kabul must be seen in this context.

And the Pakistani army chief accompanying Sharif was intended to underline that the civilian and military leaderships in Islamabad are jointly committed to dispersing the strategic distrust that blocked any genuine security cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Having said that, China also knows that Pakistan cannot handle this cleanup alone and it will have to be a coordinated Afghan-Pakistani effort. Of course, China has some self-interest here too insofar as it also hopes to be a direct beneficiary of the decimation of the terrorist groups based in the Af-Pak region. To be sure, China would have encouraged Olomi to strengthen the cooperation between the Afghan and Pakistani intelligence.

It i s also useful to recall that China participated in the recent Track II in Qatar where the representatives of the Kabul government and the Taliban held discussions. There is reason to believe that China is acting as a moderating influence on Pakistan and nudging it to get the Taliban to the peace talks. (See a Xinhua commentary here.)

The fact that Olomi was received by none other than Meng Jianzhu, member of the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party and the head of the Commission for Political and Legal Affairs of the CPC Central Committee underscores that Beijing attaches the highest importance to the security of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which is of course linked to the fight against terrorism in Afghanistan. (Meng is China’s intelligence czar, successor to Zhou Yongkang and a rising star in Chinese politics.)

It doesn’t need much ingenuity to figure out that a tripartite entente is appearing on the strategic landscape to India’s north, involving China, Pakistan and Afghanistan, in the sphere of regional security and stability. It stems from a remarkable congruence of interests on the part of the three protagonists.

Russia and Iran would only encourage such a regional process aimed at stabilizing the Afghan situation. (By the way, Moscow announced on Monday the closure of the NATO’s transport corridor through Russian territory for delivering supplies to Afghanistan.)

Of course, all this comes as a severe blow to the Indian foreign and security policy establishment. The Indian intelligence had enjoyed until recently very close ties with the Afghan intelligence, which in turn provided much “strategic depth” to us vis-à-vis Pakistan.

But India has been summarily left in the lurch and Kabul is gearing up to do business with the newfound Pakistani (and Chinese) partners. Without doubt, Pakistan’s bottom line for cooperation with the Kabul government regarding peace talks with the Taliban has been the latter’s willingness to guarantee that the Indian intelligence presence is eliminated from Afghan soil.

The NDS-ISI tie-up rankles, as it is happening within a month of Ghani’s visit to Delhi. No doubt, there has been a colossal breakdown of India’s Af-Pak policies. There is no other way to put across the bitter truth.

Hopefully, Prime Minister Narendra Modi who reportedly places emphasis on making the bureaucracy accountable, will want to know why such a policy failure could have taken place right under his nose, relating to a core area of India’s regional policies.

How does India propose to dig its way out of this fox hole? Whispering to China not to trust Pakistan is not going to take us very far. Nor is our hubris that India can afford to “ignore” Pakistan helping matters.

Truly, the intellectual bankruptcy on the foreign policy front is surging to the surface. India should see the writing on the wall – Sino-Pak relationship has transformed and is no longer “India-centric”; Pakistan’s approach to terrorist groups has changed.

Our rejectionist stance vis-à-vis China’s Belt and Road Initiatives becomes increasingly untenable and will only prove counterproductive in the long run. There are things that are beyond India’s capabilities. Zero sum mindset is doomed to fail in a globalized world.

The root problem is that India doesn’t have a “big picture” as regards the regional politics. A good beginning will be to decide on a Pakistan policy without further delay — a policy that is viable, forward-looking and sustainable. The right-wing pundits are whistling in the dark when they claim that India should “ignore” Pakistan. The recent developments in regional politics amply testify that Pakistan is far too important a regional power to be “ignored”.

Secondly, more importantly, the time has come to ask some fundamental questions regarding the wisdom of remaining fixated on Dawood Ibrahim or Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi. The history of India-Pakistan rivalry didn’t begin with these two personalities.

