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Celeberation of Birth of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) Mawlid

Mawlid falls in the month of Rabi' al-awwal in the Islamic calendar. Mawlid (Qur'anic Arabic: مَوْلِدُ النَبِيِّ‎ mawlidu n-nabiyyi, “Birth of the Prophet” is the observance of the birthday of the Islamic prophet Muhammad which occurs in Rabi' al-awwal, the third month in the Islamic calendar. Shias observe the event on the 17th of the month, coinciding with the birth date of their sixth Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq and the Prophet Muhammad while Sunnis observe it on the 12th of the month. As the Islamic calendar is a lunar calendar, the corresponding date in the Gregorian calendar varies each year. 
History:
The basic earliest accounts for the observance of Mawlid can be found in 8th century Mecca, when the house in which Prophet Muhammad was born was transformed into a place of prayer by Al-Khayzuran (mother of Harun al-Rashid, the fifth and most famous Abbasid caliph).Though public celebrations of the birth of Muhammad did not occur until four centuries after his passing away. The oldest Mawlid-text is claimed to be from the 12th century and most likely being of Persian origin.
The early celebrations included elements of Sufic influence, with animal sacrifices and torchlight processions along with public sermons and a feast.The celebrations occurred during the day, in contrast to modern day observances, with the ruler playing a key role in the ceremonies.Emphasis was given to the Ahl al-Bayt with presentation of sermons and recitations of the Qur'an. The event also featured the award of gifts to officials in order to bolster support for the ruling caliph
Legality:
Traditionally Sunni and Shia scholars have approved celebration of Mawlid-un-Nabi except Wahabi and Deobandi scholars. In the Muslim world the majority of Islamic scholars are in favor of Mawlid. They consider observing Mawlid necessary or permissible in Islam, and see it as a praiseworthy event and positive development, while the Salafi minority say it is an improper innovation and forbid its celebration.

Mufti Ali Gomaa, Chief Mufti of the world's oldest and largest Islamic University Al Azhar in Egypt, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the primary scholar of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, Muhammad Alawi al-Maliki, Grand Mufti of Cyprus Nazim Al-Haqqani, Habib Ali al-Jifri of Yemen, Syed Shujaat Ali Qadri, Muhammad Ilyas Qadri the founder of Dawat-e-Islami, Nuh Ha Mim Keller, Grand Mufti of Bosnia Mustafa Cerić, Abdalqadir as-Sufi, Hamza Yusuf, Gibril Haddad, Shaykh Said Afandi al-Chirkawi, Shaykh Hisham Kabbani, Grand Mufti of India Akhtar Raza Khan, Kanthapuram A. P. Aboobacker Musalyar of Markazu Saqafathi Sunniya and Zaid Shakir, all subscribe to Sunni Sufi Islam, and have given their approval for the observance of Mawlid.They suggest that fasting on Mondays is also a way of commemorating Prophet Muhammad's  (pbuh) birthday.

Scholars and preachers who consider Mawlid to be heresy and forbid its celebration belong to the Wahabi or Deobandi ideologies, they include Abd al-Aziz ibn Abd Allah ibn Baaz, who was the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia, Abdul Rahman Al-Sudais, the imam of the Masjid al-Haram in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, Zakir Naik,and Bilal Philips,of the Wahabi / Salafi movement, and Muhammad Taqi Usmani, Muhammad Rafi Usmani and Ebrahim Desai who subscribe to the Deobandi movement. Although all agree that the birth of Muhammad was the most significant event in Islamic history, they point out that the companions of Muhammad and the second and third generation of Muslims did not observe this event

Mawlid is celebrated in most Muslim countries, and in other countries where Muslims have a presence, such as India, Britain, Russiaand Canada. Saudi Arabia is the only Muslim country where Mawlid is not an official public holiday. Participation in the ritual celebration of popular Islamic holidays is seen as an expression of the Islamic revival.

Where Mawlid is celebrated in a carnival manner, large street processions are held and homes or mosques are decorated. Charity and food is distributed, and stories about the life of Prophet Muhammad(pbuh) are narrated with recitation of poetry by children.Scholars and poets celebrate by reciting Qaṣīda al-Burda Sharif, the famous poem by 13th century Arabic Sufi Busiri.

During Pakistan's Mawlid celebration, the national flag is hoisted on all public buildings, and a 31-gun salute in Islamabad and a 21-gun salute at the provincial headquarters are fired at dawn. The cinemas shows religious rather than secular films on 11th and 12th Rabi-ul-Awwal.Hundreds of thousands of people gather at Minar-e-Pakistan Lahore between the intervening night of 11th and 12th Rabi' al-awwal for Mawlid celebrations, this is the worlds biggest gathering for Mawlid celebrations.
Among non-Muslim countries, India is noted for its Mawlid festivities.The relics of Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) are displayed after the morning prayers in the Indian states of Jammu and Kashmir at the Hazratbal Shrine, on the outskirts of Srinagar. Shab-khawani night-long prayers held at the Hazratbal Shrine are attended by thousands.
Other non-Muslim countries noted for its Mawlid festivities are Kenya and Tanzania where it is known as "Maulidi". In Kenya, the most famous place is the coastal island of Lamu and Malindi. In Tanzania the largest celebrations are on the island of Zanzibar.
In many parts of Indonesia, the celebration of the Mawlid al-nabi "seems to surpass in importance, liveliness, and splendour" the two official Islamic holidays of Eid ul-Fitr and Eid al-Adha.

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Faith versus tradition in Islam: Mustafa Akyol



TRANSCRIPT below
A few weeks ago, I had a chance to go to Saudi Arabia. And the first thing I wanted to do as a Muslim was go to Mecca and visit the Kaaba, the holiest shrine of Islam. And I did that; I put on my ritualistic dress; I went to the holy mosque; I did my prayers; I observed all the rituals. And meanwhile, besides all the spirituality, there was one mundane detail in the Kaaba that was pretty interesting for me. There was no separation of sexes. In other words, men and women were worshiping all together. They were together while doing the tawaf, the circular walk around the Kaaba. They were together while praying.

