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Who`s policing terrorists on social media?

By Ronan Farrow 
`THE graves are only half empty; who will help us fill them?` Twenty years ago, that rallying cry on Rwandan radio helped explode ethnic enmity into one of history`s worst atrocities. In today`s Iraq, another vicious conflict between a formerly empowered ethnic minority and a longsubjugated majority is causing the deaths of thousands. At its heart is another mass-media appeal to bloodlust on radio`s modern-day equivalent: social media. This time, the world may have a chance to stop what it failed to in Rwanda.

 The Sunni Islamic State insurgents, locked in a deadly struggle with Iraq`s Shia majority, excel online. They command a plethora of official and unofficial channels on Facebook, Twitter and YouTube. `Take up arms, take up arms, O soldiers of the Islamic State. And fight, fight!` commands one recent propaganda reel, featuring a sermon from the group`s leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

 The material is often slickly produced, like The Clanging of Swords IV, a glossy, feature-length film replete with slow-motion action scenes. Much of it is available in English, directly targeting the recruit s with Western passports that have become one of the organisation`s more dangerous assets.

 And almost all of it appeals to the young: manipulated images of Islamic State fighters and their grisly massacres with video game-savvy captions like, `This is our Call of Duty`.

 But officials at social media companies are leery of adjudicating what should be taken down and what should be left alone. `One person`s terrorist is another person`s freedom fighter,` one senior executive told me on condition of anonymity. Making that call is `not something we`d want to do`.

 So official Islamic State accounts often remain on Twitter for weeks and accumulate tens of thousands of followers before being removed. A few propaganda videos have been taken off YouTube for `violating YouTube`s policy on shocking and disgusting content`, according to the notice on one removed video. But countless others remain, including a recent sermon by Baghdadi, posted through an account claiming to be Islamic Stateaffiliated.

 There are legitimate free-speech questions here: how should media coverage of propaganda be treated? What about peaceful lectures by otherwise violent terrorists? But those gray areas don`t excuse a lack of enforcement against direct calls for murder, which these companies supposedly ban. `I understand there are freedom-ofspeech concerns, but I don`t think that describes what`s going on with much of the content on YouTube,` says Evan Kohlmann, a counterterrorism analyst with Flashpoint Partners and NBC News. `No one`s suggesting they remove all journalistic clips ... This is about extremely explicit content, calling for violence.

 Another objection is practical. There`s simply too much content to monitor and too many waysfor it to resurface when quashed. An executive at one major social media company described it as the `whack-a-mole` phenomenon take down one video, it springs up elsewhere. But flawed enforcement shouldn`t excuse inaction now any more than it did in Rwanda 20 years ago, when the US government deemed the use of radio-jamming technology too legally complex, too expensive, too impractical. The perfect, then as now, was the enemy of the good.

 More troubling still is the fact that these companies already know how to police and remove content that violates the law. Every major social media network employs algorithms that automatically detect and prevent the posting of child pornography. Many, including YouTube, use a similar technique to prevent copyrighted material from hitting the web. Why not, in overt cases such as beheading videos and calls for blood, employ a similar system? Indeed, Twitter, YouTube and Facebook all strictly refuse to police content themselves instead relying on third parties, mostly users around the world, to flag objectionable material.

 But the constant torrent of new content is not a burden that can be practically managed by the crowd any more than companies expect users to serve as the prime monitor for child pornography.

 As always, beneath legitimate practical and ethical concerns, there is a question about the bottom line. Individuals involved in content removal policies at the major social media companies, speaking to me on condition of anonymity, said that`s a driving factor in their thinking. `We can`t police any content ourselves,` one explained. Added another: `The second we get into reviewing any content ourselves, record labels say, `You should be reviewing all videos for copyright violations, too.

 Yet past is prologue. The world, with each lamentation of `never again`, has cursed its failure to stop Rwanda`s deadly broadcasts. A furious Samantha Power, the US ambassador to the United Nations, once complained that the US `refused to use its technology` when it could have. A Harvard University study found that jamming the broadcasts could have saved tens of thousands of lives.