The two countries have hurt each other incessantly through the past several decades and vested interests have formed, inevitably. A new beginning is needed. Modi should not allow himself to be taken in by the seductive cloak-and-dagger tales of the great game in the Hindu Kush, lest it became an entrapment of the mind and precluded new thinking. The AfPak buck stops at Modi’s desk, finally.
http://blogs.rediff.com/mkbhadrakumar/author/bhadrakumaranrediffmailcom/

The many problems with Seymour Hersh's Osama bin Laden conspiracy theory

Recently the legendary investigative journalist Seymour Hersh finally released a story that he has been rumored to have been working on for years: the truth about the killing of Osama bin Laden. According to Hersh's 10,000-word story in the London Review of Books, the official history of bin Laden's death — in which the US tracked him to a compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan; killed him in a secret raid that infuriated Pakistan; and then buried him at sea — is a lie.

Hersh's story is amazing to read, alleging a vast American-Pakistani conspiracy to stage the raid and even to fake high-level diplomatic incidents as a sort of cover. But his allegations are largely supported only by two sources, neither of whom has direct knowledge of what happened, both of whom are retired, and one of whom is anonymous. The story is riven with internal contradictions and inconsistencies.

Related Every movie rewrites history. What American Sniper did is much, much worse.
The story simply does not hold up to scrutiny — and, sadly, is in line with Hersh's recent turn away from the investigative reporting that made him famous into unsubstantiated conspiracy theories.

A decade ago, Hersh was one of the most respected investigative journalists on the planet, having broken major stories from the My Lai massacre in 1969 to the Abu Ghraib scandal in 2004. But more recently, his reports have become less and less credible. He's claimed that much of the US special forces is controlled by secret members of Opus Dei, that the US military flew Iranian terrorists to Nevada for training, and that the 2013 chemical weapons attack in Syria was a "false flag" staged by the government of Turkey. Those reports have had little proof and, rather than being borne out by subsequent investigations, have been either unsubstantiated or outright debunked. A close reading of Hersh's bin Laden story suggests it is likely to suffer the same fate.

What Seymour Hersh says really happened to Osama bin Laden

The truth, Hersh says, is that Pakistani intelligence services captured bin Laden in 2006 and kept him locked up with support from Saudi Arabia, using him as leverage against al-Qaeda. In 2010, Pakistan agreed to sell bin Laden to the US for increased military aid and a "freer hand in Afghanistan." Rather than kill him or hand him over discreetly, Hersh says the Pakistanis insisted on staging an elaborate American "raid" with Pakistani support.

According to Hersh's story, Navy SEALs met no resistance at Abbottabad and were escorted by a Pakistani intelligence officer to bin Laden's bedroom, where they killed him. Bin Laden's body was "torn apart with rifle fire" and pieces of the corpse "tossed out over the Hindu Kush mountains" by Navy SEALs during the flight home (no reason is given for this action). There was no burial at sea because "there wouldn’t have been much left of bin Laden to put into the sea in any case."

In this telling, the yearslong breakdown in US-Pakistan relations, which had enormous ramifications for both Pakistan and the war in Afghanistan, was all staged to divert attention from the truth of bin Laden's killing. The treasure trove of intelligence secured from bin Laden's compound, Hersh adds, was manufactured to provide evidence after the fact.

What is the proof?
The evidence for all this is Hersh's conversations with two people: Asad Durrani, who ran Pakistan's military intelligence service from 1990 to 1992, and "a retired senior intelligence official who was knowledgeable about the initial intelligence about bin Laden’s presence in Abbottabad." Read that line again: knowledgeable about the initial intelligence. Not exactly a key player in this drama, and anonymous at that.

Hersh produces no supporting documents or proof, nor is the authority of either source established. We are given no reason to believe that either Durrani or the "knowledgeable official" would have even second- or thirdhand knowledge of what occurred, yet their word is treated as gospel. His other two sources are anonymous "consultants" who are vaguely described as insiders.

Beyond that, Hersh's proof is that he finds the official story of the Osama bin Laden raid to be unconvincing. And he points out that in the first days after the raid, the administration released details that cast bin Laden in a negative light — saying he tried to use one of his wives as a shield, for example — that it later walked back. But raising questions about the official story is not the same as proving a spectacular international conspiracy.

If that seems like worryingly little evidence for a story that accuses hundreds of people across three governments of staging a massive international hoax that has gone on for years, then you are not alone.

On Sunday night, national security journalists and analysts on Twitter picked through the story, expressing dismay at its tissue-thin sourcing, its leaps of logic, and its internal contradictions.

