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US Led Bogus Wars on Terrorism

The UNO- a global institution of formal HOPE for the mankind failed to stop the powerful aggressors in their plans to invade Iraq and Afghanistan for purely strategic-political domination and to occupy the natural resources.  The UNO’s inaction and inability to fulfill its mandate of the Charter has made it a redundant organization simply to rejoin the historical failure of the League of the Nations – a complete failure in contemporary history, from the working of the UN to the global adventurous organizations such as the NATO, the UN Security Council, the EU and other security establishments. They exist to protect the self interest of the so called Five Superpowers (known bullying actors of the UN Security Council), as has been the case throughout the human history. E.H Carr foresaw the teaching-learning role of the history but the modern so called superpowers appear devoid of making good out of the living history. NATO’s priorities were chartered in the collective defense of the member states against the hypothesis of communist led war in Europe, not the adventurous notion of collective security defying its own charter to fight in Afghanistan and possibly Iraq and onward to Pakistan. This clearly is a self-expanded dictum of the NATO war mongers. After the WW2, the UN was the embodiment of collective security for the war torn apart world by the European adventures of national pride and ethnic identity. Like the failure of the League of the Nations, history tells how the UN has come to be a failed enterprise in global affairs. It affirms the principle of self-interest, that is the wars of European nationalism and superiority over others nations in areas irrelevant to the European-American foremost national interests. The European war mongers and the US Empire lost sense of intellect and strategic direction by invading Iraq and Afghanistan under the guise of “war on terrorism.”  After its final defeat, the US and its allies are gearing momentum to invade Pakistan—an ally but a pinching irk to the egomaniac and paranoid invaders. No wonder, it was an entrapment from the outset of the US warmongering in that region-only the Pakistani Generals and political rig heads were so stupid not to detect the true intents of the aggressors.  Chris Floyd noted it in plain words (“Darkness Renewed: Terror as a Tool of Empire,” 04/2009)
“It is the policy of the United States government to provoke violent extremist groups into action. Once they are in play, their responses can then be used in whatever way the government that provoked them sees fit. And we also know that these provocations are being used, as a matter of deliberate policy, to rouse violent groups on the "Af-Pak" front to launch terrorist attacks.”
The US and Britain had no rational purpose to be fighting against the poor and destitute people in Afghanistan and Iraq. Wars are the outcome of naïve, egoistic and corrupt mindset representing minority ruling elite, irresponsible to consequences on human society and are planned, financed and fought by governments, not by groups or ordinary people. Wars are based on political agendas and they long for complete control over resources, people and territory. Most wars would have multiple reasons, domestic, foreign and global outreach. The American led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are fought to maintain the US domination worldwide, to occupy the untapped natural resources of the Middle East in particular the oil and gas, and to protect the value of American dollar as a stable international reserve currency. In September 2000, the proactive policy paper written by the neoconservative intellectuals to envision “the Project for the New American Century (PNAC): sets out the milestone seeking American domination over the rest of the world powers and to meet its energies needs plans to occupy by force all the oil resources in the Arab Middle East. The blueprint supports military occupation of the oil exporting Arab countries and regime change where it is necessary to fulfill the policy aims of the New American Century of global domination. Centuries ago, German historian Carl Von Clausewitz wrote On War: “War is not merely a political act but also a real political instrument, a continuation of political commerce, a carrying out of the same by other means.” The small ruling elite who plans and wages war are often afraid of citizenry reaction and refusal to accept the so called antidote for the rationality of a war. Throughout the history European nationalism institutionalized the doctrine of war as a necessity to promote national interest and racial superiority over other by using war as a means to that end. Most proponents of wars have used “fear” as one of the major instruments of propaganda and manipulation to perpetuate allegiance from the ordinary folks to the elite warmongers in a crisis situation. Sheldon Richman (“War is Government Program” ICS, 05/2007), notes that “war is more dangerous than other government programs and  not just for the obvious reason – mass murder….war is useful  in  keeping the population in a state of fear and therefore trustful of their rulers.”
Ordinary citizens do not have passion for war as it disturbs the safe and secure, and destroys the living habitats. The ruling elite, the actual warmongers force people to think in their extreme terms of hatred and rejection of others so that people would be forced to align with the rulers to support and finance the war efforts. Sheldon Richman describes how Herman Goering, one of Hitler’s Minister understood the discourse of war making:
“Of course the people don’t want war….but after all, it’s the leaders of the country who determine the policy, and it’s always a simple matter to drag the people along, whether, it’s a democracy or a fascist dictatorship or a parliament or a Communist dictatorship.”
Paul Craig Roberts (“The Collapse of America Power”: ICS, 03/2008), attempts to explain how the British Empire had collapsed once its financial assets were depleted because of the 2ndWorld War debts. Correlli Barnett (The Collapse of British Power, 1972) states that at the beginning of the WW2, Britain had limited gold and foreign exchange to meet the pressing demands of the war. The British Government asked America to help finance their sustainability to continue the war. Thus, ‘this dependency signaled the end of British power.’ For its draconian wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, America is heavily dependent on China, Japan and Saudi Arabia. It is well known that American treasury owes trillion of dollars to its foreign debtors and therefore, its financial dependency is increasingly becoming an obvious indicator of the end of American global hegemony and wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. Now the US financial system  have broken down and some of the leading banking institutions have gone into declaring the bankruptcy the roller coaster repercussion could be seen across the American economic,  social and political spectrum of life. Under the Bush administration, America has shrinked its capability and vitality of role and in fact appears dismantled as a superpower status in global affairs. It is no wonder that other nations of world do not seem to take America and its traditional influential stratum in any serious context. Paul Craig Roberts (The Collapse of American Power”) refers to Noam Chomsky stating that under the neoconservative Bush Presidency, “America thinks that it owns the world.” But the fact of the matter is, explains Roberts, “that the US owes the world. The US ”superpower” cannot even finance its own domestic operations, much less its gratuitous wars except via the kindness of foreigners to lend it money that cannot be repaid.” It is undeniable that the US is “bankrupt” because of the on-going wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. David M. Walker Comptroller General of the US and Head of the Government Accountability Office (December 2007). reports that “In everyday language, the US Government cannot pass an audit.”
Chris Floyd (Darkness Renewed: Terror as Tool of Empire”), elaborates the warmongering mentality of the US policy makers: You goad and provoke violent extremist groups into retaliating against your attacks, your civilian-slaughtering invasions and incursions into their territory. Being unable to confront directly your war machine – the largest, most advanced military force in the history of the world, sustained by a tsunami of public money that each year surpasses the military spending of the rest of the world – they naturally respond with "asymmetrical" operations. At first, these are directed at nearby targets: your supply lines, the forces of your local proxies and allies, and other chaos-inducing depredations in the groups' own regions, designed to foul the lines of your control and drive you out. Just as naturally, you use these attacks to justify an even greater military presence in their regions. The cycle inevitably, inexorably ratchets upwards and outwards, until at last the extremists strike at your homeland – either with your connivance, or your covert acquiescence, or, in any event, with your foreknowledge that such an attack was sure to come. This is the moment you have waited for; this is exactly what you wanted. Now you can whip the herd back into a martial frenzy, keep the Long War going, and push aside the rabble's petty, small-minded desires for a peaceful, prosperous life at home, minding their own business.”
Michel Meacher, British Environment Minister under former Prime Minister Tony Blair (“This War on Terrorism is Bogus”) provides most credible insight on the real reasons for the “War on Terrorism.” He claims that the war on terror is superficial as “the 9/11 attacks gave the US an ideal pretext to use force to secure its global domination.” He further records that “the so called “war on terrorism” is being used largely as bogus cover for achieving wider US strategic geopolitical objectives…..in fact, 9/11 offered an extremely convenient pretext to put the PNAC plan into action. The evidence again is quite clear that plans for military action against Afghanistan and Iraq were in hand well before 9/11.” In its report prepared by the Baker Institute of Public Policy (April 2001), it stated clearly that “the US remains a prisoner of its energy dilemma. Iraq remains a destabilizing influence to….the flow of oil to international markets from the Middle East” and it its recommendations elaborated the dire need that because it was a challenging risk therefore, the “US military intervention” was the most favored action (Sunday Herald: Oct 6, 2002).  
