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Showing posts with label Arab. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Arab. Show all posts

Exporting Iranian revolution to Arabs


After the Iranian Revolution the foreign policy of Iran changed dramatically. In many cases diplomatically inimical Arab nations became more cooperative with Iran, while some formerly supportive nations decreased their support.
Ruhollah Khomeini, leader of the revolution and founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its first Supreme Leader declared that, "The concept of monarchy totally contradicts Islam." Therefore, Arab leaders developed a hostile attitude towards the Islamic Republic of Iran. Khomeini's idea of supporting the mustazafeen (those who are wronged or oppressed) as opposed to the mustakbareen (those who are arrogant) led to many problems with neighboring countries due to some Arab regimes being judged by Iranian jurists to be among the mustakbareen. Ayatollah Khomeini was open about his intention to export the revolution to other parts of the Muslim world. Thus, during the early 1980s, Iran was isolated regionally and internationally. This diplomatic and economic isolation intensified during the Iran–Iraq War in which almost all neighboring Arab states, except Syria, supported Iraq logistically and economically. According to some observers,Saddam Hussein fought on behalf of other Arab states that viewed Iran as a potential threat to their stability.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the revolutionary zeal cooled and a degree of pragmatism was adopted by Iranian policy makers. During the presidency of Akbar Hashemi and Mohammad Khatami, Iranian foreign policy switched to reducing international tensions and Iran tried to normalize its relations with its Arab neighbors. When the United States attacked Iraq in the early 1990s, it promoted Iran's political influence in the Middle East.
Since 2000 the situation changed completely. The most significant factor was Bush administration's decision to attack Iraq in 2003 which led to the fall of Saddam, a ba'athist leader with pan-Arab sympathies who was determined to balance Shi'a Iran's regional influence. With the deposition of Saddam, Iran found a major obstacle to its expansion removed. This gave Iran a good chance to emerge as a major player in the Middle East. As Richard Haass quoted Iran will be one of the two most powerful states in the region...The influence of Iran and groups associated with it has been reinforced. Iran could find allies in Arab world comprising Syria, Lebanon, Kuwait and Iraq. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and United Arab Emirates united against Iran, with support from the United States. Other Arab countries continued to have normal relations with Iran.
Another aspect of tension between Iran and Arab countries has been sectarianism. During the early days of the Iranian Revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini endeavored to bridge the gap between Shias and Sunnis by forbidding criticizing the Caliphs who preceded Ali. He also declared it permissible for Shiites to pray behind Sunni imams. However, the influence of Iran on Shiite communities outside its borders and the territorial disputes with Arab neighbors among other issues remain sources of tension in Arab-Iranian relations.[citation needed]