 The Islamic State`s campaign of incitement is `definitely reminiscent of Rwanda`, said John Prendergast, a former Clinton administration official focused on Africa who has studied Rwanda for years. Now as then, exploiting sectarian hatred can quickly turn deadly on a massive scale. Now as then, cracking down on calls to kill isno panacea,butitcanhelp.

 These companies have a moral obligation to do more. And US law should not create a legal barrier for them to act when lives are on the line. The current regime enforced ignorance and halfmeasures may be among our apologies when we say `never again` over Iraq.

 Dawn.com By arrangement with The Washington Post



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Dreams of an Islamic caliphate


A member of the Islamic State of Iraq and Al Sham stands on an armoured personnel carrier as he holds aloft a flag. — Reuters
A member of the Islamic State of Iraq and Al Sham stands on an armoured personnel carrier as he holds aloft a flag. — Reuters
“O God do not allow us to go stray after showing the right path. Remove our differences. End our miseries. Teach us to love each other,” prayed the Imam at a Friday congregation in Virginia.
“Ameen,” said the worshippers, with tears rolling down their cheeks.
“Encourage unity among Muslims. Help the Muslims of Palestine and Myanmar,” prayed the Imam.
“Ameen,” said the congregation, which included Pakistanis, Indians, Afghans and Arabs.
As the prayer ended, they split in small groups, each speaking a different language, and walked out of the mosque.
Some of them would gather again at iftar, at a local mosque or a restaurant, each ethnic group sitting separately.
Islam promotes collective demonstration of faith. The five prayers, the annual fasting and the Haj all encourage Muslims to get together, causing some to believe this collective display of faith would also foster greater political unity within the ummah.
But this demonstration of unity has often been confined to religious rituals. Even the Organisation of Islamic States, which is supposed to represent all the Muslims of the world, has never gone beyond a symbolic demonstration of unity.
So far, all efforts to turn this fraternity into a political reality have failed, mainly because there are not many among Muslims who desire a common political identity.
Some groups blame the absence of an Islamic state for the lack of political unity among the Muslims. They believe that an Islamic state would be a centre of attraction for all Muslims and by successfully implementing the Sharia; this state can also lay the foundation for an Islamic caliphate.
This state would ultimately lead to the creation of a caliphate, i.e. one government for all Muslims.
Unfortunately, all efforts to create such a state have failed. Instead of fostering unity, such efforts have often ended in creating new discords, which further weakened the Muslims.
With the proclamation of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the Muslims now assumedly have two states and two caliphs to choose from - one in the Middle East and the other in Afghanistan. Both have grand designs and want to bring the entire Muslim world under the yoke of the new caliphs.
The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria is still a political movement. It can only become a reality if two existing Muslim states – Syria and Iraq – collapse. Both also have to split on sectarian and ethnic lines to make space for the new state.
This will require Syria to divide into Shia and Sunni enclaves, and the Sunni side to join the proposed state. Other religious and ethnic groups living in the present day Syria will have to fend for themselves.
Iraq has to face a similar fate, splitting into three states: one each for the Shias and Sunnis and one for the Kurds. The Iraqi Christians will apparently be forced to become Dhimmis or leave the country.
The split will lead to the creation of two immediate blocs, with Iran leading the Shia blocs, which may include the Shia areas of Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.
On the Sunni side, the transition will be less smooth as Saudi Arabia and other major Arab states will compete with each other to lead the bloc. Besides, it is still doubtful if Saudi Arabia would like to have an Islamic state on its borders.
By financing the military takeover in Egypt, the Saudis have made it very obvious that they are in no mood to allow a religious party, the Muslim Brotherhood, to run an Arab state. And ISIS, which will be run by hardcore al Qaeda militants, could be more dangerous for the Saudis than a Brotherhood-led Egypt. After all, al Qaeda started in the kingdom as a political group, which wanted to end the Saudi monarchy.
The present day crisis in Iraq, however, has allowed the gradual emergence of a semi-independent state within its border, that of Kurdistan. It is more homogenous than the two states that the ISIS activists are trying to form because it is dominated by one ethnic group, the Kurds.
But a fully independent state of Kurdistan will face strong resistance from all its neighbours. Turkey, which has a large Kurdish minority, has already declared that it will not accept any new development that encourages its own Kurds to secede.
Iran and Syria too have Kurdish enclaves and will not look at this new state with favour. The Sunni Iraq will have its own dispute with Kurdistan over the oil city of Kirkuk.
Since all oil wells will end up in the Shia and Kurdish parts of the country, the Sunni Iraq will have to fight both for a share.
These will be the immediate consequences of the creation of an Islamic state in the Middle East, if it ever happens. And it is apparent that none of these developments will help the Muslim ummah or strengthen its unity.
Unlike ISIS, the other Islamic state, that of Afghanistan, is not an unknown commodity. The Islamic emirate of Afghanistan had existed before, from 1996 to 2001. And there are not many Afghans who remember it fondly.
The Taliban emirate reduced Islam to flogging, beating, beheading, and forcing women to stay indoors. It denied them education and health facilities and, in some cases, forced them to marry Taliban commanders.
It strained Afghanistan’s ties with the rest of the world and turned it into an international pariah. Its unholy alliance with al Qaeda led to the Sept. 11, 2011 terrorist attacks in the United States, and, consequently, to the US invasion, which ended the Taliban rule.
There are no reasons to believe that a new Taliban emirate in Afghanistan will be any different from the previous emirate.
Pakistan is another nation that dreams of creating an Islamic state, although within its borders.
By Anwar Iqbal http://www.dawn.com/news/1118796/dreams-of-an-islamic-caliphate
Related:  Caliphate: Redundant or Relevant? 