Both the US and United Kingdom have increasing dependence on imported oil from the Middle East. The overriding motivation for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are shielded by political smokescreen that the US and UK will run out of sufficient hydrocarbon energy supplies whereas, the Arab and Muslim world would control almost 60% of the world oil  producing capacity and perhaps more significantly 95% of the remaining global oil production capacity. The news media reports indicate that the US is predicted to produce only 39% of the domestic oil production in 2010, whereas in 1990 it produced 57% of its total oil consumption. The UK Government projects ”severe” gas shortages by 2005 and it confirmed that 70% of the electricity will drawn from gas and 90% of gas will be imported. It is interesting to note that Iraq is said to have 110 trillion cubic feet of gas reserves in addition to its approximately 15-20 % of the world oil reserves. In another research report by the Commission on America’s National Interests (July 2000), it observed that the most promising new energy resources are found in the Caspian Sea, Central Asian region and it would spare the US exclusive dependence on the Saudi Arabian oil imports. The report outlined the feasible routes for the Caspian Seas oil deliveries, one hydrocarbon pipeline via Azerbaijan and Georgia and another pipeline through Afghanistan and Pakistan would ensure the future strategic demands of the US government. To review the documentary evidence of the 9/11 events, it is not unlikely that many strategists have seen the American Government failure to avert the 9/11 terrorist attacks as facilitating a much needed stage drama for its policy aims and an invaluable opportunity to attack Iraq and Afghanistan – a military intervention already been well planned in early 2000. The PNAC policy blueprint of September 2000 projects the transformation of the American power as an unchallengeable global superpower and the need for some tangible tragedy to make it happen. The paper outlines that it “is likely to be a long one in the absence of of some catastrophic and catalyzing event- like a new Pearl Harbor.”  In his analytical view, Minister Michael Meacher (“This War on terrorism is Bogus”) states that “global war on terrorism” has the hallmarks of a political myth propagated to pave way for a wholly different agenda-the US goal of world hegemony, built around securing by force command and over the oil supplies required to drive the whole project.”
Did the US hegemonic war achieved any of its set goals for strategic domination? Have the US and UK Governments secured any viable hydrocarbon energy routes to ensure their depleting gas and oil stocks and the much planned control over the Arab oil reserves? Is the US dollar still a reliable international currency used by some of the oil exporters and other global business dealers?
Recently, a retried American General Ricardo Sanchez challenged the prevailing notion of the Bush Administration “Mission accomplished “in Iraq, when he asserted that the occupation of Iraq is a “nightmare with no end in sight.” He claimed that the US administration is “incompetent” and “corrupt” and that the most American people could hope for under the present circumstances is to “stave off defeat” in Iraq war. Mike Whitney (“Come and see our overflowing morgues…..come and see the rubble of your surgical strikes”: An Arab Women Blues by Layla Anwar), believes that General Sanchez is neither against the war nor for withdrawal. He simply doesn’t like losing…. and the United Sates is losing.”  The General is reported to have admitted that “ after more than four years of fighting , America continues its desperate struggle in Iraq without any concerted effort to devise a strategy that will achieve victory in that war-torn country or in the greater conflict  against extremism.”  Under President Barrack Obama, the global community looks anxiously how and when the promised change will come to America’s failed strategy in Iraq and Afghanistan. How soon, President Obama will be able to put the body of US politics together again after its moral, political and financial collapse. America and Britain appear lost, not knowing how to come out of the self-engineered defeat in wars against Islam and the humanity.  Masses have sympathies with the true believers and the Muslim freedom fighters appear to have lost nothing. They had no banks to declare bankruptcy and they had no Bush and Cheney to go down in disgrace. They remain in tact and active all the fronts even buying weapons from the US and Russia to fight against them. American strategists know well to do business in global arms market. The so called superpowers are extremely nervous not knowing how soon they could be replaced by smaller nations of the developing world.
Layla Anwar (“An Arab Women Blues”-blog), a prominent high spirited Iraq female blogger attempts to share the global conscience with an inborn natural perspective of the Iraqi people who are the real victims of this ferocious war against their country. To reflect on how the adversely affected Iraqi people think on the on-going America-British led occupation of Iraq and unending causalities of daily deaths and destruction of the civilian population and habitats, Layla Anwar offers the real world description on her web site:
“Everyday, under the pretext of either al-Qaida, insurgents, militants or whatever imaginary name you coined, you have not ceased, not even for one day, slaughtering our innocents……for 4 years, you have not ceased for one single day, Not during holiday periods, not during religious celebrations, not even during the day your so called God was born….if you have a God that is.”
Did the US Empire achieve any of its strategic goals in transporting super war machines and the military and civilian death squads to Iraq and Afghanistan? Chris Floyd (Darkness Renewed”), explains the prevalent reality in global affairs:
“The United States government is planning to use "cover and deception" and secret military operations to provoke murderous terrorist attacks on innocent people. Let's say it again: Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, George W. Bush and the other members of the unelected regime in Washington plan to deliberately foment the murder of innocent people – your family, your friends, your lovers, you – in order to further their geopolitical ambitions.”
Overwhelmingly deficient with its thinking, moral and intellectual resources, America and Britain need “Idea Men” and THINKING people to dispel the obvious military defeat and surrender in Iraq and Afghanistan. These are some of the critical measures that any strategic thinkers should prefer to have for change and adaptability to the future in -waiting for the lost in action US and British forces.  
Paul J. Balles (“The World Sickest Warrior State” 03/2010, Information Clearing House), offers candid observations:
“We have now reached a stage where our extreme horrors of brutality and cruelty have exceeded our past records. We no longer have the rationale of moral righteousness of the earlier wars…. There were no excuses for Abu-Ghraib, but our interest in that inhuman travesty dried up and blew away. We have little concern about our violations of human rights in Guantanamo. ….the real horrors – of this war come with the primitive killer mentality developed in our youth. I've now seen a half dozen documentary films and read eyewitness accounts that reveal troops or pilots gloating over the massacres of civilians who just happened to be available targets.”
The wars spread hatred, chaos and human degeneration as are the global institutions responsible for security, peace and conflict resolution. The UN, NATO and other security agencies are driven to failure by their own deviations of the original role-play and inaction in situation of real world challenges. They have been manipulated and misled by the contemporary superpowers as was the devastating fate of the League of Nations. When something loses its purpose and direction, it ends-up in self-defeat and piles of garbage. The US-British strategic policy makers do not have the right kind of weapons to fight against Islam and God.  They appear to miss the historical conclusion that those who cross-over the limits of REASON and global responsibility, do end –up in failure and disasters. Both are trapped in self-generated illusions and are fighting against their own interest and survival.  American and British policy makers appear more victims of their own failing mindset than the self-desired challenges posed by the Talibans and other Mujihdeens in Afghanistan and Iraq. America and its allies need a Navigational Change. One would imagine, if the US and British policy makers had any rational understanding of fighting in a distant land without knowing the enemy and without having a logical basis for the wars, they would have cautioned the leaders and prevented them from historical repetition of disgraced failure. Obviously, the US Obama administration is looking for a fast track convenient opportunity to dispel the obvious military defeat in their cruel pursuits. The administration could resort to an extended attack on Pakistan under some false pretext and destroy its nuclear arsenal as a face saving achievement to bring the troops back home with drumbeats and spectators cheers. Pakistani crime riddled PPP political rulers and the cash-paid Generals could well deserve a  US led friendly jolt to learn from the contemporary history.
Mahboob A. Khawaja, Ph.D., http://www.opinion-maker.org/2011/10/us-led-bogus-wars/#

India's Silent War

A 40-year long civil war has been raging in the jungles of central and eastern India. It is one of the world's largest armed conflicts but it remains largely ignored outside of India.