And if you wonder why this is interesting at all, you have to see the rest of Saudi Arabiabecause it's a country which is strictly divided between the sexes. In other words, as men, you are not simply supposed to be in the same physical space with women. And I noticed this in a very funny way. I left the Kaaba to eat something in downtown Mecca. I headed to the nearest Burger King restaurant. And I went there -- I noticed that there was a male section, which was carefully separated from the female section. And I had to pay, order and eat at the male section. "It's funny," I said to myself, "You can mingle with the opposite sex at the holy Kaaba, but not at the Burger King."

Quite ironic. Ironic, and it's also, I think, quite telling. Because the Kaaba and the rituals around it are relics from the earliest phase of Islam, that of prophet Muhammad. And if there was a big emphasis at the time to separate men from women, the rituals around the Kaaba could have been designed accordingly. But apparently that was not an issue at the time. So the rituals came that way. This is also, I think, confirmed by the fact that the seclusion of women in creating a divided society is something that you also do not find in the Koran, the very core of Islam -- the divine core of Islam that all Muslims, and equally myself, believe. And I think it's not an accident that you don't find this idea in the very origin of Islam. Because many scholars who study the history of Islamic thought -- Muslim scholars or Westerners -- think that actually the practice of dividing men and women physically came as a later development in Islam, as Muslims adopted some preexisting cultures and traditions of the Middle East. Seclusion of women was actually a Byzantine and Persian practice, and Muslims adopted that and made that a part of their religion.

And actually this is just one example of a much larger phenomenon. What we call today Islamic Law, and especially Islamic culture -- and there are many Islamic cultures actually;the one in Saudi Arabia is much different from where I come from in Istanbul or Turkey. But still, if you're going to speak about a Muslim culture, this has a core, the divine message,which began the religion, but then many traditions, perceptions, many practices were added on top of it. And these were traditions of the Middle East -- medieval traditions.

And there are two important messages, or two lessons, to take from that reality. First of all, Muslims -- pious, conservative, believing Muslims who want to be loyal to their religion --should not cling onto everything in their culture, thinking that that's divinely mandated.Maybe some things are bad traditions and they need to be changed. On the other hand, the Westerners who look at Islamic culture and see some troubling aspects should not readily conclude that this is what Islam ordains. Maybe it's a Middle Eastern culture that became confused with Islam.

There is a practice called female circumcision. It's something terrible, horrible. It is basically an operation to deprive women of sexual pleasure. And Westerners, Europeans or Americans, who didn't know about this before faced this practice within some of the Muslim communities who migrated from North Africa. And they've thought, "Oh, what a horrible religion that is which ordains something like that." But actually when you look at female circumcision, you see that it has nothing to do with Islam, it's just a North African practice,which predates Islam. It was there for thousands of years. And quite tellingly, some Muslims do practice that. The Muslims in North Africa, not in other places. But also the non-Muslim communities of North Africa -- the Animists, even some Christians and even a Jewish tribe in North Africa is known to practice female circumcision. So what might look like a problem within Islamic faith might turn out to be a tradition that Muslims have subscribed to.

The same thing can be said for honor killings, which is a recurrent theme in the Western media -- and which is, of course, a horrible tradition. And we see truly in some Muslim communities that tradition. But in the non-Muslim communities of the Middle East, such as some Christian communities, Eastern communities, you see the same practice. We had a tragic case of an honor killing within Turkey's Armenian community just a few months ago.

Now these are things about general culture, but I'm also very much interested in political culture and whether liberty and democracy is appreciated, or whether there's an authoritarian political culture in which the state is supposed to impose things on the citizens. And it is no secret that many Islamic movements in the Middle East tend to be authoritarian, and some of the so-called "Islamic regimes" such as Saudi Arabia, Iran and the worst case was the Taliban in Afghanistan -- they are pretty authoritarian. No doubt about that.

For example, in Saudi Arabia there is a phenomenon called the religious police. And the religious police imposes the supposed Islamic way of life on every citizen, by force -- like women are forced to cover their heads -- wear the hijab, the Islamic head cover. Now that is pretty authoritarian, and that's something I'm very much critical of. But when I realized that the non-Muslim, or the non-Islamic-minded actors in the same geography, sometimes behaved similarly, I realized that the problem maybe lies in the political culture of the whole region, not just Islam. Let me give you an example: in Turkey where I come from, which is a very hyper-secular republic, until very recently we used to have what I call secularism police, which would guard the universities against veiled students. In other words, they would force students to uncover their heads, and I think forcing people to uncover their head is as tyrannical as forcing them to cover it. It should be the citizen's decision.

But when I saw that, I said, "Maybe the problem is just an authoritarian culture in the region, and some Muslims have been influenced by that. But the secular-minded people can be influenced by that. Maybe it's a problem of the political culture, and we have to think about how to change that political culture." Now these are some of the questions I had in mind a few years ago when I sat down to write a book. I said, "Well I will make a researchabout how Islam actually came to be what it is today, and what roads were taken and what roads could have been taken." The name of the book is "Islam Without Extremes: A Muslim Case for Liberty." And as the subtitle suggests, I looked at Islamic tradition and the history of Islamic thought from the perspective of individual liberty, and I tried to find what are the strengths with regard to individual liberty.

And there are strengths in Islamic tradition. Islam actually, as a monotheistic religion,which defined man as a responsible agent by itself, created the idea of the individual in the Middle East and saved it from the communitarianism, the collectivism of the tribe. You can derive many ideas from that. But besides that, I also saw problems within Islamic tradition.But one thing was curious: most of those problems turn out to be problems that emerged later, not from the very divine core of Islam, the Koran, but from, again, traditions and mentalities, or the interpretations of the Koran that Muslims made in the Middle Ages. The Koran, for example, doesn't condone stoning. There is no punishment on apostasy. There is no punishment on personal things like drinking. These things which make Islamic Law,the troubling aspects of Islamic Law, were later developed into later interpretations of Islam.Which means that Muslims can, today, look at those things and say, "Well, the core of our religion is here to stay with us. It's our faith, and we will be loyal to it. But we can change how it was interpreted, because it was interpreted according to the time and milieu in the Middle Ages. Now we are living in a different world with different values and different political systems." That interpretation is quite possible and feasible.