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ISIS’s cascading effect

 
A PAKISTANI militant group Tehreek-i-Khilafat’s declaration of allegiance to the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), now calling itself the Islamic State, has surprised many. Though most analysts are suspicious of the declaration and see it as insignificant, because little is known about the group, it does indicate that ISIS has started to inspire some individuals and groups in Pakistan with similar objectives.

 The rise of the Afghan Taliban in the 1990s inspired many Islamist political and militant movements across the world. Afghanistan became an attractive destination for thousands of Muslim radicals hailing from different parts of world. Today, ISIS is attracting Islamist militants and also financial resources in an almost similar way. As Pakistani militants and religious organisations do not operate in isolation, it is natural for them to draw inspiration from ISIS.

 Indeed, the ideological association and operational linkage between the Pakistani militants and ISIS are not at all new. Pakistani militants were part of the group from its inception. Many militants from Lashkar-e-Jhangvi’s Balochistan and Punjab factions constitute the best fighting force of ISIS. It was LeJ militants who set up the Ghazi Abdul Rasheed training camp in the Iraqi city of Arbil in 2013. The militants trained in the camp constituted the Ghazi Force.

 Western nations are concerned about their nationals who have joined the ranks of ISIS and other militant groups in Syria and Iraq. But for Pakistan such a threat is far bigger because once the LeJ and other Pakistani militants fighting in Syria and Iraq return to Pakistan, they will add to the sectarian violence, besides strengthening their respective militant groups.

 As Pakistani militants do not operate in isolation, it is natural for them to draw inspiration from ISIS.
As far as the Tehreek-i-Khilafat is concerned, the Omer media, the media wing of the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan, describes the group as a TTP affiliate in Karachi and regularly publishes reports on its terrorist activities. Also, the Tehreek-i-Khilafat has an online presence and has claimed responsibility for some attacks on police and the Rangers in Karachi.

 According to Omer media reports, the group came into existence in 2012. Abu Jandal Khurasani is the so-called spokesperson who claims that the group is aiming to get back Muslim territories from the control of the local puppets of imperialist forces, and to establish a caliphate in Pakistan. The group is a strong critic of democracy, like the TTP, and believes that democracy is un-Islamic.

 The ideology espoused by the Tehreek-i-Khilafat is not new to Pakistan; most violent and many non-violent Islamist groups in Pakistan believe in it, and even reject what religious forces have achieved thus far in Pakistan. The country presents a unique and complex case of religious activism which cannot be compared with that in any other Muslim country. Multiple religious organisations are operating in the country with different objectives and they have a mixed bag of successes and failures.

 Religious forces made early gains on the Islamisation front by managing to define the ideological discourse of the state through the Objectives Resolution of 1949. They also had their say in the shape of a formal constitutional acknowledgment that laws considered divine will have precedence over those made by parliament. They also managed to get many Sharia laws adopted during the rule of Gen Ziaul Haq.