Caught in the crossfire of it are the Adivasis, who are believed to be India's earliest inhabitants. A loose collection of tribes, it is estimated that there are about 84 million of these indigenous people, which is about eight per cent of the country's population.

For generations, they have lived off farming and the spoils of the jungle in eastern India, but their way of life is under threat. Their land contains mineral deposits estimated to be worth trillions of dollars. Forests have been cleared and the Indian government has evacuated hundreds of villages to make room for steel plants and mineral refineries.

The risk of losing everything they have ever known has made many Adivasis fertile recruits for India's Maoist rebels or Naxalites, who also call these forests home.

The Maoists' fight with the Indian government began 50 years ago, just after India became independent. A loose collection of anti-government communist groups - that initially fought for land reform - they are said to be India's biggest internal security threat. Over time, their focus has expanded to include more fundamental questions about how India is actually governed.

In their zeal for undermining the Indian government, Maoist fighters have torched construction equipment, bombed government schools and de-railed passenger trains, killing hundreds. In the name of state security, several activists who have supported the Maoists have been jailed and tortured. Innocent people have also been implicated on false charges. These are often intimidation tactics used by the government to discourage people from having any contact with the Maoists.

The uprising by Maoist fighters and its brutal suppression by the Indian government, has claimed more than 10,000 lives since 1980, and displaced 12 million people. Many of the victims are not even associated with either side. They are simply caught in the crossfire. And the violence is escalating as both sides mount offensive after counter-offensive.

Al Jazeera's Imran Garda travelled to the Indian states of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa and West Bengal to get a secret glimpse into the world of the Naxalites and to meet with rebel fighters as well as those victimised by this conflict.

India's Silent War
Imran Garda examines the 40-year war that has claimed thousands of lives but been largely ignored outside of India. http://english.aljazeera.net/programmes/aljazeeracorrespondent/2011/10/20111019124251679523.html

Libya’s path to Democracy

If there is one thing more fraught, more attended by failure and more difficult to do than fighting a war, it is building the peace which follows. Our modern wars are fought in weeks or months — but building the peace is measured in decades.

Wars are violent and swift. Building peace is long, painful and almost always untidy. Winning wars needs decisiveness. Building peace needs strategic patience.

What happens next in Libya is unlikely to be tidy or elegant to watch. Get used to it. The country is tribal by nature and the war has been tribal in its conduct. Finding a constitution — probably a highly devolved one — that can provide a framework to contain these pressures is not going to be easy — especially with such oil revenues to be distributed, so much religion to infect minds, and so many arms in the peoples’ hands.

But there are strengths to build on. There are some able individuals who are more than capable of efficiently running their country. With the world waiting at Tripoli’s door for its precious high-quality crude, Libya will not be poor. There is international goodwill. And, it seems, a desire among Libya’s people for genuine democracy, though — note please London,
Paris and Washington — one which will more likely see Turkey’s Islamic democracy as its model, than our secular ones.

We in the west must only help where we are asked to. This was a different war — we played our part to enable the Libyan people to fight on their own terms. We have to be prepared to let them build their own peace on the same basis. Interference will be unwise and unwelcome as they have made clear. Sending in floods of uninvited businessmen to capture contracts as reward for our help is not likely to be well received. Ditto dispatching the kind of small army of wet-behind-the-ears economic
graduates to “help them rebuild their economy”, which we sent to Iraq in the early days.

When, as seems almost inevitable, the building of the Libyan peace starts getting untidy and inelegant to watch, let us remember that when we did it our way in Iraq and Afghanistan, it wasn’t exactly a success either.

Our biggest mistake in Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere — from which perhaps the Libyans can learn — was to fail to make the rule of law the first priority. Thus corruption, that constant by-product of war, became ingrained in the peace. I changed this in Bosnia when I went there as high representative, but by then it was too late. The establishment of the rule of law — perhaps even martial law at first — which then develops over time into a reliable legal, judicial and prosecutorial
structure based on the cultural norms of the country, is the essential framework for the security people need and for economic activity.

A key and early ingredient in this is to establish the state’s monopoly in the use of lethal force. This will be one of Libya’s earliest challenges — taking privately possessed arms out of circulation. It will not happen quickly and it may need to be approached with subtlety as well as forceful insistence (in Kosovo they simply converted the rebel forces into a kind of home guard as an interim step).
By Paddy Ashdown-Dawn/Guardian News Service: http://www.dawn.com/2011/10/23/libyas-path-to-democracy.html

Tajikistan and Uzbekistan: Crackdown on Islamists may backfire

TASHKENT: US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton warned Tajikistan and Uzbekistan on Saturday that efforts to crack down on religious freedom might backfire.She said this could lead to increased sympathy for radical views in Central Asia, a region the United States sees as key to the future stability of Afghanistan.Clinton met Tajik President Imomali Rakhmon and Uzbek President Islam Karimov to thank the two Central Asian states for their cooperation in the US-led war in neighbouring Afghanistan.She stressed to both that freedom of religious expression was tied to the region`s future security, US officials said.“I disagree with restrictions on religious freedom and shared those concerns,” Clinton told a news conference after meeting Rakhmon in Dushanbe on the last full day of her latest overseas trip.She said efforts to regulate religion “could push legitimate religious expression underground, and that could build up a lot of unrest and discontent”.Clinton`s visit to the two former Soviet republics came after a trip to Afghanistan and Pakistan that was focused on US efforts to find a political solution to the decade-long Afghan conflict. She also promoted greater regional economic integration under a plan US officials have dubbed “the New Silk Road”.

Karimov and Rakhmon have moved to limit religious freedom in their countries which remain under authoritarian rule two decades after the break-up of the Soviet Union.Tajikistan, a mainly Muslim country of 7.5 million people, introduced laws in August to ban youths from praying in mosques, churches and other religious sites, a move that was criticised by religious leaders.Rakhmon, in power since 1992, has said tough measures are needed to stop the spread of religious fundamentalism in an impoverished country that shares a porous 1,340-km border with Afghanistan. “You have to look at the consequences,” Clinton said in Tajikistan.

“We would hope there would be a rethinking of any restrictions going forward, because we think it will increase sympathy for extremist views which would in turn threaten the stability and security of the country.”

Rakhmon`s Moscow-backed secular government clashed with the Islamist opposition during a 1992-97 civil war, in which tens of thousands were killed.

The president has ignored previous requests from the West to respect freedom of conscience. He has ordered students home from religious schools abroad and clamped down on a growing trend for Islamic dress.

US officials said Clinton also raised the issue with Uzbekistan`s Karimov — widely seen as one of the most repressive leaders in the region — as one of a number of human rights concerns that also include press freedom, human trafficking and political reforms.—Reuters

LONDON: If there is one thing more fraught, more attended by failure and more difficult to do than fighting a war, it is building the peace which follows. Our modern wars are fought in weeks or months — but building the peace is measured in decades. Wars are violent and swift. Building peace is long, painful and almost always untidy. Winning wars needs decisiveness. Building peace needs strategic patience.