Diplomatic cables leaked in 2010 revealed Arab leaders singled out Iran as the greatest threat to regional stability, yet refuse to speak publicly, telling US diplomats in private, they'd face domestic troubles if they were seen as siding with the West against a Muslim country. The cables showed that Saudi Arabia and Bahrain supported a military attack against Iran aimed to stop the Iranian nuclear program.
On January 4, 2016, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain severed diplomatic ties with Iran. Saudi Arabia cited attacks on the Saudi embassy in Tehran following predominantly Sunni Saudi Arabia's execution of a Shiite cleric. Bahrain cited Iran's "blatant and dangerous interference" in Bahrain and other Arab countries. Read full article at Wikipedia >>>
Read English translation below.....
ایران سے عرب ممالک میں 'انقلاب کی برآمد'
لبنان - حسن فحص
انیس سو پچاسی کے اوخر میں ایرانی قیادت نے پاسداران اسلامی انقلاب کے زیرانتظام "ورلڈ لبریشن موومنٹس بیورو – دفتر سازمانهائے أزادى بخش" کو بند کرکے ان تحریکوں کے ساتھ رابطے کی ذمہ داری وزارت خارجہ کے حوالے کردی۔ اس وقت علی ولایتی وزیر خارجہ، میر حسین موسوی وزیراعظم اور علی خامنہ ای ایران کے صدر تھے۔
اس فیصلے کے بعد تہران میں لبریشن موومنٹس کے دفاتر پر پابندیوں کے حوالے سے اقدامات کا آغاز ہوا جن کا نتیجہ بالآخر ایران سے ان تحریکوں کے نکل جانے پر ہوا۔ تاہم عراقی اور افغان تحریکوں کو مستقبل میں ان کے خصوصی کردار کی وجہ سے باقی رکھا گیا۔ بعد ازاں یہ کردار 1988 اور 2003 میں عراقیوں اور 2001 میں افغانوں کے ساتھ واضح ہوگیا۔ اس کے علاوہ فلسطینی سفارت خانے کو بھی برقرار رکھا گیا تاکہ ایران کی نگرانی میں پروان چڑھنے والی تنظیموں کے مفاد میں فلسطین کے ساتھ تعلق استوار کیا جائے۔
بعض میدانوں کی خصوصیت
یہ بات بالکل واضح ہے کہ شروع سے ہی لبنان کے ساتھ خصوصی تعلق رکھا گیا۔ لبنانی بحران میں فوجی پاسداران کے ادارے کی جلد اور براہ راست مداخلت کا ایرانی حکمت عملی سے گہرا تعلق تھا کیوں کہ وہ لبریشن موومنٹس کے لیے بہترین میدان تھا۔ بالخصوص 1982 میں اسرائیلی حملے اور اس کے بعد ایرانی فورس کے لبنان بھیجے جانے کے بعد۔ تاہم اس منصوبے کی راہ میں بھی دو بنیادی رکاوٹیں تھیں :
پہلی : خمینی نے "سب سے پہلے ایران" کے نعرے کے تحت ایرانی فوجیوں کی بڑی تعداد کو نہ بھیجنے کا فیصلہ کیا کیوں کہ ایران کو عراق میں صدام حسین کی حکومت کے ساتھ جنگ کا سامنا تھا۔
دوسری : اس وقت کے شامی صدر حافظ الاسد نے دمشق پہنچنے والے ایرانی فوج کے ہراول دستے کے تقریبا 4 ہزار اہل کاروں کو لبنان کی سرحد تک پہنچنے سے روک دیا تھا۔
اس کے مقابل تہران میں ان تحریکوں کے نمائندوں کا نظر آنا ختم ہوگیا جو جزیرہ عرب میں انقلاب لانے کی کوششیں کررہی تھیں جن میں بحرین، کویت اور دیگر عرب ممالک شامل ہیں۔
اس کے علاوہ دیگر تحریکوں مثلا جنوبی امریکا کے انقلابی، پولیساریو تحریک، الجزائر کے انقلابی، مصری انقلابی، یورپی بائیں بازو کی جماعتیں اور اسپین میں باسک تنظیم وغیرہ کے نمائندے بھی ایران سے کوچ کرگئے۔
آزادی کی عالمی تحریکوں کے ساتھ تعلق محدود کرنے کے ایرانی فیصلے سے تین میدانوں کو مستثنی رکھا گیا جو ایرانی قیادت کے لیے تزویراتی گہرائی کی حیثیت رکھتے تھے۔ ان میں ایک میدان تو افغانستان تھا جہاں شمالی اتحاد سے تعلق استوار کیا گیا۔