 Despite these significant achievements, the religious forces are still struggling for absolute Islamisation of the state. At the same time, the religious forces believe that this objective cannot be achieved until they get control over the state. That is why their agendas are largely political and revolve around capturing power.

 The religio-political parties claim they are custodians of the larger religious discourse and tradition in the country. However, in the last two decades, another form of religious organisation has also emerged. It comprises the agents of Islamisation and religio-socialisation but believes that change is impossible within the parameters of the Constitution and with the current political dispensation. It deems democracy and the democratic process inadequate for the change it pursues and advocates.

 Some of them see democracy as an idea contrary to the Islamic principles of governance and want to replace it with their own version of the Sharia. Others such as Tanzeemul Ikhwan and Tanzeem-i-Islami believe that the Sharia cannot be introduced in its entirety through the democratic electoral process and consider the use of force to achieve power as an alternative.

 These organisations have sectarian and militant tendencies but the dominant approach is characterised by their quest for a complete change of the system. This is contrary to the approach of the religio-political parties, which focus on a gradual change within the system.

 Despite the varying approaches adopted by religious organisations and religio-political parties for the enforcement of the Sharia, many extremist groups believe that the change is impossible within the Constitution and current system. Nor do they believe in a mass struggle for bringing about change. They believe in armed revolt against the state and its defence apparatus. The TTP, LeJ and smaller groups like the Tehreek-i-Khilafat fall in this category.

 The appeal of their message increases when Islamists succeed elsewhere in the world. But it builds pressure on the leaders of non-violent Islamic movements and political parties because their followers and cadres start comparing the achievements of their leadership with that of Islamist movements succeeding elsewhere.

 At the time of the rise of the Afghan Taliban in Afghanistan, non-violent religious groups and religio-political parties had associated themselves with the Taliban with a view to sharing the latter’s successes but they will find it hard to associate with ISIS.

 Achieving a goal within the shorter time frame always attracts ideological movements, and spurs extremists to adopt violent ways. If ISIS sustains its momentum and the group succeeds in maintaining its control over the captured territories, it can cause frustration in the cadre of groups such as Hizbut Tahrir and the students’ wings of religio-political parties that believe in non-violent struggle for the establishment of a caliphate.
By Muhammad Amir Rana: The writer is a security analyst.
http://www.dawn.com/news/1118838/isiss-cascading-effect

  1. BBC News - Profile: Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS)

    www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24179084
    The Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) is a jihadist group active in Iraq and Syria.ISIS was formed in April 2013 and grew out of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).

  3. ISIL: Rising power in Iraq and Syria - Al Jazeera

    www.aljazeera.com/.../isil-eminent-threat-iraq-syria-20...
    Jun 11, 2014
    The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant has outgrown even ... death, the group rebranded as the Islamic ...

  4. Isis Islamists destroy cigarettes in Raqqa, Syria – video ...

    www.theguardian.com › News › World news › Syria
    Apr 4, 2014
    Islamist fighters in Raqqa, Syria, burn a truckload of confiscated cigarettes. The men, part of the Islamic State in ...

  5. The Evolution of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant ...

    www.stratfor.com/.../evolution-islamic-state-iraq-and-l...
    Jun 20, 2014
    Its operations in Syria have caused it to change its name to the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, also ...


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Massacre at Gaza by Israel, Great Tragedy - An Analysis