What happens next in Libya is unlikely to be tidy or elegant to watch. Get used to it. The country is tribal by nature and the war has been tribal in its conduct. Finding a constitution — probably a highly devolved one — that can provide a framework to contain these pressures is not going to be easy — especially with such oil revenues to be distributed, so much religion to infect minds, and so many arms in the peoples` hands.

But there are strengths to build on. There are some able individuals who are more than capable of efficiently running their country. With the world waiting at Tripoli`s door for its precious high-quality crude, Libya will not be poor. There is international goodwill. And, it seems, a desire among Libya`s people for genuine democracy, though — note please London, Paris and Washington — one which will more likely see Turkey`s Islamic democracy as its model, than our secular ones.

We in the west must only help where we are asked to. This was a different war — we played our part to enable the Libyan people to fight on their own terms. We have to be prepared to let them build their own peace on the same basis. Interference will be unwise and unwelcome as they have made clear. Sending in floods of uninvited businessmen to capture contracts as reward for our help is not likely to be well received. Ditto dispatching the kind of small army of wet-behind-the-ears economic graduates to “help them rebuild their economy”, which we sent to Iraq in the early days.

When, as seems almost inevitable, the building of the Libyan peace starts getting untidy and inelegant to watch, let us remember that when we did it our way in Iraq and Afghanistan, it wasn`t exactly a success either.

Our biggest mistake in Bosnia, Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere — from which perhaps the Libyans can learn — was to fail to make the rule of law the first priority. Thus corruption, that constant by-product of war, became ingrained in the peace. I changed this in Bosnia when I went there as high representative, but by then it was too late. The establishment of the rule of law — perhaps even martial law at first — which then develops over time into a reliable legal, judicial and prosecutorial structure based on the cultural norms of the country, is the essential framework for the security people need and for economic activity.

A key and early ingredient in this is to establish the state`s monopoly in the use of lethal force. This will be one of Libya`s earliest challenges — taking privately possessed arms out of circulation. It will not happen quickly and it may need to be approached with subtlety as well as forceful insistence (in Kosovo they simply converted the rebel forces into a kind of home guard as an interim step).
Dawn/Guardian News Service:http://www.dawn.com/2011/10/23/clintons-warning-to-tajikistan-and-uzbekistan-crackdown-on-islamists-may-backfire.html

Comments:
Dictators in Muslim world do not learn lessons, see Qadafi, Zain Abdin, Hosni Mubarak .... Asad and Saleh in line..... ..Central Asian states oppress people, where are human rights of these people, freedom to worship... freedom to speak... oppression breeds extremism and violence... world should move stop these dictators ... if want to make this world safe and peaceful..


Why Sufism?

To counter the emergence of fundamentalism in Pakistan, the ruling classes as well as intellectuals are advocating the revival of sufism. However, it is evident that ideas and the system cannot be revived because fundamentalism is a product of a certain time and space and fulfills the needs of that age.

Secondly, the very idea of revivalism indicates intellectual bankruptcy and lethargy of our intellectuals who are either not ready or do not have the capacity to understand the very phenomenon of religious extremism and its advent as a result of social, economic and political changes in society. A number of myths are associated with sufis. One of the arguments being that they converted non-Muslims and are responsible for the spread of Islam through the subcontinent. To portray them as missionaries discredits them as an impartial community. To convert someone means that they initially did not believe in the truthfulness of other religions. If this view is correct, it does not explain how they could create goodwill among people belonging to different religions.

Moreover, historical evidence shows that they did not make any attempt to convert people. Most of the great sufis lived in northern India where the Muslim population was a minority. Islam spread in Punjab, Sindh, and East Bengal where Brahmins were weak and the tribal system was powerful. Therefore, there are negative impacts of the glorification of sufism. We all know that the successors of the sufi saints exploited their ancestors’ stature and took undue benefits.

The shrine culture has always been opposed by the puritans as irreligious and as an attempt to pollute the purity of religion. In the subcontinent this conflict is evident between Deobandis and Barelvis. Revenge attacks on the shrines of some sufi saints has created a gulf between these two sects.To the Taliban, who adhere to the Deobandi creed, it is idolatry to visit shrines and to pray for the fulfillment of wishes. Some liberal intellectuals support it as an expression of cultural unity of different religions where Hindus and Muslim gather in respect of the saint.

Considering the whole phenomenon as popular culture according to the anthropological and historical point of view, every society has an elite class that enjoy music concerts, dancing, art, restaurants, clubs and other places for recreation. On the other hand, the masses enjoy popular culture which provides them an opportunity to forget the daily routine of life and indulge in some leisure time at popular festivals.

They visit shrines which are easily accessible to them and here they can pray to the saint to provide them with a cure for their ailments, to find them jobs, to save and protect them from evil forces and to make them materially successful in life. Women have their own specific wish list which includes a desire to bear children, to safeguard their marriage and have a loving relationship with their husband. It indicates the helplessness of not only women but also men.

When the state and society leave them without any service, the ordinary man has no option but to go and pray to a saint, to mediate between the individuals and God for fulfilment of their wishes.

As a majority of people live in poverty and misery, they are threatened by insecurity. Visiting a sufi shrine to pay homage to the saint gives them a sense of satisfaction.

Bringing Solutions to the Table in Afghanistan

By Ayesha Siddiqa
If you are a journalist or a political commentator, you are certain to get frantic calls from friends and family inquiring whether there will be a war between Pakistan and the US. The recent increase in tension between Pakistan and the US is unprecedented as both allies appear poised to come to blows with each other – or at least this is the common perception on the streets of Pakistan. There is concern in the country’s policy-making circles as well; they are considering a whole range of possibilities from an increase in American drone attacks to additional surgical strikes inside Pakistan, such as the one on Osama Bin Laden’s compound on May 2. There are fears too of American boots on the ground, which will naturally be viewed as a clear violation of Pakistan’s sovereignty.