دوسرا میدان عراق تھا جہاں سپریم کونسل برائے اسلامی انقلاب تشکیل دی گئی۔ آغاز میں اس کونسل میں ایران میں موجود تمام اسلامی گروپ شامل تھے۔ تاہم بعد میں ان گروپوں کے اندر بعض اختلافات بھی سامنے آئے اور پھر محمد باقر الحکیم نے اس سپریم کونسل کی قیادت سنبھال لی۔ اس دوران پاسداران انقلاب کے خصوصی حلقوں نے عراق میں کرد جماعتوں کے ساتھ بھی سیکورٹی، عسکری اور سیاسی تعلقات قائم کیے۔ افغانی اور عراقی پتوں کو بچا کر رکھنے کی براہ راست اہمیت 11 ستمبر کے واقعات کے بعد 2001 میں افغانستان میں اور اپریل 2003 میں عراق میں بین الاقوامی مداخلت کے بعد پوری طرح واضح ہوگئی۔
تشکیل اور تربیب
مستثنی رکھا جانے والا تیسرا میدان لبنان تھا.. جہاں ایران کی جانب سے تشکیل دی گئی تنظیم "امت حزب الله" کو امل موومنٹ کے سامنے حقیقی حریف کی شکل میں بدل دیا۔
انیس سو بیاسی میں خمینی کے فیصلے اور شام اور لبنان میں ایرانی توسیع سے متعلق حافظ الاسد کے اندیشوں کے باوجود پاسداران انقلاب کے تقریبا 4 ہزار اہل کار دمشق پہنچ کر سیدہ زینب کے علاقے میں ٹھہر گئے۔ شامی حکومت نے ان اہل کاروں کو الزبدانی کے علاقے میں منتقل کر کے ان کے لیے ایک خاص کیمپ قائم کردیا تاکہ وہ مقامی باشندوں اور ایران کے حامی لبنانی فریقوں تک نہ پہنچ سکیں۔
بعد ازاں شامی حکومت اور ایرانی سفارت خانے کے درمیان ایک معاہدے کے تحت ان ایرانی اہل کاروں کی مقررہ تعداد کو لبنان کے مشرقی میں البقاع کے علاقے بعلبک میں تربیتی کیمپ قائم کرنے کی اجازت دی گئی.. تاکہ اسرائیلی قابض فوجوں کا مقابلہ کرنے والے گروپوں کو تربیت دی جاسکے۔
یہ منتقلی تہران میں وزارت دفاع، پاسداران انقلاب کی قیادت، وزارت خارجہ، خمینی کے انقلاب کے بیورو کے سربراہ اور باسیج فورس کے سربراہ کے درمیان کئی ملاقاتوں کے بعد عمل میں آئی۔ بعد ازاں تہران میں امل موومنٹ کے نمائندے کو بھی شریک کیا گیا جس نے لبنان میں شیعہ فرقے کے اندر امل موومنٹ کے خلاف اور متوازی ایران کے زیرانتظام ایک خصوصی تنظیم قائم کرنے پر آمادگی کا اظہار کیا۔ اس طرح "امت حزب اللہ" کے نام سے یہ تنظیم وجود میں آئی۔
کردار کی بنیاد
پچاسی میں لبنان سے اسرائیل کے جزوی انخلاء نے ایران کو یہ موقع فراہم کردیا کہ وہ "امت حزب اللہ - اسلامی مزاحمت" تشکیل دے کر لبنان میں اپنے رسوخ اور کنٹرول کو مضبوط بنائے۔ یہ نئی جماعت اپنی پیچیدہ سیکورٹی، سماجی، سیاسی اور عسکری کارروائیوں کے ذریعے بائیں بازو کی قومی جماعتوں کو مزاحمت کے عمل سے دور کرنے میں کامیاب ہوگئی۔
اس سلسلے میں شام کی ایران کے ساتھ یہ مفاہمت طے پائی کہ لبنان کے میدان کو دو شیعہ فریقوں کے درمیان تقسیم کردیا جائے۔ ان میں ایک تو امل موومنٹ میں شام سے وابستگی رکھنے والا گروپ تھا جو نبیہ بری کی قیادت میں سیاسی سرگرمیوں کا ذمہ دار تھا.. جب کہ دوسرا گروپ ایران سے وابستگی رکھنے والے عناصر پر مشتمل تھا جن کے ذمے سرحدی پٹی پر اسرائیلی وجود کے خلاف عسکری کارروائیاں سرانجام دینا تھا۔
1993 میں "حزب الله" (جس نے اپنے نام سے امت کا لفظ ہٹا دیا تھا) کی جانب سے ادا کیے جانے والے کردار کی اہمیت اس وقت بھرپور انداز سے واضح ہوگئی.. جب ایران نے خود کو خطے کے نئے نقشے سے باہر پایا۔ 1993 میں حزب اللہ اور اسرائیل کے درمیان ہونے والے معرکے نے تصفیے کے عمل کو بڑی حد تک برباد کر دیا یا کم از کم پیچیدہ ضرور بنا دیا.. جس کے بعد علاقائی سطح پر شام اور ایران ایک مرتبہ پھر نمایاں کھلاڑی بن کر ابھرے۔
1996 میں بھی لبنان کے جنوب میں حزب اللہ اور اسرائیل کے درمیان جنگ ایران اور شام کے اس مشترکہ کردار کو مضبوط کرنے کی کوشش ثابت ہوئی۔ دونوں نے اپنے مفادات کو پورا کرنے میں کوئی کسر نہ چھوڑی۔