Its really sad, sorry state. Innocent people being killed mercilessly and world is silent.... Arabs are silent, Muslims are silent .... BUT let's analyse it briefly... Does the commonsense demand to initiate war while Hamas is not prepared? Is it not suicidal? Do we have such examples in the Sunnah ? Muslims at MAdina only fought defensive battles, they only moved to Makkah when they were strong well prepared.
A believer should not involve himself in matters, which he is unable to deal with effectively:
The Prophet (pbuh) once said: “It is not for a believer to humiliate himself,” “How does one humiliate oneself?” The Prophet (pbuh) was asked and to this he replied, “By falling foul of a situation from which one cannot extricate oneself.”
Gauging one’s own strength before testing it on others:
Abdullah ibn Umar relates how once, when he was listening to a sermon preached by Hajjaj ibn Yusuf, he took objection to something Hajjaj had said, and was just about to air his own views on this, when he recalled what the Prophet (pbuh) had once said that it did not befit a believer to disgrace himself. Abdullah ibn Umar had asked the Prophet (pbuh) what was meant by disgracing oneself, and the Prophet (pbuh) had replied: “It means attempting to deal with a problem which is quite beyond one’s capacities.”
The problem with religious fanatics is that they consider themselves to be as good as the Companions [R.A] [God forbid, we are weak in faith]. Only Faith is not required to win battles, preparations and fighting skills tactics is required. Remember... Hudabia, .. AND Uhad when people got busy in booty collection and Khalid bin Walid [then non Muslim ] attacked and Muslims suffered losses. Allah could have have out rightly helped Muslims, but the the law of Cause and affect works.
Hamas and PLO fight among themselves, there is no unity. All Arabs. Muslims are fighting among themselves. No one has power to unite them by use of force. Its through diplomacy, talks they may get closer.
SO THERE IS TIME OF RETROSPECTION, LEARN SOME LESSONS, PREPARE WELL IN POLITICAL, DIPLOMATIC AND MILITARY FRONT TO RESOLVE. SAVE LIVES TO DESTROY ENEMY .. USE WISDOM, HIKMAH...

إِنَّ شَرَّ الدَّوَابِّ عِندَ اللَّـهِ الصُّمُّ الْبُكْمُ الَّذِينَ لَا يَعْقِلُو

نَیقیناً خدا کے نزدیک بدترین قسم کے جانور وہ بہرے گونگے لوگ ہیں جو عقل سے کام نہیں لیتے

Verily, the worst of all creatures in the sight of God are those deaf, those dumb people who do not use their intellect.(Quran;8:22)

لِّيَهْلِكَ مَنْ هَلَكَ عَن بَيِّنَةٍ وَيَحْيَىٰ مَنْ حَيَّ عَن بَيِّنَةٍجو

ہلاک ہو، دلیل پر ہلاک ہو اور جو زنده رہے، وه بھی دلیل پر زنده رہے

Who would perish might perish by clear proof, and he who would live might live by clear proof(Quran;8:42)
Wisdom should go hand in hand with bravery:
Khalid ibn Walid was one of the greatest warriors and leaders of the Muslim army in its early days. Yet, in the year 17 AH, while he was still riding high after his mighty conquests, he was removed from his post by the second Caliph Umar. Khalid was a brave and extremely daring commander. But there were times when his bravery would lead him into hasty decisions. A case in point was siege of Hims, (16 AH) when the Roman Emperor Heraclius, alongwith his North African troops, attacked the forces of Khalid and besieged them within the town. Contrary to orders from the Caliphate, Khalid immediately sallied forth to do battle with the attacking forces, without waiting for the arrival of reinforcements. On this particular occasion, the Muslims, by the sheer grace of God, were victorious. But Umar considered that Khalid had been hasty and imprudent in this action. Shah Waliullah comments: “Courage is not everything in the field of battle. Patience to await the necessary assistance is also a virtue, otherwise courage, on its own, can lead one straight to defeat. (SHAH WALIULLAH, IZALA AL-KHAFA)
Retreat and fight another day:
It was at Mutah, a village situated in present-day Jordan, that” a battle took place in 8 AH between the 3,000-strong Muslim and Byzantine forces, numbering 100,000. Three commanders of the Muslim army were slain one after another, whereupon the standard of the Muslims was handed over to Khalid ibn Walid, who took a command and knit the ranks together. The enemy advance was so firmly checked that they drew back enough for the Muslims to beat an orderly retreat. Considering it unwise to advance again, Khalid then returned to Madinah with the one thousand troops who had survived. As they entered Madinah, crowds of men and women lined the route, jeering and throwing dust in their faces as they passed. “Runaways!” they shouted. “No” said the Prophet (pbuh); “they are not runaways but soldiers who will return to the fight if God wills it so.”
http://freebookpark.blogspot.com/2014/06/treasury-of-islamic-virtues.html


Post by Aftab Khan.