Minister for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan HinaRabbani Khar (second from right) speaks at the APC held in Islamabad in September. Photo: AFP / Press Information Department
Nothing seems impossible considering the rising American rage over Pakistan’s alleged cooperation with the Haqqani network and the ISI’s alleged involvement in the attack on the American embassy in Kabul. Recently, Admiral Mike Mullen, who always regarded himself as a friend of General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, a few days prior to his retirement as chairman of the US joint chiefs of staff, went on record to accuse Pakistan of collusion with the Haqqanis. Although other American policy-makers were subsequently more cautious, Mullen’s comments, which he made while testifying before the Senate Committee in Washington, resonated on Capitol Hill. Needless to say, these comments did not do much for either American or Pakistani interests; rather, they brought the two sides to what looks like a collision course.
The Americans claim to have evidence of Pakistan’s involvement in the attack on the US embassy in Afghanistan, a charge that was denied by the ISI chief, General Ahmed Shuja Pasha, during his briefing to the All-Parties Conference on September 29. Earlier, Major General Athar Abbas, the ISPR chief, had stated that Pakistan’s ISI had nothing more than some contacts with the Haqqani network, but then so did numerous other agencies.
The entire focus of the bilateral dispute seems to be the Haqqani network, which is a group of the Taliban that have shown tremendous capacity to attack the US forces inside Afghanistan with impunity. The network comprises Sirajuddin Haqqani, son of the Afghan veteran warlord Jalaluddin Haqqani, Mullah Nazeer and Hafiz Gulbahadur. Although these warlords hail from Afghanistan, they have, over they years, managed to operate from Pakistan’s tribal areas and use it for re-grouping purposes or what a friend terms “rest and recreation.” The Haqqani network remains an “old irritant” in Washington circles. Prior to the Swat military operation, the US had been insisting that the Pakistan army target the Haqqani network, which appeared to control the areas bordering Afghanistan. But the Pakistan army always maintained that it would not antagonise any group that did not attack the Pakistani state. Additionally, Islamabad was peeved that the US was very selective and that it did not target those forces in Afghanistan that hurt the Pakistani state despite the evidence provided by Pakistan.
However, when a known enemy like Baitullah Mehsud was killed in a drone attack, Pakistan was not comfortable with the US policy of drone strikes. Some analysts are of the view that drone attacks pose a major threat to the Taliban, and one wonders if the Pakistani state’s main concern is collateral damage caused to innocent victims or the safety of Taliban groups that are considered friendly by the army and the ISI. In any case, numerous military analysts who are also linked with the ISI and the military, such as Brig. (retd) Asad Munir and Lt General (retd) Asad Durrani, consider the Taliban as representing almost 90% Pashtun interests. A similar claim is also made for the Haqqani network, which is viewed by the Pakistani state as representing Taliban interests. This perspective came out very clearly in a recent report published by Pakistan’s Jinnah Institute and America’s United States Institute for Peace (USIP). The analysis in the report, which was based on the point of view of 53 analysts, most of whom are known to sympathise with the state perspective, equate Taliban interests with Pashtun interests. This report is important since it indirectly presents the Pakistani military establishment’s perspective. Prime Minister Yusuf Raza Gilani endorsed this standpoint by announcing that Islamabad will talk to the Haqqani network as well.
The present friction is a consequence of the initiative on both sides (the US and Pakistan) to influence the Afghan endgame to their respective advantage. Privately, retired and serving military officers and strategic experts, who are now in abundance in Islamabad, admit that the ISI supports the Haqqani network due to its ability to launch military operations inside Afghanistan. These attacks are meant to bring the situation to a point where the US agrees to include Haqqani in the negotiations, the same way that Washington is talking to Mullah Omar. Lately, there were also reports that some of the military operations carried out in the last three to four months in South Waziristan were to allow room for the Haqqani network to operate in the South and engage with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). According to this plan, a friendly tribal force would manage to eliminate or neutralise an unfriendly tribal army more effectively.
There is no doubt that the Haqqani network keeps moving across the border, but its use of Pakistani territory as a staging post has never really been a secret. There are three Taliban groups: the Sirajuddin Haqqani group represents a Pakistan-friendly force as does the Quetta Shura but the TTP is considered inimical to Pakistan’s interests. For the moment, the Pakistani military is keen to put all its eggs in the Haqqani basket, in the hope that the Haqqanis inclusion in any future dispensation in Kabul would ensure a Pakistan-friendly government in Afghanistan.
But pursuing this game is not as easy as it sounds. First and foremost, there is the issue of American perception and reaction to the plan. The US has continued to launch drone attacks in North Waziristan to put pressure on the Taliban, in order to be able to negotiate with them from a position of strength. Although the Pakistani media has decreased its reporting of drone attacks after May 2, there has never been a lull in these attacks. If the US intends to up the ante, it could only do so by conducting a May 2 kind of a strike, but that is not possible without the availability of specific and actionable intelligence. Besides, there is always the risk of Pakistan responding to a surgical strike, which the army claims it would resort to the next time round. A Pakistani response would bring the army in direct confrontation with the US, which both sides might try to end to their own advantage. The political costs of such an adventure would be high for both sides and would not bring any real strategic benefits. The US must understand that the possibility of a military defeat may not, at this stage, convince Pakistan to take on the Haqqani network.
The greater risk Pakistan faces is that of economic sanctions. The Pakistani establishment is trying hard to find alternative economic sources such as China, or by increasing trade options. But none of these have the potential to offset the damage if the US were to rally the world to punish Pakistan economically. From this perspective, the All-Parties Conference convened by Prime Minister Gilani to deal with the situation failed to do a satisfactory job. While the APC was high on expression of national anger, it did not really look at the various scenarios that Pakistan may have to encounter. Also, the meeting did not highlight the fact that there is little that Pakistan can do in terms of convincing the US to accommodate the Haqqani network. However, the APC uproar has somewhat eased Washington’s pressure on Pakistan. They have toned down their accusations, even though a large number of American policy-makers are not convinced of Pakistan’s innocence vis-à-vis the Taliban.
Another problem with the APC was its inability to emphasise the need for an alternative agenda to counter radicalism, terrorism and Talibanisation in Pakistan, and in the region. GHQ Rawalpindi, as sources suggest, feels that after the American exit from Afghanistan, violence in Pakistan and the region in general will dissipate as the Afghan Taliban, including the Quetta Shura and the Haqqani Network, will move back into Afghanistan. The Pakistani groups, on the other hand, such as the Lashkar-e-Taiba or various other Deobandi groups, will either take their activities to the tribal areas or keep moving between Afghanistan and the tribal areas. It is generally believed that in either case, Pakistan will see less violence. A friendly government in Kabul will ensure peace in Pakistan. But this formula does not necessarily guarantee Pakistan’s security or solve its radicalisation problem. Furthermore, with so many factions in Afghanistan, there is a risk of Pakistan getting sucked into the Afghan quagmire. After all, if you rush to get to the head of the table, there is also the risk of being the first to face the music. Supporting the Taliban and similar groups is a strategy fraught with huge security risks for Pakistan’s stability in the future.
The current showboating between Pakistan and the US does not serve the interests of either. The best option for Afghanistan would be for all players in the region to come together to ensure the country’s immediate securityand find a solution to its future problems. Besides America’s dependence on Pakistan to keep its supply lines to Afghanistan open, there are strategic reasons for Washington to keep talking to Islamabad. But as the US gets into the election cycle and its enthusiasm for staying on in Afghanistan wears out, chances are that the hawkish elements in Washington may increase the pressure on Pakistan. This is the time for various forces involved in Afghanistan and in the region to move with caution and show sense and sensibility, without which they will not be able to bring a solution to the table.
http://www.newslinemagazine.com/2011/10/bringing-solutions-to-the-table-in-afghanistan/

Top 5 Ways Jewish Law Justifies Killing Civilians


Islamophobes claim that Islam is more violent than other religions, particularly Judaism and Christianity.  To prove this, they argue that the Islamic holy book, the Islamic prophet, and the Islamic God are all uniquely violent–certainly more so than their Judeo-Christian counterparts.
Instead of defending their initial claim (which they simply cannot), the Islamophobes quickly shift gears and rely on a fallback argument: ,,,,continue reading >>  http://wp.me/p1dL2Q-fi