اپریل 1996 میں حزب اللہ اور اسرائیل کے درمیان طے پائے جانے والے معاہدے کے مطابق فریقین کو ایک دوسرے کے خلاف جارحیت کے صورت میں اپنے دفاع کا حق دیا گیا۔ اس معاہدے کے نتیجے میں حزب اللہ محض ایک ایران نواز لبنانی جماعت کے خول سے باہر آ کر "علاقائی سطح پر کردار کی حامل" جماعت بن گئی۔
اس طرح اس کے سامنے لبنان کے علاوہ پوری عرب دنیا اور دیگر ممالک میں بھی بڑا کردار ادا کرنے کی راہ ہموار ہوگئی۔ ایرانی قیادت کو جو حزب اللہ کے لیے سیاسی، مذہبی اور ثقافتی سائبان شمار کی جاتی ہے.. ولایت فقیہہ کے نظام اور اپنے عالمی منصوبے پر عمل درامد کے سلسلے میں تنظیم سے بڑی توقعات وابستہ ہوگئیں۔
جولائی 2006 میں اسرائیل کے ساتھ جنگ کے دوران اور اس کے بعد خطے کی سطح پر حزب اللہ کا کردار مضبوط ہو کر زیادہ سنجیدہ مرحلے کی طرف منتقل ہوگیا۔ اس لیے کہ نیوکلیئر پروگرام کے حوالے سے ایران کو بچانے کی جنگ تھی.. یہ معاملہ اس وقت ڈیڈلاک کا شکار ہوگیا تھا اور نیوکلیئر پروگرام کے علاوہ عراق، افغانستان اور فلسطین میں کردار کی وجہ سے امریکا اور مغربی ممالک کی جانب سے ایران کے خلاف بھرپور ممکنہ جنگ کی دھمکیاں عروج پر پہنچ گئیں تھیں۔
کرداروں کی تقسیم
1997 ایران کے لیے ایک اہم سال تھا جب محمد خاتمی نے ملک کی صدارت سنبھالی۔ اس سے قبل عالمی برادری کے ساتھ ایران کے تعلقات انتہائی نازک مرحلے میں داخل ہوچکے تھے۔ ایران پر جرمنی اور ارجنٹائن میں دہشت گرد کارروائیوں کا الزام عائد کرکے یورپی ممالک نے اس کے بائیکاٹ کا اعلان کرتے ہوئے وہاں سے اپنے سفارت کاروں کو واپس بلالیا۔
مغربی دنیا کے سامنے خاص طور پر اور پڑوسی عرب ممالک کے سامنے کشادگی اور خیرسگالی کے جذبے کے اظہار کے لیے ایران کو اطمینان بخش اقدامات کرنے کے ساتھ ساتھ اعتماد کی راہوں کو پھر سے استوار کرنا تھا۔ اس موقع پر خاتمی نے اپنے مصالحانہ خطاب میں عالمی برادری کے ساتھ مکالمے کی فضا سازگار کرنے کا عندیہ دیا۔
اس کے مقابل ایرانی حکومت نے خاتمی کے خطاب کو خطے کی سطح پر میدان میں اپنی صلاحیتوں کے دوبارہ حصول کا موقع شمار کیا اور اصلاح پسند صدر کی جانب سے فراہم کردہ سکون کی فضا کا پورا فائدہ اٹھایا۔
یہاں سے ایران نے براہ راست سیاسی نگرانی کے تحت خطے میں سیاسی اور عسکری قوتوں کے ساتھ دوبارہ تعلق استوار کرنے کا فیصلہ کیا۔ اس سلسلے میں لبنان میں حزب اللہ اور اس کے سکریٹری جنرل حسن نصر اللہ کو مہرہ بنایا گیا.. جس کے بعد بیروت ایرانی فلک پر گھومنے والی فلسطینی قوتوں مثلا حماس اور اسلامی جہاد یہاں تک کہ فلسطینی اتھارٹی کے ساتھ بات چیت کے لیے بھی ملاقات کا مرکز بن گیا۔ اس کے علاوہ سوڈان، یمن اور مصر کے میدانوں میں بھی تعلقات استوار کرنے پر کام کیا گیا۔
لبنان سے شروع کرکے مختلف میدانوں میں سیاسی، سیکورٹی اور فوجی سطح پر سرگرمیوں کو پھر سے فعال بنانے کے نتیجے میں ایران کو ورلڈ لبریشن موومنٹس کے بیورو کو بھی دوبارہ سے متحرک کرنے کا موقع مل گیا جب کہ نہ تو اس کا نام استعمال کرنے کی ضرورت پیش آئی اور نہ ان سرگرمیوں میں اپنے کردار کے حوالے سے براہ راست شک و شبہات کی گنجائش چھوڑی گئی۔
تقریبا چار دہائیوں سے جاری اس انبار سازی کی اہمیت گزشتہ پانچ سالوں میں ایران کے لیے بہت نمایاں ہوگئی.. اس کی وجوہات میں عرب دنیا میں انقلابی لہر کا بیدار ہونا اور خطے کی پیش رفت میں حزب اللہ کا براہ راست داخل ہونا شامل ہیں۔ اس طرح حزب اللہ کا یمن، عراق، بحرین اور یہاں تک کہ مصر اور نائیجیریا میں... اور سب سے زیادہ خطرناک کردار شام میں نمایاں ہوگیا جو ایرانی دائرہ کار میں موجود قوتوں کی سرگرمیوں اور ان کے درمیان رابطے کے محور میں تبدیل ہوگیا... اور یہ ایرانی توسیع پسندی کے بڑے منصوبے کے سلسلے کی ایک اہم کڑی ہے۔
پیر 28 جمادی الاول 1437هـ - 7 مارچ 2016م
رابط مختصر 
http://urdu.alarabiya.net
English Translation by Google:

Aukr administered in nineteen hundred and fifty leaders of the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard "World Liberation Movements Bureau - Office sazmanهayy free unsatisfactory" closed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs with responsibility for communication these movements. The foreign minister Ali Velayati, Minister Mir Hossein Mousavi, Ali Khamenei, Iran's president.
In Tehran after the initiative of restrictions on the offices of Liberation Movements, which ultimately result in the withdrawal of these movements from Iran. The Iraqi and Afghan campaigns was the cause of their special role in the future. Later it became clear with the Iraqis and Afghans in 2001, 1988 and 2003. The Israeli embassy was maintained in order to establish contact with the Palestinians nurtured in the interest of the monitoring organizations in Iran.
The grounds feature
It is clear that the special relationship with Lebanon began. Why the Lebanese crisis was closely linked to the Iranian strategy of early and direct intervention of the institution of the military elite that was the best field for the Liberation Movements. After the attack, especially in 1982 and then sent to Lebanon by Iranian forces. The project had two main obstacles to:
The first revolution of "Iran first" slogan was the number of soldiers facing war with Iran did not decide to send Iran to the government of Saddam Hussein in Iraq.
Second: The Syrian President Hafez al-Assad had stopped about 4 thousand vanguard of the Iranian military officials arrived in Damascus from reaching Lebanon. It has over its competitors to see the representatives of these movements in Tehran Turks were trying to bring revolution in the Arab world, including Bahrain, Kuwait and other Arab countries.
The other movements such as the South American revolutionary, pulysaryu movement, the Algerian revolution, revolution, European left-wing parties and representatives of the Basque coach Iran've also organized in Spain.
Iran's decision to limit to three areas with the liberation movements were freed who had the status of a strategic depth for the Iranian leadership. If a field has been developed with the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan where he was.
The field was formed the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution in Iraq where. The Islamist group in Iran were included in the Council. However, some differences emerged within these groups and then Mohammad Baqir al-Hakim took over the leadership of the Supreme Council. The Revolutionary Guards have set up special areas of security, military and political ties with the Kurdish parties in Iraq. Afghan and directly after the events of September 11 to save the addresses in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in April 2003 became fully apparent after the international intervention in Iraq.
Creating and trbyb
The third field was sorry about Lebanon. The organization was formed by Iran, "people turned into Hizb Allah" real rival in front of the Amal Movement.
Since the revolution, despite the decision to extend the Iranian Hafez al-Assad of Syria and Lebanon reached about 4 concerns eighty thousand men stayed in Sayyida Zainab in Damascus between Iranian territory. The Syrian government has set up a special camp for these officials moved alzbdany area so they can not reach the Lebanese parties to support local residents and Iran.
Later, the government was allowed to set up camp in the Iranian embassy in eastern Lebanon's Bekaa balbk fixed number of Iranian officials, under an agreement to groups fighting the Israeli occupation forces. be trained.
The transition between the Defence Ministry in Tehran, led the Revolutionary Guards, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, head of the Khomeini revolution and Basij Force chief of bureau came after several meetings. Later, the participants were representatives of Amal Movement in Tehran, which has agreed to the Shia Amal movement in Lebanon and to establish a special body run parallel to Iran. Such "people come into this entity called Hezbollah".
Role-based
Fifty Israel's partial withdrawal from Lebanon has provided an opportunity for Iran to create "Muslim Hezbollah - Islamic resistance" to strengthen their influence and control in Lebanon. The party succeeded in removing the resistance of the left-wing political parties through their complex security, social, political, and military operations.
The rapprochement with Iran and Syria are scheduled to be divided between the two Shiite parties Lebanon field. One of them was responsible for the political Amal Movement led by an evil prophetess who was affiliated groups in Syria. The second group was composed of elements from Iran, whose ties to Israel's existence rests on the border strip was to carry out military operations against. in 1993, "Hizb Allah" (the importance of the role to be played by the word removed) from the time the nation became clear his name when Iran itself strongly. found out the new maps of the region. In 1993, the battle between Hezbollah and Israel destroyed the settlement process has largely or at least complicate the course of the evening. Iran once again emerged as a leading player at the regional level. 1996 war between Hezbollah and Israel in south Lebanon was the joint effort to strengthen its role of Iran and Syria. Both left no stone unturned to meet their own interests. April 1996, Hezbollah and Israel in accordance with the agreement between the parties was found on the right of self-defense in case of aggression against one another. The agreement resulted in Hezbollah just come out of the shell of a senior pro-Syrian party "has become a" party role at the regional level.
Thus paved the way to Lebanon to play a greater role in the Arab world and other countries. Iranian opposition that led to the political, religious and cultural layers are counted. Guardianship system and the scribes were great expectations associated with the organization in implementing our global plan. During the war with Israel in July 2006 and then regional level, Hezbollah's role shifted towards more serious stage strong. اس لیے کہ نیوکلیئر پروگرام کے حوالے سے ایران کو بچانے کی جنگ تھی.. یہ معاملہ اس وقت ڈیڈلاک کا شکار ہوگیا تھا اور نیوکلیئر پروگرام کے علاوہ عراق، افغانستان اور فلسطین میں کردار کی وجہ سے امریکا اور مغربی ممالک کی جانب سے ایران کے خلاف the full potential threats were climaxed.
Distribution of roles
1997 was a critical year for Iran when Mohammad Khatami became president of the country. Earlier, Iran's relations with the international community had entered a critical stage. The terrorist acts against Germany and Argentina announced its boycott on Iran imposed by the European Union pulled its diplomats from there. Especially neighbor spirit of openness and goodwill in the Arab world expression was the way to build trust with Iran and to give satisfaction measures. اس موقع پر خاتمی نے اپنے مصالحانہ خطاب میں عالمی برادری کے ساتھ مکالمے کی فضا سازگار کرنے کا عندیہ دیا۔ اس کے مقابل ایرانی حکومت نے خاتمی کے خطاب کو خطے کی سطح پر میدان میں اپنی صلاحیتوں کے دوبارہ حصول کا موقع شمار کیا اور اصلاح پسند advantage of the relaxed atmosphere provided by the President. from Iran decides to rebuild relations with political and military powers in the region directly under the political supervision. The piece was Hezbollah and its Secretary General Hassan Nasrallah in Lebanon. The Israeli forces on Beirut after grinding the Iranian orbit, such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad even called for talks with Palestinian Authority was the center. In addition, Sudan, Yemen and Egypt has been working to develop relations in the fields. Starting from Lebanon in various fields of political, security and military activities of the Bureau of the World Liberation Movements in Iran revivify was also an opportunity to mobilize again that neither the need to use his name, and not in the scope of activities directly planted doubts of his character. this repository of nearly four decades Listing has significant importance for Iran in the past five years. the reasons for this include the revolutionary wave in the Arab world to be awakened and entered directly into the region's progress in Lebanon. Thus Hezbollah's changed in Yemen, Iraq, Bahrain, Egypt and Nigeria, and even in the most dangerous part of the activities of the forces that were in Syria and Iran scope axis of communication between them ... and this is an important part of Iranian expansion project.
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The New Arabs by Juan Cole