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The Muslim Exodus

The last millennia has seen the persecution of Jews, their exodus and their search for land to the extent that it has been mythologised, fictionalised and sensationalised. But this new millennium belongs to the Muslims. Where Muslims are persecuted, and demonised since 2001. The Jews fought for their land, and are winning their battle while Muslims are losing ground, homes and lives in Palestine, Iraq, Pakistan, China, Sri Lanka. An unending list. But lets focus on Palestine for now. 
It is all about land, wrote Robert Fisk a few days ago. Israel was once populated by Palestinians before 1948. Before an Israeli Army arranged a mass expulsion to the Gaza strip. The Muslims and Jews were not traditional enemies. Since the 17th century, international law has carried on the tradition that a “just” war has three causes: self-defense, recovery of what is owned, and punishment for losses. The UN in Article 51 uses the same list, for a just war; that it is in self-defense. And before Israel started its recent attacks it has used the excuse of self-defense, a flimsy justification since it is the occupier. At least this much can be admitted by the international community; that Gaza is a camp for storing Palestinians. And that Israel is the first aggressor. 
Isreal does not want peace; it wants total control of land. And this battle for land holds religious meaning for them, and symbolic meaning for the west. It is not just about territorial power but a grand destiny. It is unacceptable to them- the thought that Jesus Christ will be resurrected on the site of a mosque. So in the grand scheme of things, most of the world is against Palestine. Couple a religious destiny with unending military power, and we have Israel as an almost unstoppable force. This is the moment for American demonstrators to come pouring into the streets, protesting before their President, but there is too little of that happening. Instead, all the world seems to be left with are editorials, twitter updates, columns and photographs to lodge our official protests. Only, they count for nothing of significance for the Palestinians dying.
http://www.nation.com.pk/editorials/13-Jul-2014/the-muslim-exodus

Muslim exodus in Central African Republic revives ethnic ...

www.theguardian.com › ... › Conflict and development
by Mark Tran - Feb 12, 2014 - Human rights groups are warning that there will be no Muslims left in the Central African Republic (CAR) unless international peacekeepers ..

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Pakistan’s ‘war on terrorism’

FINALLY, Pakistan has declared its own ‘war on terrorism’. The North Waziristan operation, the prime minister’s pronouncements and the adoption of the Protection of Pakistan Bill by the National Assembly are significant signals of serious intent to rid the country of the terrorist menace.

To succeed, the government will have to plan and pursue a comprehensive strategy and utilise all relevant instruments of state power — military, police, intelligence, diplomatic and economic.

The North Waziristan operation was long in coming. The political reticence was overcome by the failure of the talks with the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and its relentless acts of terrorism. The attack on the Karachi airport was the final straw.

The North Waziristan operation is unlikely to be fully successful since it lacked the vital element of surprise. Most of the militants, it must be presumed, have slipped out of the agency. Even so, the military operation will disrupt the militant groups that are affiliated with the TTP and cleanse the epicentre of anti-Pakistan terrorism.

The North Waziristan operation is unlikely to be fully successful since it lacked the vital element of surprise.

However, the presumed dispersal of the motley group of TTP militants will require the elimination of their external (Afghan) safe havens and their ‘internal’ hideouts within Pakistan. Both objectives are challenging.

Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif rightly, if belatedly, requested Afghan President Hamid Karzai to seal the escape routes from North Waziristan into Afghanistan. Given the known and self-declared support given by Afghan Intelligence to elements of the TTP and the safe haven provided to Mullah Fazlullah, the current TTP ‘leader’, Karzai’s unhelpful response was not surprising.

To eliminate the Afghan safe havens, and end the support to the TTP and the so-called Balochistan Liberation Army from Afghan (and Indian) intelligence, Pakistan might find itself considering both soft and hard options.

Like Washington, Pakistan can hope that Afghanistan’s next president will be more helpful than Karzai. Pakistan can reciprocate Kabul’s cooperation by using its presumed ‘influence’ with the Afghan Taliban to promote reconciliation within Afghanistan. Unfortunately, if the Afghan election ends in controversy and crystallizes that country’s ethnic and regional divisions, the likelihood of any cooperation from Kabul to eliminate the TTP’s safe havens will recede further.