No Panacea for Palestine




Looking for recognition: Mahmoud Abbas holds a copy of the letter requesting Palestinian statehood as he speaks at the UN in New York in September 2011. Photo: AFP
In the last week of September 2011, Mahmoud Abbas received a tumultuous reception in the West Bank on his return from New York, even though he came empty-handed. Many Palestinians had feared that in the face of threats from Israel and the United States, and bullying by some of their allies, the president of the Palestinian Authority would abandon his quest for Palestinian statehood at the United Nations.
To his credit, he didn’t – in part, no doubt, because the loss of face back home would have further eroded his legitimacy. He did, however, compromise by agreeing for the statehood application to be slow-tracked through the Security Council. It was passed on to a committee for consideration, with no declared time-scale for a vote. President Barack Obama had declared at the very outset that America would exercise its veto. The US realises, of course, that such an action would damage its credibility in the Middle East. Its preferred course would be for the request to fail to muster the nine votes it needs, and to that end considerable pressure has been exerted on members of the Security Council.
Two other permanent members of the council, Britain and France, were expected to abstain – and they too, would rather not have to do that, given that it would clearly signal a pro-Israel bias. Nicolas Sarkozy suggested to Abbas that he shouldn’t bother with the Security Council at all but go straight to the General Assembly – where the Palestinian cause is more or less guaranteed the two-thirds majority it needs. The assembly is a far more representative international forum than the Security Council, but a much less powerful one. It cannot confer statehood; a majority vote there would merely enhance the Palestinians’ observer status, enabling membership of peripheral UN committees.
It would nonetheless demonstrate that an overwhelming proportion of governments across the globe favour Palestinian statehood. The support is even greater at the popular level, not least in European countries whose governments are wary of publicly deviating from the US-Israeli line. What’s more, a poll conducted by the Hebrew University ahead of last month’s UN session found 70% support among Israelis for the idea that if the UN voted for a Palestinian state, their nation should accept the decision.
On September 22, author Sefi Rachlevski led a gathering of 80 well-known Israeli intellectuals outside Independence Hall in Tel Aviv in support of a Palestinian state. “Palestine, you don’t need our permission to have a state,” he declared, “Negotiations on its borders can follow.” Historian Yehuda Bauer said a majority of Israelis would support a two-state solution, but warned: “I am afraid of the violent orthodox who have openly established a separate entity (in settlements in occupied Palestinian territory). They pose the real danger to Israel.”
One can only wonder whether it would be possible for a bunch of Jewish intellectuals to express similar sentiments on the streets of New York, where Republican presidential contender Rick Perry, last month, accused Obama of betraying Israel by mentioning the 1967 borders and failing to support the Jewish settlements. He also found it unspeakable that Washington had abandoned Israel’s trusted friend Hosni Mubarak.

Friendly nations, not-so friendly leaders: Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu speaks during a bilateral meeting with US President Barack Obama on September 21, 2011. Photo: AFP
The rest of the world might consider it a trifle odd for anyone to question the Obama administration’s loyalty to Israel – but then a majority of Republican presidential hopefuls seem to inhabit a parallel universe. It wasn’t very long ago that the Congress embraced Benjamin Netanyahu with the fervour it once reserved for George W. Bush, and perhaps the most bizarre strand of fanatical support for Israel is represented by Christian fundamentalists who see it as a potential Armageddon and thereby a conduit to the End Times.
In his speech to the UN, Obama dropped all pretence of even-handedness, leading former Palestinian spokeswoman Hanan Ashrawi to tell the Israeli newspaper Haaretz: “I couldn’t believe what I heard. It sounded as though Palestinians were the ones occupying Israel. There wasn’t one word of empathy for the Palestinians.” Abbas, who had yet to make his own speech, was seen shaking his head and then holding it in his hands. Netanyahu snubbed the US president – it’s no secret that the two of them cannot stand each other – by being absent during his speech, but later praised it and described the veto pledge as a “badge of honour.”
The strident opposition from Israel and the US contributed a certain cachet to the drama of the Palestinian bid for recognition, creating the impression that both countries feared its consequences would be more than symbolic. Israel combined the stick of threatening to suspend the payment of taxes it collects on behalf of the Palestinian Authority with the carrot of immediate negotiations, with Netanyahu offering to open talks in New York itself.
The trouble, of course, is that over the years negotiations have led nowhere and the so-called peace process has become a means of sustaining the status quo. In fact: Israel, which already directly controls 60% of the West Bank, has continued to expand its encroachments on Palestinian territory, which have always been illegal under international law, but whose growth attracts only the mildest of reprimands from Washington.
Abbas, who was both America’s and Israel’s preferred successor to Yasser Arafat, bent over backwards to justify their trust in him, but found it led nowhere. Even now he may not have completely realised that a two-state solution based approximately on the 1967 borders has never been Israel’s intention, notwithstanding widespread support among Israeli citizens for such an outcome. Netanyahu may be the first prime minister to have categorically spoken of two states, but he also heads a government beholden to religious and political fanatics, and therefore even less likely than its predecessors to negotiate in good faith.
The Palestinian demand for decades now has been for an independent state based on 22% of historic Palestine. (When the same UN sanctioned Israeli statehood in 1947, the portion offered to Palestinians was 44%). They can hardly be expected to accept less than that. Mutually agreed land swaps could be a way for illegal Jewish settlements contiguous to Israel to be legally annexed, but there are plenty that would have to be dismantled for even a vaguely coherent state of Palestine to be established. Is that ever likely to be attempted? Certainly not without unprecedented American coercion. And what are the chances of that?
Some Palestinians and Israelis believe that the “facts on ground” have gone too far for a reversal, and that the only viable solution is a single Israeli-Palestinian state. Such a country, if it were to be democratic, could obviously not be a specifically Jewish state. The concessions required for such an outcome – and the complications it would inevitably entail – are barely conceivable.
The events of this year have transformed the regional atmosphere, much to Israel’s consternation. But the Palestinian spring that Abbas has lately been trying to evoke remains something of a pipe-dream. The dramatic UN option was something of a last resort for the beleaguered leader, but if the bold gesture pays no dividends in the short term, the renewed disillusionment of his constituents could produce unpleasant consequences.

Free Palestine: Palestinian youths hurl stones towards an Israeli army watchtower at a checkpoint between Jerusalem and Ramallah on September 23, 2011. Photo: AFP
Part of the problem with the stalled peace process has always been America’s nonsensical posture as an honest broker. Sarkozy has lately suggested enhanced European involvement, possibly alongside Arab states that have relations with Israel. That sounds like a considerably better idea than the periodic dispatch to the region of blatantly pro-Israeli interlocutors such as Dennis Ross and Tony Blair. But will Israel – and, by extension, the US (the one being a veritable arm of the other, to paraphrase Mike Mullen) – permit any diplomacy that threatens to produce results? Sure, Israel’s subjection to the sort of international opprobrium that proved positively challenging for apartheid South Africa could indeed precipitate a more realistic mindset. But that’s about as likely as the onset of the End Times.
Statehood would have transformed the occupied territories into an occupied state that could have sought international assistance to liberate itself. The moral approbation implicit in the change in status that a General Assembly vote may confer this month or later in the year could marginally enhance the Palestinians’ bargaining power but won’t necessarily get them far.
In the past few weeks there have already been incidents of violence and intimidation, mostly provoked by the heavily armed illegal settlers. The prospect of further bloodshed, in which Palestinian suffering is invariably exponentially greater than Israeli pain, cannot be ruled out. In which case, history will record yet another instance of autumn dressed up as spring.

Once upon a time…


Discovering the past has always fascinated archaeologists and historians. Archeologists recreate the past through excavation of what lies hidden beneath the earth and long forgotten, building their ideas on their findings through destroyed monuments, artefacts, tools, instruments, human and animal bones. They organise scattered evidence to reconstruct the past. In this way creation of ancient and pre-historical past has immensely enriched historical studies.

On the other hand historians recreate and reconstruct the past through documents, inscriptions, coins, paintings, architecture and sculpture. In this process of reconstructing the past, archaeologists and historians are influenced by social, political and economic perspectives of their time. For Jews, the past is full of suffering, pain, genocide, massacre and expulsion from one country to another. Their perseverance and their will to survive serve as inspiration. However, after the establishment of Israel, they applied all the methods which were used for their persecution against Palestinians.