Now if I were the only person thinking that way, we would be in trouble. But that's not the case at all. Actually, from the 19th century on, there's a whole revisionist, reformist --whatever you call it -- tradition, a trend in Islamic thinking. And these were intellectuals or statesmen of the 19th century, and later, 20th century, which looked at Europe basicallyand saw that Europe has many things to admire, like science and technology. But not just that; also democracy, parliament, the idea of representation, the idea of equal citizenship.These Muslim thinkers and intellectuals and statesmen of the 19th century looked at Europe, saw these things. They said, "Why don't we have these things?" And they looked back at Islamic tradition, they saw that there are problematic aspects, but they're not the core of the religion, so maybe they can be re-understood, and the Koran can be reread in the modern world.

That trend is generally called Islamic modernism, and it was advanced by intellectuals and statesmen, not just as an intellectual idea though, but also as a political program. And that's why actually in the 19th century the Ottoman Empire, which then covered the whole Middle East, made very important reforms -- reforms like giving Christians and Jews an equal citizenship status, accepting a constitution, accepting a representative parliament,advancing the idea of freedom of religion. And that's why the Ottoman Empire in its last decades turned into a proto-democracy, a constitutional monarchy, and freedom was a very important political value at the time.

Similarly, in the Arab world, there was what the great Arab historian Albert Hourani defines as the Liberal Age. He has a book, "Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age," and the Liberal Age, he defines as 19th century and early 20th century. Quite notably, this was the dominant trend in the early 20th century among Islamic thinkers and statesmen and theologians. But there is a very curious pattern in the rest of the 20th century, because we see a sharp decline in this Islamic modernist line. And in place of that, what happens is that Islamism grows as an ideology which is authoritarian, which is quite strident, which is quite anti-Western, and which wants to shape society based on a utopian vision.

So Islamism is the problematic idea that really created a lot of problems in the 20th century Islamic world. And even the very extreme forms of Islamism led to terrorism in the name of Islam -- which is actually a practice that I think is against Islam, but some, obviously, extremists did not think that way. But there is a curious question: If Islamic modernism was so popular in the 19th and early 20th centuries, why did Islamism become so popular in the rest of the 20th century? And this is a question, I think, which needs to be discussed carefully. And in my book, I went into that question as well. And actually you don't need to be a rocket scientist to understand that. You just look at the political history of the 20th century, and you see things have changed a lot. The context has changed.

In the 19th century, when Muslims were looking at Europe as an example, they were independent; they were more self-confident. In the early 20th century, with the fall of the Ottoman Empire, the whole Middle East was colonized. And when you have colonization what do you have? You have anti-colonization. So Europe is not just an example now to emulate; it's an enemy to fight and to resist. So there's a very sharp decline in liberal ideas in the Muslim world, and what you see is more of a defensive, rigid, reactionary strain,which led to Arab socialism, Arab nationalism and ultimately to the Islamist ideology. And when the colonial period ended, what you had in place of that was, generally, secular dictators, which say they're a country, but did not bring democracy to the country, and established their own dictatorship. And I think the West, at least some powers in the West,particularly the United States, made the mistake of supporting those secular dictators,thinking that they were more helpful for their interests. But the fact that those dictatorssuppressed democracy in their country and suppressed Islamic groups in their countryactually made the Islamists much more strident.

So in the 20th century, you had this vicious cycle in the Arab world where you have a dictatorship suppressing its own people including the Islamic-pious, and they're reacting in reactionary ways. There was one country, though, which was able to escape or stay awayfrom that vicious cycle. And that's the country where I come from; that's Turkey. Turkey has never been colonized, so it remained as an independent nation after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. That's one thing to remember. They did not share the same anti-colonial hype that you can find in some other countries in the region. Secondly, and most importantly, Turkey became a democracy earlier than any of the countries we are talking about. In 1950, Turkey had the first free and fair elections, which ended the more autocratic secular regime, which was the beginning of Turkey. And the pious Muslims in Turkey saw that they can change the political system by voting. And they realize that democracy is something that is compatible with Islam, compatible with their values, and they've been supportive of democracy. That's an experience that not every other Muslim nation in the Middle East had until very recently.

Secondly, in the past two decades, thanks to globalization, thanks to the market economy,thanks to the rise of a middle-class, we in Turkey see what I define as a rebirth of Islamic modernism. Now there's the more urban middle-class pious Muslims who, again, look at their tradition and see that there are some problems in the tradition, and they understand that they need to be changed and questioned and reformed. And they look at Europe, and they see an example, again, to follow. They see an example, at least, to take some inspiration from. That's why the E.U. process, Turkey's effort to join the E.U., has been supported inside Turkey by the Islamic-pious, while some secular nations were against that. Well that process has been a little bit blurred by the fact that not all Europeans are that welcoming -- but that's another discussion. But the pro-E.U. sentiment in Turkey in the past decade has become almost an Islamic cause and supported by the Islamic liberalsand the secular liberals as well, of course.

And thanks to that, Turkey has been able to reasonably create a success story in which Islam and the most pious understandings of Islam have become part of the democratic game, and even contributes to the democratic and economic advance of the country. And this has been an inspiring example right now for some of the Islamic movements or some of the countries in the Arab world.

You must have all seen the Arab Spring, which began in Tunis and in Egypt. And Arab masses just revolted against their dictators. They were asking for democracy; they were asking for freedom. And they did not turn out to be the Islamist boogyman that the dictators were always using to justify their regime. They said that "we want freedom; we want democracy. We are Muslim believers, but we want to be living as free people in free societies." Of course, this is a long road. Democracy is not an overnight achievement; it's a process. But this is a promising era in the Muslim world.