Failing to secure such cooperation, Pakistan could press the United States to use its vaunted drones to attack the TTP safe havens inside Afghanistan. This would be an acid test of America’s sincerity in combating all terrorists. If such US action is not forthcoming, a much harder option might be considered: Pakistan’s acquisition of armed drones (from China) to target the TTP’s safe havens in Afghanistan.

Since elements of the TTP consist of Uzbeks and Chechens, who also threaten Russia and Central Asia, and Uighurs, who threaten China, Pakistani authorities might seek support from Moscow and Beijing — both military and political — to eliminate the TTP safe havens. (Collaboration with Moscow and Beijing may also be useful in promoting internal reconciliation within Afghanistan.)

Eliminating the TTP’s ‘havens’ in Pakistan will be equally if not more difficult. A priority aim must be to smoke out the TTP terrorists from their hideouts in Karachi. Further terrorist attacks like the one on the airport in Karachi could stifle all chances of investment and economic revival in Pakistan.

A second priority should be to neutralise the Punjabi Taliban. This will need bold decisions by the ruling party, some of whose members have well-known political links with sectarian groups. These groups should be pressed to break with the TTP and renounce terrorist violence or suffer the consequences of security action by the state.

Among the Pakistani groups, the Lashkar-i-Taiba has a unique position. It is not a part of the TTP. Its agenda is pro-Kashmir and anti-Indian. A dialogue can be attempted with the LeT to dissuade it from embarking on adventures, like Mumbai, which do not serve the larger interests of the Kashmiris, the Indian Muslims or Pakistan. It should be encouraged to pursue its agenda through political means.

Combating terrorism in Fata and adjacent areas of Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa will involve winning over insurgent factions, such as the Sajna group, and tribal leaders, through a combination of incentives and disincentives. The incentives could include: provision of speedy justice, electricity, health services and education, political representation, monetary rewards and job creation, especially through infrastructure projects. A parallel endeavour is essential in Balochistan.

Halting terrorist financing is crucial. All the three main sources of such financing need to be addressed: criminal activities, such as kidnapping and drugs; contributions from religious zealots, both foreign and domestic, and money supplied by hostile foreign agencies and governments. With a determined, honest and intelligent effort, most if not all terrorist financing can be controlled.

Success in the counterterrorism campaign will depend considerably on effective intelligence and police functions. Existing structures are not up to the task. One or more special units, equipped with honest and qualified personnel, modern investigative and operational capabilities, and the intimate involvement of the armed forces and the intelligence agencies, will need to be created to address the multi-dimensional objectives of the counter-terrorist campaign.

It also seems essential to create an apex body, similar to the Nuclear Command Authority, where the political, armed forces, intelligence and diplomatic leadership can jointly formulate and oversee the execution of an agreed national counterterrorism strategy.

Ultimately, Pakistan’s ‘war on terrorism’ will be won only if it addresses and resolves the root causes of extremism and terrorism in the country: poverty, unemployment, injustice, inequality, ignorance and the erosion of tolerance, decency, humanity and nationalism within our society and polity.

This will be a long ‘war’. It will entail suffering and sacrifice. But it is a war worth fighting to achieve peace and prosperity for Pakistan’s 200 million people and to reclaim the soul of the country that was created by Pakistan’s founding fathers.

Pakistan’s ‘war on terrorism’
by Munir Akram, dawn.com
The writer is a former Pakistan ambassador to the UN.

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Pakistan Launches Decisive Battle Against Terrorism

The government and the military must institute a comprehensive policy to eliminate terrorism root and branch.

After years of uncertainty over how to handle its militant insurgency, Pakistan’s army finally launched an all-out military offensive on June 15 against the local and foreign militants based in North Waziristan agency, the second largest tribal region of Pakistan’s seven Federally Administered Tribal Areas located along the Pakistani-Afghan border. The operation, named Zarb-e-Azb, (or the Strike of the Prophet Muhammad’s Sword) seems to be a crucial fight in Pakistan’s long war against terrorism and militancy, aimed at rooting out militant hideouts associated with the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations.