In turn, the loss of their homes, expulsion from their ancestral land and bloodshed of their community has urged Palestinians to struggle and fight for their independence. Some historians regard the past of a particular age as dark and worthless. For others, the same could be an inspiring source of enlightenment.

When medieval Europe was dominated by religious narrow mindedness, the Renaissance humanists believed that the state of affairs was barren and useless. On the contrary, the classical past of Greece and Rome was fascinating to them as it encouraged creative thinking for a better understanding of human nature. Opinions about medieval Europe changed during the romantic period, when scholars depicted it as period of peace and serenity.

For Muslims, the medieval period of their history was glorious with their civilisation and culture at its zenith. Interestingly the rise of Europe coincides with Muslims’ decline. Therefore, they take pride in the medieval past but ignore the recent past.
Renaissance humanists were inspired by philosophical and literary aspects instead of military conquests. Hence it seems that politicians and scholars use the past according to their likes and interests.

For the European colonial powers, past glories were interpreted through occupation and civilisation of land. When the European nations conquered South America and found the monuments of the Inca, Maya, and Aztec civilisations, they refused to recognise these as the work of native Americans. Instead these were attributed to foreign invaders.

Similarly, historical heritage of African countries was credited to foreign conquerors. In India, the Taj Mahal was long considered the work of European architects. By rejecting the past of a civilisation, the natives were considered subhuman and uncultured.

In China, the intellectuals rejected their past as orthodox and as an obstacle in the way of advancement. Their argument was that the Chinese were defeated and humiliated by the European powers due to their tradition and culture which failed to defend the country against the onslaught of western imperialism. Therefore, to struggle against invasion and to become independent, it was important to get rid of the past and adopt modern civilisation. This led to the socialist revolution in China.

In India, the political leadership revived the Indian past to create a sense of unity and belonging among the people struggling against colonialism. In the first attempt, historians reconstructed the Mughal history and culture as a tool to unite Hindus and Muslims as one nation. In the second attempt Gandhi and other Hindu leaders propagated the revival of ancient India in order to mobilise the Hindu population.

Criticising this approach, Muslim intellectuals presented an alternative past —- the Islamic period. Their glorification of the Abbasids and the Muslim rule of Spain isolated Indian Muslims. So absorbed were they in the grandeur of their distant Islamic past that the Mughal dynasty was excluded from it.

Hali in his long poem on the rise and fall of Islam laments upon the past but in Iqbal’s poetry, there is pride and a sense of admiration of the past grandeur. However, both approaches have been unable to change the Muslim thought process to understand change and to adopt modern ideas to confront challenges.
By Mubarak Ali, http://www.dawn.com/2011/10/16/past-present-once-upon-a-time.html

Caught in the Af-Pak Quagmire


Since the tragic events of 9/11, the western world in general and the liberal, modernist intellectuals in the Muslim world have been trying to understand the causes of extremism. If we are able to understand fully the reasons for the emergence of violent, extremist groups with the agenda of capturing the soul of Muslims societies, the task of taking remedial measures will be a lot easier.

Not that the policymakers who have conducted security and foreign affairs of the state and academics from different disciplines of human sciences have not tried to do so. Rather, it is the complex social reality and the involvement of many local, regional and foreign actors in the making of the violent mindset that makes our understanding of the conflict incomplete and sometimes subjective.

Riaz Mohammad Khan, a distinguished career diplomat and an author of two books on Afghanistan, doesn’t claim to have found conclusive answers to the larger questions of extremism and conflict in the region in Afghanistan and Pakistan: Conflict, Extremism, and Resistance to Modernity. In a modest tone, he wishes to participate in the intellectual debate and register his views. Writing this book is important for two reasons. Firstly, Ambassador Khan has personally and intimately participated in the formulation of Pakistan’s position on a wide range of issues relating to Afghanistan. Naturally, the world community and many of us in Pakistan would be interested in hearing from people like him who have been insiders. Secondly and more importantly, as Pakistan is one of the countries most affected by more than 30 years of conflict in Afghanistan, its citizens and intellectuals must make a contribution to understanding the conflict. There is an obligation to be intellectually present in the debates and controversies, and in the generation of ideas about how we can recover from the extremist and violent mindset.

This is an urgent task. Insiders’ view of Afghanistan, Pakistan and the conditions that have produced the conflict are perhaps more important than of those outsiders who study these issues from their secluded desks. This is not a judgement on the quality of scholarship of either category, but a comment on the importance of the medium of books to exchange ideas and articulate alternative perspectives.

The contents of the book can be divided into three parts according to the way it has been organised. The first part of the book is a detailed analysis of the developments in Afghanistan leading to the emergence of the Taliban. Most of the facts about the rise of the Taliban are well-known. What this book contributes to our knowledge is mere confirmation by an insider in the Pakistan Foreign Office of the security concerns, regional interests and limited options that prompted Pakistan to support the Taliban. Before betting on the Taliban, Pakistan had tried every possible means to keep the Mujahiden factions unified and focussed on cooperation to ensure stability and peace in Afghanistan. The author argues with a lot of evidence how Pakistan lost influence over the Mujahideen organisations after the fall of the Najibullah regime — their struggle for power and personal rivalries were just too strong. In this struggle they looked towards outside supporters and fashioned their own respective foreign and security policies. That brought in regional countries into the Afghan power game — Pakistan being just one of them. The result was political fragmentation of Afghanistan and the emergence of warlords controlling parcels of the country.

Khan argues that two major objectives guided Pakistan’s policy toward Afghanistan — “friendly government” and “strategic depth” — objectives he considers “dubious and impractical”. Ideas like these also make Afghans suspicious of Pakistan’s intentions, as they appear to be offensive, patronising and interventionist. He argues for an alternative approach, working bilaterally towards “normal friendly relations” and stability in Afghanistan that will promote Pakistan’s interests better than what he considers “confused and warped thinking” such as strategic depth.

These are serious comments, which demonstrate two different approaches on regional foreign policy — one adopted by the Foreign Office and the other by the security establishment of Pakistan.

The book presents a nuanced and insightful view on the emergence of the Taliban. Khan is right in saying that it was a “phenomenon waiting to happen” because of the ten-year Afghan-Soviet war and then five years of civil war among the Afghan groups. There are other factors that created an enabling environment — Islamisation by General Ziaul Haq, Afghan jihad, proliferation of madrassas, and the spread of the Deobandi and Wahabi creed. But then, it was a chaotic security situation in the country created by the withering of the Afghan state and the emergence of too many centres of power controlled by greedy, aggressive and self-serving warlords that made the Taliban a popular movement. After quick successive victories they captured Kabul. Their goals also changed from establishing security and order to transforming the country into a “pure Islamic state”.

Khan provides a balanced view of this development. The Taliban are often maligned for their treatment of women, minorities and opponents while the inhuman treatment meted out to them by their foes from the Northern Front, which comprised ethnic minorities, is ignored. Khan gives a brief account of how thousands of Taliban were trapped, captured and brutally murdered in Mazar-i-Sharif. The civil war in Afghanistan was in my view motivated by ethnic, power factors and supported by
outside powers — Iran, India, Russia and Pakistan. The residual social and political effects of this brutal and bloody conflict may continue to haunt Afghanistan’s and the block’s ethnic reconciliation.

The world at large ignored the Taliban regime — a sort of social rejection by the international community for their primitive image and discriminatory treatment of women and minorities. The very powers that supported the Mujahiden resistance had abandoned the country as a dark hole once they achieved their strategic objective of winning the Cold War. Could Afghanistan and the region around it, including Pakistan, have been different from what it is today if the world community had committed itself to rebuilding Afghanistan after the fall of communism or engaged constructively with the Taliban regime? It is an important question to think about. I cannot answer it, but it would suffice to say that post-conflict reconstruction must be considered not only a moral issue, but also a national security imperative.