And I believe that the Islamic modernism which began in the 19th century, but which had a setback in the 20th century because of the political troubles of the Muslim world, is having a rebirth. And I think the getaway message from that would be that Islam, despite some of the skeptics in the West, has the potential in itself to create its own way to democracy, create its own way to liberalism, create its own way to freedom. They just should be allowed to work for that.

Thanks so much. (Applause)
http://www.ted.com/talks/mustafa_akyol_faith_versus_tradition_in_islam.html

Mali - An other Muslim Nation under Turmoil

Terrorism is just one of many scourges to beset the people of Mali [90% Muslims]for decades:
Blaming al-Qaida or neo-colonialism is too simple in a country where many have been marginalised for too long.
Mali updates >>>>
There are two versions of recent events in Mali, which have emerged in recent weeks, each suggesting that the explanation for the takeover of the country's north by Islamist groups is terribly simple.  

We wouldn't be in this mess, runs the first argument, if it weren't for the huge numbers of weapons that came into Mali after the west brought down the Gaddafi regime in neighbouring Libya; and if the US military advisers had not trained some of those who defected to the Islamist cause; and if the west was not secretly just interested in Mali's resources. In other words, it's the west's neocolonialism that is to blame.

The second argument is simpler still. It blames Mali's problems on the intervention of a resurgent al-Qaida, whatever that appellation means these days. This argument frames Mali as a global security problem on Europe's doorstep. This is the version preferred by some European governments, not least the French, and that led to their military intervention in Mali.

Like so much that has been written recently about Mali – and about the al-Qaida-affiliated groups currently fighting French and Malian forces – both accounts are too ideologically pat to describe what has really taken place.

Instead, Mali's escalating problems, which spilled over into Algeria last week, are better described as the culmination of half a century of tensions between different groups in Mali. These have been exacerbated by a long period of the government playing competing interests off against each other; and also by the sudden availability of weapons in the Tuareg and Arab communities of the country's impoverished north who have long chafed under Bamako's rule.

The reality is that if western governments and institutions have been at fault it has been over their long-running and blithe acceptance and promotion of the "procedural" version of democracy adopted by the country's upper and middle classes in Bamako. That is, more interested in establishing a system than in public participation. This is a democracy that has been neither socially nor regionally inclusive. In that respect, we should not perhaps be terribly surprised. What's more, Mali is hardly the first place where progress towards democracy has been largely overhyped. Think of Rwanda, Iraq or even Afghanistan in the immediate post-Taliban period.

The facts make for depressing reading. Mali's arid north, which accounts for some 70% of the country's territory (although only 10% of its population), has long been one of the poorest regions in Africa. It has been starved of central government investment and international aid, its population marginalised under both the leftwing government that ruled Mali through most of the 1960s and the military regime that followed. Investment, however, did increase during the mid-1990s with the transition to democracy.

In addition to these issues, there has long been resentment among the rural Tuaregs and Arabs over their inclusion in the Malian state. The first Tuareg revolt took place not long after independence in 1960. It was brutally suppressed, with the north placed under military control.

A second Tuareg rebellion, at the start of the 1990s, quickly developed into a far more complex low-level conflict. A sort of competition in rebellion emerged with the more sedentary Songhai community (protected by its own militia) and between different Tuareg and Arab militant groups who fought among each other for supremacy. All this was deliberately exploited by the central government in Bamako. There were also rising tensions between traditional tribal nobles and those lower in the hierarchy. A fractious peace lasted from the mid-1990s until 2006, when another outbreak of violence took place.

In Mali's post-dictatorship history, Bamako's response to these periodic outbreaks of rebellion has, depressingly, remained the same – a "militiatary" policy that meant that different groups armed to neutralise each other. That policy was pursued over a long period even as former peace agreements were largely allowed to slip on their commitments and old grievances allowed to fester.

Indeed, close analysts of developments in Mali have been concerned for almost a decade by the increasing dysfunctional nature of the country's government, as well as by the re-emergence of Tuareg and Islamist armed factions in the north.

The International Crisis Group noted in a report last July that in former president Touré's time in power, "relations between the centre of power in Bamako and the periphery rested on a loose network of personal, clientelistic, even mafia-style alliances". It's a low-cost system of governance that, continued the report, " disintegrated when faced with a rebellion that was quickly transformed into a well-armed group by the effects of the Libyan crisis and the opportunism of Islamist groups".

If the neocolonialist depiction of Mali's problems are lacking, then the second focus on "al-Qaida" as a cause of Mali's difficulties is not much more helpful. There have been regional factors at work in destabilising Mali. Relying on senior Arab tribal figures in the north, who often combined both Islamist political interests with involvement in the smuggling of cigarettes and drugs and people, Touré struggled to resist the Algerian-dominated al-Qaida establishing itself in northern Mali. They had forged relationships with the same tribal figures.

However, the reality is that al-Qaida style groups, where they have established themselves, have been a symptom of existing instability and weak governance. This also applies to Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and Yemen, where they have struggled to win any measure of popular support for their extremist ambitions. In the context of Mali and the wider region, many of these groups have also been synonymous with criminality as well as jihad.

Indeed, as Bruce Whitehouse, an anthropologist who has spent five years in Mali, argued in his blog, Bridges from Bamako, last week, many of the Islamist fighters in the north, including the group led by Tuareg leader Iyad Ag Ghaly, are viewed with deep suspicion. "Malians," he argues, "widely perceive these groups as foreign invaders, motivated by racism and greed as well as a perverted, even ignorant view of their faith."

While only a fool would predict what may come to pass in Mali and the Sahel in the coming months, one thing is clear. If and when the French and African intervention comes to a conclusion, whatever new democratic government is installed in Bamako needs to talk to those who have so long been held at arm's length, at Mali's margins.

Any new attempt to establish democracy must be one that is genuinely inclusive, not a neoliberal version designed only for the elites. That is the real guarantee of stability, a stability that would leave little room for al-Qaida-affiliated groups.
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A Timbuktu Test For Europe:


Last year soon after the fabled Timbuktu had fallen first to Tuareg separatists and then to jihadists linked with al-Qaeda, I wrote to various editors proposing a trip to Mali. They all said no.