For more than a decade North Waziristan has remained a safe haven for regional and global terrorist organizations. A place from which to plan and execute deadly attacks on their main targets, most importantly coalition troops in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s public places and security installments. Considered by many as the epicenter of terrorism, North Waziristan is the territory that militants used as a headquarters for planning and coordinating most of the terror acts that reportedly took the lives of 50,000 Pakistanis, including more than 5,000 security personnel, and cost more than $1 billion in financial losses.

There has always been demand for action against militants. Despite popular support, the military’s insistence on launching an operation, and the international community’s calls to eliminate the sanctuaries of terrorists in North Waziristan, Pakistan’s confused political leadership could not make up its mind about how to tackle the issue. Since September last year, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s civilian government pursued elusive peace talks instead of handling the issue militarily, while the Taliban resorted to acts of terrorism, targeting civilians, minorities and security forces.

With the formidable attack on the country’s biggest and busiest international airport in Karachi on June 8, the army lost patience and decided to launch a full-scale military offensive against the militants. Since the peace dialogue had already failed, a military operation became inevitable, compelling the political leadership and even the biggest critics of the use of force to accept it.

The North Waziristan operation is significantly different from the Swat, Bajaur and South Waziristan operations conducted in the last decade in two ways. First, it enjoys the support of a majority of the people and almost all political parties endorse the operation. There also seems to be a consensus among the civilian and military leadership on this issue. Second, it seems that the military has abandoned the policy of keeping the “good” Taliban – those who undermine the interests of Pakistan’s adversaries on the directives of the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (the military’ s premier spy agency) – and eliminating the “bad” Taliban – those that direct their guns at the Pakistani state – as it understands that the recalcitrant proxies often morph into enemies and make alliances with anti-state militants.

After realizing that the good and the bad Taliban are two sides of the same coin, the military has decided to “eliminate all terrorists regardless of hue and color, along with their sanctuaries.” In the first phase of the operation, it is successfully conducting air strikes on terrorist hideouts, destroying their infrastructure and killing hundreds of suspected foreign and local militants. Troops have cordoned off many areas of North Waziristan to prevent the relocation of militants to adjacent regions, and aerial strikes have been extended to those regions as well. To make the operation more successful, the military has boosted security near the Pakistani-Afghan border to stop militants from crossing over into Afghanistan, and requested the Afghan Army to strengthen security on its side to keep militants from fleeing to the neighboring province of Khost. Most recently, Islamabad and Kabul agreed to “to take action against all terrorists without making any discrimination among them and their hideouts on their respective sides.” As soon as the evacuation of civilians is completed in North Waziristan, the military plans to launch a ground offensive to wipe out the terrorists and establish order in the state.

There is a serious concern that the immediate reaction to the operation could be violent terrorist attacks across the country, mostly on places of worship, vital public buildings and security installments. To deal with the threat, the government has beefed up security in large cities and other sensitive areas, though perhaps not as much as it should. Law enforcement agencies have also conducted some raids on terrorist hideouts in Islamabad, Peshawar, Karachi and other major cities on the basis of intelligence information.

If the operation successfully concludes in the coming weeks – as some expect – it could significantly reduce terror incidents across the country. However, merely clearing North Waziristan will not be sufficient to root out terrorism. For a permanent solution, Pakistan needs to develop a comprehensive counter-terrorism strategy.

The most crucial part of fighting the militancy is to wage and win the battle of ideas. A forceful national narrative needs to be developed to counter the Taliban’s regressive and intolerant narrative, in order to win the ideological conflict and garner support for counter-terrorism operations

The government must try to increase the efficiency of and cooperation among its various intelligence and law-enforcement agencies in order to carry out counter-terrorism operations more effectively, and limit the activities of terrorist groups. There is also an urgent need to initiate a crackdown on the TTP and other terrorist outfits’ sleeper cells in major cities and towns across the country. It is equally important for the government to eliminate Sunni sectarian militant groups such as Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba, and anti-Indian militant outfits such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Hizbul Mujahideen.

The operation in North Waziristan is the beginning of a decisive battle against militancy and terrorism. To survive as a nation state, it is a battle Pakistan must win.

Deedar Hussain Samejo is pursuing a Masters in Political Science at The University of Sindh,  Jamshoro, Pakistan. His commentaries have appeared in Asia Times Online, Global Post, and Express Tribune.

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