SENIOR University of Michigan academician, Juan Cole, appears to have a twofold agenda in writing this book. On the one hand, he wishes to provide a comprehensive overview of the role and function of young revolutionaries central to the Arab Spring in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. On the other, by doing the former, he attempts to give the reader an idea of the collective identity of (what he terms) the young millennial Arabs of the 21st century.

Cole’s tome is a breathtakingly detailed and comprehensive tour de force; lucidly written and extensively documented, over a tenth of the book is devoted to extensive explanatory notes and sources. He thus succeeds in achieving the first aim of his agenda, and while determining whether he creditably defines the millennials is ultimately up to the individual reader to ascertain, there is no doubt about the fact that his aspirations are valid and noble ones.

It should come as no secret to anyone even remotely familiar with the machinations of the Arab Spring that heads of state such as Mubarak of Egypt, Ben Ali of Tunisia, and Gaddafi of Libya, were displaced partly by means involving extensive internet networking by the revolutionaries within their respective countries. Indeed cyberspace (as opposed to ‘meatspace’) provided outlets for the restless energy and legitimate frustration of the millennials. Naturally, Cole consistently creates fundamental links between his perception of revolutionary activities and the widespread use and availability of social media in the Middle East.

The first half of the book delineates precisely what Cole means by the terms “Arab millennials” and “Republican monarchs”. He also painstakingly underscores the manner in which the post-revolution, New-Left parties within these countries struggled to cope with the confusion and fallout that inevitably arise when any regime (no matter how oppressive) is left without a central leader.

The latter half of the text details the revolutions of the three countries within the precincts of separate chapters. The number of courageous individuals listed by Cole is too numerous to dwell on here at length, but special mention may be made of a few that stand out as having been particularly significant. One of these is the Egyptian blogger Wael Abbas, another is the tragic figure of Tunisian Tariq Bouazizi, and last but not least, the Tunisian activist Zouhair Yahyaoui.

Given the immense amount of internet information about the revolutions to which one can have access, and which invariably tends to overwhelm as opposed to instruct, Cole’s book (though dense and difficult) provides a welcome sense of anchorage. This is primarily because it focuses on that which is both genuine and important. Had it not been for the heroic and systematic blogging of Wael Abbas, many Egyptian youth who wished for reform would have found themselves to be politically rudderless in the second decade of this century. Fortunately for Abbas, he was a survivor. Creator of the dissident internet magazine TUNeZINE, his counterpart Zouhair Yahyaoui attempted to co-ordinate and stimulate Tunisians in a similar manner, but his is a sadder case than that of Abbas. Though Yahyaoui achieved some of his aims, the stresses of rigorous imprisonment resulted in his health collapsing fatally when he was still in his thirties.

Bouazizi’s case appears to be the most depressing. Consistently denied the ability to put his education and personal resources to good use, in a last act of desperation he immolated himself, thereby (almost literally) beginning the conflagration that set Ben Ali’s corrupt government ablaze. One of the most vital aspects of Cole’s text is that he never places a hero before the audience, unless that individual has truly earned the dignity of being regarded as one. He is just as measured in documenting their polar opposites — for example, individuals such as the post-Mubarak president, Mohammed Morsi, whose firm personality but conservative and myopic views resulted in the Egyptian economy being affected detrimentally. Even a substantial infusion of funds by Morsi’s main benefactor, Qatar, was unable to salvage either the economy or even, ultimately, his position.

Perhaps the only major criticism of Cole’s work that jumps out at any reader is that it lacks information about some key points, such as international sentiment regarding the new millennials, and portrayals of heroic female figures of the revolutions.

This may have been because Cole’s intensely honed focus necessarily excludes such elements, or at least a detailed discussion of them, resulting in an unevenness that is understandable but can hardly go unnoticed. He feels compelled to offer thumbnail sketches of several family members of the Gaddafi ‘cartel,’ but is oddly silent about points such as Christiane Amanpour’s historic and exclusive interview with Mubarak during the early days of the Egyptian revolution. This is surprising since the author’s respect for Western journalism subtly fuels much of his own documentation.

Equally puzzling is why Cole seems so quick to view these revolutions as similar to the French one of the 18th century; that the writer is an expert on Napoleonic Egypt does not automatically mean that one should dispel a healthy personal sense of scepticism and subscribe to this viewpoint. To do so would result in an undercutting of the imperative need to see each Arab revolution as unique and non-Western.

To be perfectly fair, however, Cole never claims to be writing from a quasi-indigenous, or even empathetic, perspective, although he is both linguistically and geographically well-versed when it comes to his knowledge of the Middle East.

Deeply sobering though the book is, perhaps it would not be inappropriate to end with a fantastical but apt quote from the science-fiction novel, Star Wars: A New Hope, where Princess Leia notes: “They were in the wrong place at the wrong time. Naturally, they became heroes.” The saying fully applies to key millennial figures of the Arab Spring.

The reviewer is Assistant Professor of Social Sciences and Liberal Arts at the Institute of Business Administration.