The editors didn't see Mali's troubles as a big enough problem to warrant the expense and risk of putting someone on the ground. Now it looks as though many of the people making decisions about Europe’s defense and security thought the same way.
As French and West African troops pile into Mali, the country is shaping up as an important test for European defense, whether formally in terms of Europe’s Common Security andDefense Policy, or informally in terms of bilateral support. Europe's governments need to ask themselves if they are prepared to do more to help France's military, whether with logistical support or with troops.
The first thing to note is that Mali’s problems, and those of the wider Sahel -- countries on the belt of land that runs along the southern edge of the Sahara -- are not new. There was no lack of intelligence about them. In September 2011, the European Union prepared a detailed strategy paper on the region, with recommendations of what to do and how to tackle the issue of the Sahel becoming an empty space free for jihadists to roam. The U.S. also has been deeply involved there for more than a decade, training soldiers for counterinsurgency operations and closely monitoring the situation on the ground.
Clearly, the net result wasn't very successful. Otherwise, the Malian army would have been able to defend the north after Libya's Muammar Qaddafi fell in 2011, when well-armed Tuareg fighters returned from Libya to Mali. That changed the strategic balance between the rebels and the government.
Over the last few months, preparations have been made for an EU military-training mission. A United Nations Security Council resolution in December gave a green light to forming a West African military mission to send to Mali. Slowly the stage was being set for a reconquest of the north.
The international timetable was upset, however, when the Islamists made a pre-emptive strike from the north and the Malian government appealed to France to intervene, which it did on Jan. 11. Within days, on Jan. 16, a group of jihadists counterattacked at the In Amenas gas plant in Algeria, which supplies 2 percent of Europe's natural-gas imports. It appears that the attackers came from countries all over the region, including Nigeria.
On Jan. 17, EU foreign ministers met to give full support to the French and to accelerate in Mali the EU's training mission, which will start to deploy within weeks. They also agreed to help finance the West African peacekeepers.
The French have been welcomed by most Malians, despite their colonial history. "The French state is a liberator," said Salif Keita, the Malian singer, who has a big following in Europe. Malian musicians, more generally, have been singing for peace and condemningthe music-banning Islamists of the north.
On Malian television, local interviewees say it is right that France should help Mali in its hour of need, because Malian soldiers of the legendary Tirailleurs Senegalais regiment died for France, including in the two world wars.
It isn't yet clear, though, whether the French troops will be joined by their European allies. So far, the U.K., GermanySpainBelgium and Denmark have offered transport planes and logistical support. France has not yet asked for boots on the ground, over and above those soldiers who will come as part of the EU training mission.
Neither has France called on the EU Battlegroup, the rapid-deployment force that was set up in 2007 for precisely these kinds of fast-moving circumstances, and has yet to be sent into action. The unit, currently on standby, is made up of about 1,500 French, German and Polish troops.
Whether or not the French eventually call on the Battlegroup, it is likely, failing a quick victory, that the rest of Europe will soon face a choice: either support the French and the Malians with real resources, or concede defeat in an area where Europe's interests, including its energy supplies, are directly threatened. Gilles Kepel, one of France's foremost Middle East scholars writes in Le Monde newspaper:
France going it alone, in a challenge that concerns the   whole of Europe on its southern flank, is untenable without rendering the European Union meaningless.
Libya and Algeria export much of their natural gas and oil to the EU. A third of Italy’s natural gas comes from Algeria, so it is clearly in Europe’s self-interest to prevent northern Mali from becoming the launchpad for attacks. Nigeria to the south, which for years has been under attack from the Islamic terrorists Boko Haram, is also a significant oil producer.
Unlike Syria, a far more complex problem, stabilizing Mali is probably doable. Even Russia, which opposed the international military intervention in Libya and now more forcefully in Syria, has offered to lift weapons and associated personnel to work with the French in Mali, according to the French newspaper Le Figaro -- something the U.S. has yet to do.
Although few Europeans are aware, the EU is already present in Africa. The EU is training security forces in Niger, while the U.K., for example, is working with Mauritania on counterterrorism. An EU naval force has been in action to crush piracy off the Somali coast, while the EU is also training Somali troops in Uganda and paying for African peacekeepers in Somalia. U.K. Foreign Minister William Hague described the EU's involvement in Somalia as a model for Mali, in a BBC radio interview this morning. He added:
What we don’t want in these countries like Mali is the 20 years of being a failed state that preceded all of that in Somalia.
The optimistic scenario is that, having been slow off the mark, the EU, or at least European countries acting together in one combination or another, is now ready to help in Mali, recognizing that, as the U.S. pivots to Asia, Europe will need to do more to secure its own interests in Africa and the Middle East.
As Le Figaro newspaper has noted, the U.K. was slow to wake up to the Sahel threat only realizing how serious it was when it understood the connections between Boko Haram and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, which is now ensconced in northern Mali. Germans, too, need to understand the threat, according to Ute Schaeffer, the editor in chief of Deutsche Welle, who writes:
Mali has the potential to turn into a bomb under the whole region: Should Mali fall, the Sahel goes up in flames -- and that's a region that Germany, too, should finally realize is one of its immediate neighbors.
The pessimistic scenario is that if the French need help, their allies won't be there for them because of falling EU defense budgets and the doleful experiences of Afghanistan andIraq. This is Europe’s Timbuktu test: If Europe fails it, then the jihadists will win an important battle, in a war that will be far from over.
(Tim Judah, the Europe correspondent for the World View blog, is a correspondent for the Economist and author of several books on the Balkans. Follow him on Twitter. The opinions expressed are his own.)
To contact the author of this article: Tim Judah at timjudah@btinternet.com : To contact the editor responsible for this article: Marc Champion at mchampion7@bloomberg.net
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Mali: The Wind, the Sand and the Stars:

The most capable force among the insurgent coalition in Mali was trained by American Special Forces. That program began in 2008 under the auspices of the U.S. Army's African Command (United States Africa Command USAFRICOM or AFRICOM). Of the four elite units that acquired refined skills and sophisticated equipment, three defected to the rebels in April -- taking their special skills, arms and critical transport equipment with them. These American-trained units were supposed to be the key to repelling attacks from Islamist militants reinforced by veterans from the Libyan war. Instead, they nailed the lid on the defeated Malian army.