Some of the problems with Hersh's history of Abbottabad

Perhaps the most concerning problem with Hersh's story is not the sourcing but rather the internal contradictions in the narrative he constructs.

Most blatant, Hersh's entire narrative turns on a secret deal, in which the US promised Pakistan increased military aid and a "freer hand in Afghanistan." In fact, the exact opposite of this occurred, with US military aid dropping and US-Pakistan cooperation in Afghanistan plummeting as both sides feuded bitterly for years after the raid.

Hersh explains this seemingly fatal contradiction by suggesting the deal fell apart due to miscommunication between the Americans and Pakistanis. But it's strange to argue that the dozens of officials on both sides would be competent enough to secretly plan and execute a massive international ruse, and then to uphold their conspiracy for years after the fact, but would not be competent enough to get on the same page about aid delivery.

And there are more contradictions. Why, for example, would the Pakistanis insist on a fake raid that would humiliate their country and the very military and intelligence leaders who supposedly instigated it?

A simpler question: why would Pakistan bother with the ostentatious fake raid at all, when anyone can imagine a dozen simpler, lower-risk, lower-cost ways to do this?

Why not just kill bin Laden, drive his body across the border into Afghanistan, and drop him off with the Americans? Or why not put him in a hut somewhere in Waziristan, blow it up with an F-16, pretend it was a US drone strike, and tell the Americans to go collect the body? (Indeed, when I first heard about Hersh's bin Laden story a few years ago from a New Yorker editor — the magazine, the editor said, had rejected it repeatedly, to the point of creating bad blood between Hersh and editor-in-chief David Remnick — this was the version Hersh was said to favor.)

"helping Obama boost US-Pakistan relations seems like an unusual hobby for an al-Qaeda leader"

If Pakistan's goal is increased US aid, why do something that will virtually force the US to cut aid, as it indeed did? For that matter, why retaliate against the US for the raid that you asked them to conduct? Pakistan's own actions against the US, after all, ensured that it had less influence in Afghanistan.

By the same token, why would the US cut a secret deal with Pakistan to allow that country a "freer hand" in Afghanistan — essentially surrendering a yearslong effort to reduce Pakistani influence there — rather than just taking out bin Laden without Pakistan's permission?

There are smaller but still troubling inconsistencies. Why, for example, would the US need to construct a massive double of the Abbottabad compound for special forces to train in, if the real compound were going to be totally unguarded and there would be no firefight?

See also, for example, the intelligence material that the US brought back from bin Laden's compound and then displayed to the world. Hersh says that, in fact, bin Laden had spent the previous five years a hostage of Pakistani intelligence rather than an active member of al-Qaeda. The intelligence "treasure trove" was thus a fabrication, cooked up by the CIA after the raid to back up the American-Pakistani conspiracy.

This is a strange thing to argue, as Carnegie Endowment Syria research Aron Lund points out, because al-Qaeda second-in-command Ayman al-Zawahiri subsequently said the intelligence materials were real, and had quoted from them himself. So either Hersh is wrong or, Lund writes, "Zawahiri is helping Obama forge evidence to boost US-Pakistan relations, which seems like an unusual hobby for an [al-Qaeda] leader."

when facts seem to contradict his claims, his answer is that this only shows how deep the rabbit hole goes

In other words, for Hersh to be correct that the intelligence material was faked, and thus that bin Laden was a secret prisoner of Pakistani intelligence, and thus that the raid to kill him was a staged American-Pakistani ruse, then al-Qaeda would have had to be in on it — even though al-Qaeda was also the supposed victim of Pakistan's plot.

As for Hersh's story of what really happened to bin Laden's body — "torn to pieces with rifle fire" and thrown bit by bit out the door of the escaping helicopter, until there was not enough left to bury — it is difficult to know where to begin. It is outlandish to imagine small arms fire reducing a 6-foot-4 man "to pieces," not to mention the sheer quantity of time and bullets this would take. Are we really to believe that special forces would spend who knows how long gleefully carving up bin Laden like horror movie villains, and then later reaching into the body bag to chuck pieces of him out of a helicopter, for no reason at all? On the most sensitive and important operation of their careers?