The New Arabs: How the Millennial Generation is Changing the Middle East

(POLITICS)

By Juan Cole   Simon and Schuster, US  ISBN 978-1451690392   348pp.
The New Arabs by Juan Cole
by Nadya Chishty-Mujahid, dawn.com

The Gulf and Iran: New realities, new strategies

Recent tensions between the GCC countries have loosened the cohesiveness of the Council
An Iranian nuclear deal is likely to put an end to the status quo between the Gulf and Iran. While the US withdrawal from Iraq shook the balances, a nuclear deal would mean an unprecedented rise in Iran's power in the region. This development has put a political distance between the countries in the Gulf region.

But not all members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are on the same wavelength. Oman has adopted a neutral approach, while playing the role of facilitator in US-Iran relations when it hosted preparatory diplomacyfor the nuclear deal. Qatar is vying to position itself as a key regional and international player. The UAE is confused and has sided with Saudi Arabia, while also attempting to ease its own tensions with Iran. Saudi Arabia has intensified its proxy wars against Iran, feeling both threatened and betrayed by the recent US-Iran rapprochement.

Meanwhile, the Arab Spring uprisings are continuing and have major implications for the region. A new collective consciousness for change has resulted in a strong societal will for the transformation of autocratic ruling systems. It has also empowered non-state actors and intensified transnational interaction. The wider international picture is in no better shape. At the same time, on the international arena, the search for a balance of power in the post-Cold War era persists and has left considerable power vacuums and room for manoeuvring for global players.

Turkey can help the GCC deal with Iran's regional influence.

Iran's increasing regional power and divergent foreign policies are not a desirable development for the Gulf countries. These difficulties require thinking outside the box, leaving behind the burden of the past and looking forward.

The shifting regional order presents Gulf countries with three challenges. The first one is overcoming their differences in order to embrace a new idea of collective power which would mobilise political efforts to restructure the political landscape in the region.

GCC countries are immune, to a considerable extent, to the Arab Spring spirit because of their small populations and rich economies. However, the demands for good governance, universal rights and freedoms are not likely to disappear. There is an urgent need to take societal demands into serious consideration, engage in constructive dialogue with citizens and put domestic issues in order. Once there is progress on this front, then GCC involvement in other countries facing similar challenges would be more uniform and constructive.

Diminish differences

The second challenge is to work on strengthening the GCC structure and diminishing differences on regional issues. No one expects a total consensus on every issue. However, the new regional setup necessitates thinking beyond immediate interests and setting an agenda to deal with the situation in the medium-to-long term. However, the aftermath of the nuclear deal would mean a tectonic shift in the regional balance of power and no country can handle this change on its own. There is an urgent need for a new initiative of collective action within the GCC if countries want to prevent the Council from becoming a dysfunctional organisation.

The third challenge is developing a common strategy to deal with Iran. The Iran nuclear deal would result in a certain degree of moderation in Iranian foreign policy. It will also have an impact on its domestic arena, especially in terms of potential economic opening. However, the impact of the deal will not majorly affect the structure of the Iranian regime. Therefore, potential moderation of Iranian foreign policy is not likely to completely alleviate tensions in the region.

In their efforts to regain regional cohesion, Gulf states will have to take decisive measures on three key issues. The first one is minimising sectarian tension. There is a potential danger of the spread of sectarian conflict at the societal level throughout the region. One way to prevent this is to nip it in the bud, by containing it at the state level.

The second issue is selective engagement with Iran to create channels for moderation in regional politics. This engagement should be undertaken collectively with great coordination.

The third one is to strengthen the partnership with Turkey, which can balance out Iran's power and at the same time maintain economic and political ties with it. Turkish foreign policy toward Egypt created friction with some GCC countries, but the issues at stake are too high to keep a distance. Turkey can help the GCC deal with Iran's regional influence.

The status quo in the Gulf region is not sustainable. A new spirit of regional cooperation with careful risk assessment and future-oriented planning would help to restructure regional order. The alternative risks bringing about a collapse of regional structrure, which cannot be repaired at a later stage even at a high cost.

Bulent Aras is a Global Fellow at Wilson Center, Washington DC and professor of International Relations at Sabanci University, Istanbul.

Follow him on Twitter: @arasbulent

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.

http://google.com/producer/s/CBIwganc6Ag

The Arab Awakening: Islam and the new Middle East: Tariq Ramadan الصحوة العربية: الإسلام والشرق الأوسط الجديد: طارق رمضان

The Arab Awakening: Islam and the New Middle East from Middle East Institute, Singapore on Vimeo.
Public intellectual and Islamic philosopher Tariq Ramadan has written extensively about Muslims in contemporary Western societies, the troubled relationship between Islam and the West more generally, and how he believes it can be mended. His latest book, The Arab Awakening: Islam and the New Middle East, takes up similar themes against the backdrop of the Arab uprisings of 2011, asking how these Muslim majority countries can leverage this historic political opening to bring about comprehensive social and cultural change.
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    Middle East Institute, Singapore Dr. Tariq Ramadan for a talk on "The Arab Awakening:Islam and the New ...
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Ramadan begins the book by outlining his position of “cautious optimism” regarding the mass mobilisations against dictatorial regimes that shook many countries of the Middle East and North Africa. This interpretation of events lies between two extremes: a premature celebration of radical reform and renewal that has yet to unfold, and a cynical dismissal of popular protest movements as being manipulated and engineered by external forces. Ramadan takes pains to identify the role played by US and European governments and media, such as the selective coverage and diplomatic support granted to opposition movements in some Arab countries versus others, and how economic and geopolitical concerns dictated these choices rather than humanistic ones. He makes special mention of the training in pro-democracy, non-violent activism that young Arab bloggers and cyber-dissidents had received in certain Western countries in the decade leading up to the unrest. These enabling factors, he suggests, should not be seen as controlling the agenda and outcomes of the broad-based mobilisations.