A complementary program provided the Malian army's senior officer corps with schooling in command, operations and organizational management. They were routed by the motley rebel forces early 2012 and then proceeded to usurp the civilian government In Bamako. The coup leader is Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, who attended a four-month infantry officer basic training course in Fort Benning,

The Malian mission was one element of a grand strategy for making the Western Sahara a terrorist-free, Salafist free zone that now is in tatters. General Carter F. Ham, the four star chief of Africa Command (headquartered in Stuttgart for some inexplicable reason), and some of his senior subordinates are quoted in last weekend's New York Times (January 12) as greatly surprised by that "unacceptable....disappointing" development. Evidently, they are shocked -- shocked that such a thing could have occurred. Unlike Captain Reynaud, they are not feigning ignorance. "The coup in Mali progressed very rapidly and with very little warning," said command spokesman Tom Davis. "The spark that ignited it occurred within their junior military ranks" where presumably we had little personal contact.

One recognizes tragic farce when one sees it; after all, we've been given an intensive twelve year course in tragic farce. Yet, the reaction at home has been nearly non-existent. Are we so inured to incompetence and its consequences that it makes not a ripple in policy circles and among our political class generally? Where else in the few score countries where we are doing 'Malis' are we preparing the ground for similar fiascos?

Mali is not an isolated happenstance. It has precedents. The Zetas, Mexico's most ruthlessly violent drug cartel, stems from a founding core of former commandos in the Mexican Army's elite forces (Grupo Areomovil de Fuerzas Especiales or GAFE) who received training at Fort Bragg in the mid-1990s. The deserted to become enforcers for the Gulf Cartel before setting up their own highly lucrative and blood thirsty operation in 2010.

It is of course unrealistic to posit these types of missions on complete assurance as to the actual capabilities and political orientation of the people you've trained and the units that you've formed. Here are perhaps two useful criteria to apply in deciding whether to go ahead anyway. One, is the American national interest stake great enough to warrant the costs and the risks of things going awry? I do not believe that the answer should have been 'yes' in Mali 5 years ago.

Checking as to what was the state of affairs five years ago, one learns that the formation we now call al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM ) consisted, by best estimates, of some hundreds of persons belonging to disparate groups: inter alia spin-offs from the Algerian insurrection of the 1990s who took refuge in the desert; thugs/kidnappers like Mokhtar Belmokhta ("Mr. Marlboro" his nom de commerce) who is more mafia capo than Islamic terrorist; and some stray Salafists . They were scattered across Algeria, Niger and Mali. This rag-tag "terror network" which we dubbed AQM was a threat mainly to naive French tourists taking the scenic route across the Sahara.

Only within the past 18 months have they acquired any serious fighting capability. Then, things happened: the violent break-up of Libya with the resulting dispersal of the African mercenaries from Gaddafi's army along with arms from his well-stocked depots. Among them were Malians drawn from both Tuareg tribes who harbored their own deep-seated grievances against the government in Bamako, and more hard-core Islamist elements. They then were joined by the American trained elite units who are an important stiffening element in the insurgents' ranks.

It is critical to bear in mind one feature of those units, and the overall mission to whip the Malian army into shape. The purpose from the outset was not to prepare them to deal with an external aggressor - none existed. Their concern was internal threats from militant jihadist groups of Islamists who might seek to topple the pro-Western regime in order to establish a sharia state. Such an eventuality was visualized as tantamount to posing a serious terrorist threat to American interests. So the political and religious sentiments of the elite units should have been the paramount concern from the outset. They were not.

A sober monitoring of this key dimension was imperative as the mission proceeded. That wasn't done. Evidently the Africa Command leadership who worked with the Malians for 50 months had no idea as to their politico/sectarian disposition. Hence, the complete surprise of General Ham et al in Germany. In fairness to the Special Forces officers who did the actual training, one suspects that none spent 50 months with the Malians -- or anything like it. Their tours probably lasted a year or less. In addition, the training likely was segmented and specialized: i.e. different USA officers trained them in different skills. Finally, they may have moved from unit to unit -- thereby never establishing strong bonds. Those overseeing the program in Stuttgart failed to take account of this -- thereby disregarding the nature of the mission they led and their Command's underlying rationale.

If the above is more or less accurate, it's no great surprise that we were surprised. Had T.E. Lawrence and his colleagues operated this way, there would have been a good chance that Faisal and the brilliant tactical commander of the Arab camel cavalry Atta had wound up defending the Ottoman Caliphate and attacking the British army of kafirs and Crusaders instead of allying with it.

In a world of reasonable accountability, Admiral William H. McRaven the aggressive head of all US Special Forces (United States Special Operations Command USSOCOM), and General Ham who took charge of Africa Command in March 2011 after his predecessor, General William E. 'Kip' Ward, was removed on charges of misappropriating public monies, could be sacked. All other officers in charge of such programs would be given tutorials in what they are meant to accomplish.

In perspective, it is becoming increasingly clear that the United States has allowed its infatuation with unconventional warfare conducted by Special Forces, and unconventional technology as exemplified by drones, to drive assessment of what we need to do and what we should do in an all-embracing 'war-on-terror" that no one can any longer define. In Mali we have a classic case of iatrogenic treatment -- as they say in medical circles. The misguided prescription for a minor illness produced a more severe illness. Why go back to a physician who does this repeatedly (see, too, Iraq, Somalia and Yemen)?

Our compulsion is fired, and the resulting actions -- however calamitous -- are justified by the evocation of terror. Any violence by Muslim militants anywhere sets these passions in motion, passions that then freight them with the full force of 9/11 and its sequels. "This is terror," pronounces Hillary Clinton after the Algerian commando assault at Ain Amenis results in civilian deaths. "Terror" -- the one word is enough, there and then, to put thought on sabbatical. Spice it with the word "evil" and the mind seizes up entirely.