When Hersh acknowledge the vast evidence against his theory, he typically dismisses it out of hand, at times arguing that it is in fact proof that the Pakistani-American-Saudi architects of this plan were so brilliant that they spent years meticulously engineering their actions at every level so as to appear to be doing the opposite of what Hersh suggests.

For example, Hersh says the CIA station chief in Islamabad, Jonathan Bank, was a key player in helping the Pakistanis stage the bin Laden raid. But the year before the raid, a Pakistani journalist publicly named Bank (many suspect, and Hersh agrees, that this was done at Pakistani intelligence's behest), thus imperiling his life, forcing him to flee the country and sparking a diplomatic incident that set back US-Pakistan relations. Hersh says this entire monthslong incident was staged, a "cover in case their co-operation with the Americans in getting rid of bin Laden became known."

Hersh's story is littered with such justifications: when facts seem to squarely contradict his claims, his answer is that this only goes to show how deep the rabbit hole goes.

Seymour Hersh's slide off the rails

In early 2004, Hersh reported one of the most important stories of the Iraq War: the torture of detainees at the American-run prison complex in Abu Ghraib, Iraq. In a series of articles for the New Yorker, Hersh revealed horrific and systemic American torture, as well as its authorization at the highest levels of the Bush administration. While earlier investigations by the Associated Press and Amnesty International had uncovered aspects of this story, the depth of Hersh's reports proved both damning and shocking, contributing to a public backlash against both Abu Ghraib and the war itself.

The Abu Ghraib stories were in line with Hersh's reputation as one of the most respected investigative reporters alive. That reputation goes back to 1969, when Hersh uncovered the My Lai massacre, in which American troops killed hundreds of Vietnamese civilians. He later broke elements of the Watergate story while working for the New York Times.

In recent years, however, Hersh has appeared increasingly to have gone off the rails. His stories, often alleging vast and shadowy conspiracies, have made startling — and often internally inconsistent — accusations, based on little or no proof beyond a handful of anonymous "officials."

Supporters of Hersh will often point to his earlier stories in defense of his more recent work, saying that we should trust his sources and not dismiss his reporting so easily. Fair enough. But Hersh's stories on Abu Ghraib or My Lai or Watergate were sourced with documented evidence (in the case of Abu Ghraib, a damning internal military report) and interviews with firsthand participants.

For his bin Laden story, however, he has no documented evidence, and his sources are limited to a couple of "consultants," one "retired official with knowledge," and a Pakistani spymaster who left that world 23 years ago. If Hersh still has his once-famous connections in the American intelligence world, they do not show up here.

Similarly, Hersh's earlier blockbusters were all quickly confirmed by dozens of independent reports and mountains of physical proof. That's how such exposés typically work: the first glint of sunshine brings a rush of attention, which uncovers more evidence and encourages more sources to come forward, until the truth is incontrovertible.

That is not how things have gone with Hersh's newer and more conspiratorial stories. Rather, they have tended to remain all alone in their claims, and at times have been debunked. This is not, in other words, the first time.

The growing list of conspiracy theories
The first hints came in the latter years of the Bush administration, when Hersh reported repeatedly that the US was on the verging of striking Iran. These included reports stating that the US might even bomb Iran with a nuclear warhead, and later that the administration had considered using US special forces disguised as Iranians to launch a "false flag" attack as a premise for war.

These reports seemed a bit far-fetched, particularly since Hersh kept predicting a strike that never came. And, troublingly, they were often sourced to perhaps one or two anonymous "consultants" or "former officials" who were said to "have knowledge" of high-level discussions.

The Iran stories were difficult to accept on anything much more than faith. How do you prove that Dick Cheney never had a meeting in his office during which someone verbally proposed pinning a false flag attack on Iran? You can't. In any case, Hersh had a long record of excellence, and who was going to doubt Cheney's capacity for hawkishness?

The moment when a lot of journalists started to question whether Hersh had veered from investigative reporting into something else came in January 2011. That month, he spoke at Georgetown University's branch campus in Qatar, where he gave a bizarre and rambling address alleging that top military and special forces leaders "are all members of, or at least supporters of, Knights of Malta ... many of them are members of Opus Dei." He suggested that they belong to a network first formed by former Vice President Dick Cheney that is steering US foreign policy toward an agenda of bringing Christianity to the Middle East.