The cost of that neglect has been too heavy for the West, the region, Afghanistan and Pakistan. With this in mind, and how Pakistan became fixated with the construction of a national security state, its imperatives driving our internal political development and foreign policy, Khan explains the rise of militancy, extremism and conflict within Pakistan. His main thesis is that Pakistan has drifted away from the vision of its founders. I am in full agreement with him when he makes an argument for a democratic, constitutional state driven by a modernist agenda of social change and economic development. He registers his concern about making militancy an instrument of foreign policy which has stung Pakistan and
appears to be out of control.

Drawing insights from the history of the region and based on his own experiences in handling Afghanistan, Khan makes a sound argument for Afghanistan for the Afghans — respect of the country’s sovereignty and autonomy. The American led war and presence of its forces can pose a problem for Afghanistan and the region as it may continue to fuel anger and incite militant resistance. Khan proposes “long-term international and US political and economic engagement” and “reconciliation” within Afghanistan as important variables for peace and stability. For reconciliation to be successful, it must be an Afghan initiative and its ownership and responsibility must rest with them, with supportive role from the outsiders.

The author argues that the post-Taliban Afghanistan is “irreversible”, but to protect gains in state and nation building, the American and international strategy needs to move beyond war as a primary instrument of policy. The key point he suggests is overcoming fear and distrust by the three players — Afghanistan, Pakistan and the US. Better understanding of one
another’s expectations, genuine interests, and limitations can help. But what is more important is being realistic in the pursuit of ambitions and not going back to the old power games, regional rivalries and interventionist policies.

In the case of Pakistan, Khan makes a passionate case for a return to the modernist vision, educational and madrassa reforms, the integration of FATA with the Pakistani state system and the rejection of militant outfits as instruments of policy. The hearts of those readers who want to see a progressive, modernist Pakistan would be warmed by reading the book.

Caught in the Af-Pak quagmire Reviewed By Rasul Bakhsh Rais . The reviewer is a professor of Political Science at LUMS and the author of two books on Afghanistan


Book Review on: "Afghanistan and Pakistan: Conflict, Extremism and Resistance to Modernity" By Riaz Mohammad Khan, Oxford University Press, Karachi, ISBN 978-0-19-906381-9 , http://www.dawn.com/2011/10/16/cover-story-caught-in-the-af-pak-quagmire.html

Arab uprising to continue for years: Ex-chief of Al Jazeera


In the dingy lobby of a London hotel, Wadah Khanfar makes room for me on the sofa and says he is feeling fantastic. “It`s one of the most beautiful moments in my life. You know when you wake up in the morning and you don`t have that kind of responsibility — to watch the screen and make sure there are no mistakes — it is very relieving. To be able to go swimming early in the morning and have breakfast and sit with your wife, it`s amazing. I haven`t done this for years.”

Three weeks ago, at the age of just 43, Khanfar left one of the best jobs in the world. As director general of Al Jazeera, the Qatar-based satellite broadcaster that made its name in the aftermath of 9/11, he led the transformation of Arab television that some believe enabled the Arab spring to take place.

On TV and Twitter he insisted the decision to resign was his own, to widespread disbelief, and last week journalism professor George Brock suggested he had sacrificed himself “to save Al Jazeera”. So is Al Jazeera, which celebrates its 15th anniversary next month, under threat? If so, where from?

The broadcaster`s independence has been challenged from several directions recently, highlighting the tightrope it must walk in its dealings with the west on one hand, and Arab states on the other. Khanfar has always insisted that the hefty subsidy paid by the Qatari royal family to Al Jazeera did not buy editorial influence, and says the support of the emir and the chair of governors insulated the channel from the complaints of foreign governments.

But the situation of Qatar itself has become more complicated, as the emir has pursued an active policy of punching above his tiny country`s weight and shaping a new role for Qatar in international diplomacy. WikiLeaks showed Qatar badmouthing Egypt and promoting itself as an alternative broker in the Middle East, while recent reports suggest the Taliban may soon open a Doha office from which to conduct negotiations with the Americans.

Khanfar`s resignation followed the release of another WikiLeaks cable that showed him bending to US pressure over footage of injured Iraqi civilians, leading some to conclude that the Qataris sacked him to save face. His replacement by a member of the Qatari royal family, a former gas executive, has been seen as proof that the Qataris have adjusted the broadcaster`s remit and drastically shortened the reins.

Khanfar says, however, that his departure has nothing to do with any of this: “OK, we have millions of rumours about why and how and who, but the story actually is, that after this year of our coverage, I think we achieved the peak of our presence.”

Journalism with a joy

He talks about journalism with a joy and sincerity wonderful to hear for a fellow journalist toiling away in an organisation battling multimillion-pound losses in a British media landscape poisoned by the cynicism of some of its owners. Since I don`t want to think he`s not telling the truth, I believe him. It may be that Khanfar resigned because he knew the greatest days of his editorial freedom were behind him, and that Al Jazeera`s coverage of uprisings closer to home in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia could not equal the glory of those February days when 24-hour rolling news helped ensure the safety of the Tahrir Square protesters. But resign he did.

“This Arab spring is going to continue for years,” he says. “I don`t think it`s going to end tomorrow, but the biggest part of it is to start the revolution and that has happened. The greatest success was in Egypt and Tunisia; in Libya and the rest of the Arab world we have a more complicated situation and on a personal level, I thought this is the right moment for me to move on, to become part of the building of a new Arab world.”

Khanfar used to be a foreign correspondent, and is full of great stories of life in the field. Although he must have been brave, reporting from Kabul and returning to Iraq through Kurdistan after he was kicked out, he does not seem all that interested in war. One of his favourite tales is eating a rooster under the stars after getting lost in south-west Zimbabwe. Khanfar wrote a thesis on African democracy and thinks he would have ended up in a think-tank if Al Jazeera had not offered him a job.

He has always been keen to use the camera himself. “I discovered that in order to write a magnificent piece you should shoot the images because once you are filming, you are writing the script in your mind,” he says. Once a group of armed Pashtun farmers mistook the camera for a chemical-spraying device aimed at their poppies, but he made them laugh by playing his footage to them. “I wrote a magnificent report; they started complaining about the government, about the Americans. They showed me how they refine it [the heroin]; told me why they are doing it.”

He and seven younger siblings grew up in a village near Jenin on the West Bank. His father was a teacher and Khanfar left to study engineering in Jordan, where he met his wife, a novelist, as she gave a speech to the student union (impressed by her courage, he proposed the same day). His family remains in Palestine and Khanfar calls it “a very beautiful, simple, isolated life”, but politics was everywhere. “There was a feeling of protest and resistance in 1982-83, long before the intifada.”

He describes the mosque as a crucial part of village life. “Yes, I am a practising Muslim and I go to mosque whenever I have time — not every day, as you see. For me, Islam is a moral reference point, a source of inspiration to work collectively with people, to love people and to help them, to concentrate on universal values of mercy, co-operation and tolerance.”

The other universal value Khanfar has adopted is democracy, which he believes will eventually stretch across the Arab world, including Qatar and Saudi Arabia. “Some people have started to be critical of the Arab spring, to say that extremists will be brought into parliaments and so on. In my opinion, you have to accept this and deal with the ramifications because there is no other way. If you reject this, what other way are you going to pick?
Dawn/Guardian News Service: http://www.dawn.com/2011/10/16/ex-chief-of-al-jazeera-says-arab-uprising-to-continue-for-years.html