Leon Panetta vows that we shall not rest until we have tracked down the killers of the dead American, Frederick Buttaccio -- who actually died of a heart attack during the raid. Moreover, "They are a threat to our country. They're a threat to the world."

What is most important is not what happens in the remote stretches of the Sahara where the so-called AQIM will be bloodied and dispersed by the French while remaining a nuisance to the weak states of the Sahel. Some of the wayward American-trained soldiers will gradually brought back into the government fold and the Tuareg could gain a measure of deserved autonomy. Rash tourists will remain at risk as kidnapping and smuggling regain their place as mainstays of the Saharan economy. It is what lessons we learn that counts. We have McRaven and others on record as defining Special Forces missions in Africa -- and elsewhere -- as encompassing much that normally was associated with the CIA and State. Do we wish them better luck in future or reel them in?

Admiral McRaven has promulgated a detailed, audacious plan to give the central role for advancing American interests (very broadly defined) to Special Operations Command. As outlined in the New York Times last February (Feb. 13), he is putting the finishing touches on a comprehensive strategy for using his 60,000 personnel as a multi-purpose, semi-autonomous force operating on every continent except Antarctica. It will be designated the military's tool of choice - and not only to fight insurgencies, but also Latin American drug cartels in Honduras, Mexico, Columbia, etc. and bandit gangs in eastern Congo. SOC will be mandated to do active intelligence gathering, to engage in political penetration of other countries and governments, to undertake training and liaison with foreign militaries, and to address underlying conditions that spark insurgencies.

McRaven modestly admits that "we're not yet ready... to run the global war on terror." We must wait awhile for that happy day to arrive. Where are the State Department and other Executive Branch agencies in all this? The White House? Eclipsed. The State Department was not even briefed on the plan that bears the formidable name of Global SOF Alliance.

In a companion innovation, the Pentagon will send hundreds of additional spies overseas as part of an ambitious plan to assemble an espionage network that rivals the CIA. As Greg Miller has reported, ".... Among the Pentagon's top intelligence priorities... are Islamist militant groups in Africa." (Washington Post, Dec. 1 2012)
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Mali - A Brief

The Sudanese Republic and Senegal became independent of France in 1960 as the Mali Federation. When Senegal withdrew after only a few months, what formerly made up the Sudanese Republic was renamed Mali. Rule by dictatorship was brought to a close in 1991 by a military coup that ushered in a period of democratic rule. President Alpha KONARE won Mali's first two democratic presidential elections in 1992 and 1997. In keeping with Mali's two-term constitutional limit, he stepped down in 2002 and was succeeded by Amadou TOURE, who was elected to a second term in 2007 elections that were widely judged to be free and fair.
Malian returnees from Libya in 2011 exacerbated tensions in northern Mali and Tuareg ethnic militias started a rebellion in January 2012. Low-mid level soldiers, frustrated with the poor handling of the rebellion overthrew TOURE on 22 March. Coup leader Capt. Amadou Haya SANOGO and his junta under the mediation of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) returned power to a civilian administration in April with the appointment of interim President Dioncounda TRAORE. Interim Prime Minister Chieck Modibo DIARRA immediately appointed a unity cabinet. The post-coup chaos led to rebels expelling the Malian military from the three northern regions of the country, which remain under the control of a Tuareg militia, Ansar al-Din, and its terrorist group allies. Hundreds of thousands of northern Malians fled the violence to southern Mali and neighboring countries, exacerbating regional food insecurity in host communities. TRAORE was attacked by an angry mob in May and spent two months recovering in Paris, he returned in July. TRAORE and DIARRA announced a second unity government in August and in September called upon the international community to assist them in reclaiming land lost to rebels. SANOGO forced DIARRA to resign in December 2012; Django CISSOKO immediately replaced him and announced a third unity cabinet. The interim government is working with ECOWAS to organize negotiations with Tuareg rebels and the international community to plan a military intervention to retake the three northern regions.


Some of Mali's prominent natural resources include gold, being the third largest producer of gold in the African continent and salt. About half the population lives below the international poverty line of US$1.25 a day.



Ethnic groups: Mande 50% (Bambara, Malinke, Soninke), Peul 17%, Voltaic 12%, Songhai 6%, Tuareg and Moor 10%, other 5%
Languages: French (official), Bambara 80%, numerous African languages
Religions: Muslim 90%, Christian 1%, indigenous beliefs 9%
Population: 15,494,466 (July 2012 est.)
country comparison to the world: 66
More: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mali

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Promoting Hindu terrorists through RSS, BJP camps: Shinde, Indian home minister




Indian Home Minister Sushil Kumar Shinde raked up a storm while addressing a gathering at the Congress Chintan Shivir at Jaipur. While commenting on the nation’s security issues, Shinde said, “It is in the RSS and BJP camps that Hindu terror is being promoted. These people are talking about infiltration in Assam riots etc but from a report we have come to know that they are breeding terrorists. The Mecca Masjid, Samjhauta Express blasts and Malegoan blasts are examples. There have been instances when they have planted bombs and blamed the minority community for it,” said Shinde.
Sushil Kumar Shinde. Agencies.
Prior to Shinde, Digvijay Singh had also once accused the RSS for the Samjhauta Express blast. However, the minister speaking from the AICC meet gives the allegations a completeny new dimension and has, hence, sparked widespread outrage.
Manmohan Vaidya, senior RSS leader retorted: “Congress should look into their own party. They are the ones safeguarding terrorists. The Congress is making up these stories to cover up their inability to rein in separatist communal forces. They can’t hang Afzal Guru, they were balking at taking action against Owaisi, we know their drill,” said Vaidya.
“A Home Minister can’t make a comment that disturbs the peace of the country. The Congress is a party of cowards. Terrorists are infiltrating our country, killing our soldiers and we are welcoming them with roses,” says BJP vice president Mukhtar Abbas Naqvi.
The party also alleged that by making this statement, the Congress has encouraged terrorist outfits.
“We demand Sonia Gandhi to apologise to the party and the nation. Otherwise they will face grave consequences. It’s a defaulter party and they have proved it again,” said Naqvi.
Shiv Sena leader Sanjay Raut said that Shinde didn’t deserve to be the Home Minister of the country. “He came to power by buttering Sonia and Rahul. He has no clue as to what is going on in the country,” sais Raut.
Congress leader Rajeev Shukla, however, came to the Home Minister’s defence by saying that Shinde essentially didn’t mean Hindu terrorism, he meant right-wing extremism. “Terrorism doesn’t have any religion. Shinde was talking about right wing terrorism,” said Shukla.
Shinde on the other hand, while talking to reporters, said that he was merely repeating a known fact. “Saffron terrorism is a known reality. It has been talked about in the media for very long now. I am just repeating what has been published several times as fact,” he said.