They do see what they’re doing — and this is not an atypical attitude among some military — it’s a crusade, literally. They see themselves as the protectors of the Christians. They’re protecting them from the Muslims [as in] the 13th century. And this is their function.

... That’s the attitude. "We’re gonna change mosques into cathedrals." That’s an attitude that pervades, I’m here to say, a large percentage of the Joint Special Operations Command.

As Blake Hounshell pointed out at the time, there is no evidence for any of this — many of the US military leaders that Hersh named are known as personally liberal and not outwardly religious, and in any case both Opus Dei and Knights of Malta are Catholic service organizations very different from the shadowy forces portrayed in Dan Brown novels.

The next year, in 2012, Hersh reported in the New Yorker that the Bush administration had secretly armed and funded an Iranian terrorist group known as the MEK in 2005. Two sources, neither with direct knowledge, told Hersh that American special forces had flown the Iranians all the way to Nevada to train at a base there. This detail was both spectacular and puzzling: the US has bases throughout the world, including several in the Middle East; why bring terrorists to Nevada?

To be clear, the story was never specifically discredited, but neither has it ever been confirmed by any subsequent investigations into Bush-era national security policy, of which there have been many. Hersh's story was greeted skeptically by many reporters and analysts. Hersh is still employed by the New Yorker, but he has not written an investigative piece for the magazine since.

The Syria chemical weapons story

Since the 2012 MEK story, Hersh has published his primary investigative work in the London Review of Books.

Two of these articles have focused at great length on the August 2013 chemical weapons attack in Ghouta, Syria, that killed hundreds of civilians. An extensive UN report, while barred from formally assigning responsibility, pointed out that the chemical weapons were delivered by munitions only used by the Syrian military, and had been fired from an area entirely controlled by Syrian military forces. Independent investigations by human rights groups pointed the finger at forces loyal to Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad. So did the US government.

Hersh, in his two articles, states that this is all false. In December 2013, he claimed that the Obama administration, seeking to justify its threat to strike Syria in retaliation, had willingly downplayed or ignored evidence that the chemical weapons had in fact been launched by the al-Qaeda franchise Jabhat al-Nusra. He cited a handful of anonymous (and, strangely, often retired) "officials" who warned of a "deliberate manipulation of intelligence" and compared Ghouta to the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin incident used to justify the US escalation in Vietnam.

Then, in April 2014, Hersh came out with a different story: the government of Turkey, he stated, had orchestrated the Ghouta chemical weapons attack with Jabhat al-Nusra as a false flag operation. Assad was innocent. Turkey and the al-Qaeda branch had cooked up the plan, intending that the attack would be blamed on the Syrian government, thus leading the United States to attack Syria. (You will notice, again, Hersh's preoccupation with false flag operations.)

The accusation of a Turkish-jihadist conspiracy to lure the US into war with Syria seemed stunning — and, to many, outlandish. Could it be true? No independent investigation has yet confirmed it, and the story has been exhaustively and repeatedly debunked, including by Eliot Higgins and Dan Kaszeta, two respected analysts who focus on small arms and chemical weapons in Syria.

As time goes on, Hersh's stories seem to become more spectacular, more thinly sourced, and more difficult to square with reality as we know it. Perhaps one day they will all be vindicated: the Opus Dei special forces cabal, the terrorist training in Nevada, the American plan to nuke Iran, the Turkish false flag in Syria, even the American-Pakistani bin Laden ruse.

Maybe there really is a vast shadow world of complex and diabolical conspiracies, executed brilliantly by international networks of government masterminds. And maybe Hersh and his handful of anonymous former senior officials really are alone in glimpsing this world and its terrifying secrets. Or maybe there's a simpler explanation.

Correction: Due to an editing error, an earlier version of this article at one point referenced the My Lai massacre and Ghouta chemical weapons attack as occurring in 1969 and 2014, respectively, when in fact those were the years when Hersh's stories on the incidents were published. Other references to those events in the story described their timing accurately. The article has been corrected.
The many problems with Seymour Hersh's Osama bin Laden conspiracy theory
by Max Fisher, vox.com

Source: http://www.vox.com/2015/5/11/8584473/seymour-hersh-osama-bin-laden

Manhunt: The Search for Bin Laden 2013 HD (HBO Full Documentary)

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