http://www.firstpost.com/politics/rss-bjp-camps-promoting-hindu-terrorism-shinde-595040.html
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Is Atheism a religion?

There have been numerous times (both on these forums and in the larger debate) when the question has come up- is Atheism a religion? Now, as a proud member of the 'Godsquad' (as one of my Atheist-friends have hilariously taken to calling any grouping of religious persons), I can give the short and hopefully definitive answer: No, Atheism is not a religion.

I have also many times seen Atheists be perplexed, bemused, annoyed and frustrated by claims from some on the religious side that Atheism is “in fact” a religion. I would like to propose a possible reason for this incorrect claim repeatedly popping up:

Some Atheists share many of the same characteristics found in the so-called 'religiots'.

To back up my hypothesis, I have compiled a non-exhaustive list as to why I make this statement. Like “religiots” are with their religious views, many Atheists:

1) Hold the position that they are the sole proprietors and vendors of "the truth" and that if only the world was as they wanted it, everyone and everything would be better off.

2) Have the mentality that if another person is not an Atheist, then they are to be shunned, derided and ridiculed mercilessly, until they change their ways. They will gladly gang up on, spur each other on and applaud each other’s endeavors in order to achieve this. Should the religious person then change their ways, they are welcomed into the fold with a pat on the back and a sympathetic arm around the shoulders. (Is this not a “conversion”?)

3) Have formed global groups such as http://www.atheistalliance.org/ to help support the spread of Atheism. Here, I use “the spread of Atheism” in the sense of the drive to support the increase in the Atheist demographic, as per AAI’s president. (AAI curiously lists “Freedom from discrimination” as item number 5 under their list of values, but also states that part of its “mission and vision” is to confront religious faith. The dictionary definition of confront is to “Meet (someone) face to face with hostile or argumentative intent”. Once again, it speaks of the mindset that their movement proclaims freedom from discrimination, defined as the “unjust or prejudicial treatment of different categories of people or things”, as long as you are on their side, see #2 above.)

4) Follow the teachings of other better-read and more famous Atheists almost blindly and all-too willingly will regurgitate and follow their instructions. An example of this is the increase in the hostility which Atheists have been showing towards the religious after being instructed to, as for example per #3 above. Dawkins also famously instructs this at nearly every opportunity he gets. 

5) Hold and attend rallies in order to “advance secularism (in the broadest sense of the word) in society” (taken from the ironically named http://reasonrally.org/about/  [by the way, their website reads like it is Mighty Men for Atheists!] )

6) Perform charitable works not because of altruism, but in the name of Atheism (www.atheistvolunteers.org for example states right at the very top of their website “doing good in the name of atheism”).

7) Will revert to name calling and off-the-ball tactics to illicit a response from the religious, for nothing else but entertainment value. 

and

8) Will gladly part with wads of their hard-earned cash to buy merchandise from vendors supporting the Atheist cause. (http://www.atheistalliance.org/store , http://www.thearrogantatheist.com/ , http://www.rationalresponders.com/buy_amazon_through_these_links_support_online_atheism , http://evolvefish.com/ a quick Google search yields many more).
So, next time some “religiot” calls Atheism a religion, ask yourself if your actions are contributing to their ignorance.
PS. I am sure that other commentators can add to this list and I sincerely hope for some contributions from our resident Atheists!
Source: http://www.news24.com/MyNews24/Is-Atheism-a-religion-20130111

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The comfort of religion without God
Stanford University has a new chaplain for atheists and agnostics. Photo: Bloomberg

Stanford University has a new chaplain for atheists and agnostics. This comes after Harvard University and the US military introduced - how shall I put it - non-religious religious services for non-believers who may still seek the comfort and benefits of real religion.

This is emerging as a new trend in the US, and I am sure sooner or later it will spread around and reach Hong Kong. Call it non-alcoholic drinks for the soul, religion without a belief in an almighty God.

Once upon a time, it was simple. You either believed or they burned you at the stake. That's what they did to Giordano Bruno - the Italian philosopher who believed in the infinities of worlds - in a place poetically called Campo de' Fiori, the field of flowers.

But the battle this martyr fought for free thought has been won, at least in the West. And some people just don't like the results. If you don't believe in God, it should logically follow that you can't follow any religion. If you are an agnostic, it means you can't decide, or think it's impossible to decide, whether God exists. So you shouldn't have a religion - or one religion is as good as another without any rational basis for preference.

Perhaps the certain prospect of eternal oblivion is highly discomforting. Or life and the world being products of random physical and biochemical processes with no higher purpose disturb you. You can be intellectually an atheist or an agnostic while still finding the implications of your beliefs too overwhelming and unsettling.

Marxism was once called a secular religion, but that's not quite right. True Marxists thought theirs was a social-economic science, not a religion. Whatever you say about them, many were tough cookies who spurned the false comfort of religion.

Those at the American universities and the Pentagon want the comfort and conveniences of religion without having to believe and commit. Maybe religion-free confessions offer solace without the high per-hour charges of psychiatrists; and public prayers provide a sense of community reminiscent of their religious childhood.

Well, decaf coffee, sugar-free coke, low-fat sausages … why not a God-free religion?
http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1132471/comfort-religion-without-god