Tunisia and Egypt are two cases that figure most prominently in this account, with occasional references to events in Libya, Syria, Bahrain, Morocco, Yemen and others. The author repeatedly urges a holistic understanding of the extraordinary developments unfolding across the region. Yet his analysis ultimately adds little that is new or especially insightful by way of sociological, economic or geopolitical explanation. The book becomes much more interesting in the second half as Ramadan moves to his core concerns: critique of the ideological narratives deployed by insiders and outsiders to frame events, outline of an intellectual project to guide the future course of action, and the special contribution that Islam can make.

Two salient characteristics of the Arab movements — they remained largely peaceful, and were joined by people of various ages, classes, and genders without being taken over by any one political party — rendered them especially palatable to Western observers. The dominant discourse portrayed the protestors’ demands for democracy, justice and freedom as an embrace of quintessentially Western values, leading to the conclusion that the Middle East is finally ready to democratise, modernise and become more like the West. Ramadan is quick to denounce such a reading of events as imperialistic and ahistorical, one that deliberately erases the Muslim identity of activists. He finds it even more problematic that protagonists within Muslim majority societies subscribe to this understanding of their own history.

Ramadan reserves the bulk of his criticism for the current condition of public discourse within the Arab world. It is marked by a polarisation between ‘secularists’ and ‘Islamists’ on the one hand, and between ‘us’ Muslims perceived as victims and ‘them’ in the West who are blamed for all our problems. Those who advocate secularisation as the solution for Middle Eastern societies oversimplify and are out of touch with real social issues, he shows, just as those espousing Islamist platforms have little to offer other than emotive appeals to tradition to enhance their own credibility. An instructive section of the book discusses why secularism has become a much-loathed and feared term across the Muslim world where processes of secularisation were experienced as repressive control and loss of freedoms, as opposed to the political democratisation and religious pluralism that defines the history of secularisation in Western societies. A similar discussion of political Islam situates it within the early-20th century context of nationalist, anti-colonial resistance where it first arose and traces the evolution of its many ideological currents across time and place.

Ramadan challenges Arabs and, more broadly, Muslims to abandon a counter-productive debate between outmoded conceptual categories and to overcome their intellectual colonisation. He calls for a sustained project of self-criticism and intellectual reconstruction, one that engages with indigenous histories, cultures and identities and promises to restore dignity. He sees lasting change resulting from the mass uprisings only if they don’t stop at the removal of oppressive political regimes and instead go on to launch a comprehensive programme of cultural, economic, social and political transformation.

This ambitious call for social and cultural renewal contains many standard elements from a reformist’s wish list: full rights and participation for women, revamped educational systems, democratic political processes, religious freedoms and pluralism, and an end to poverty, corruption and military interference. The emphasis on social justice also includes a strident critique of the global neo-liberal economic order and the control exerted by international financial institutions, multinational corporations and powerful states on countries of the global South. In fact, Ramadan identifies the shifting realignment of global powers — with the decline of Western economies and the increasing significance of China, Brazil, Russia, India and others — as another critical enabling factor in the toppling of Middle Eastern dictatorships. He sees this moment of multiple overlapping crises as an opportunity for Arab and other third world countries to press for more equitable economic relations, without really specifying how that will come about.

The distinctive part of Ramadan’s proposals concern the role that Islam is to play in the new Middle East that he envisions. The “Islamic reference,” as he calls it, is ever-present as oppositional mobilisations in Egypt and Tunisia have given way to elections, and the formation of new governments and new constitutions but these debates about the place of religion continue to engage in formal, procedural details and tinkering at the margins. He advocates a fundamental re-thinking whereby Islam becomes an ethical framework guiding political conduct and ensuring social justice, an alternative simultaneously more expansive and more limited than what we have been accustomed to. Instead of providing laws, rules and prohibitions, Islamic teachings are to serve as a source of spirituality and meaning. It is an elegant formulation but not easily translatable into actual practice. Unfortunately, Ramadan has developed this notion of Islam as applied ethics in his other works and it is only briefly showcased here (along with his other postulates, such as the distinction between the concepts of religion and culture).

What he does clearly reject is the concept of an “Islamic state,” insisting that a separation between divine and worldly authority has always been present in Islamic jurisprudential thought. He prefers the alternative “civil state” that some Islamist movements are now advocating, i.e. a democratic, secular state de-coupled from religious authority, the closest contemporary approximation of which is the Turkish model. Yet without a flourishing civil society and an active engagement with their Islamic heritage, he warns, Muslim societies will not experience real emancipation and peace.

In the midst of his cautious optimism about the future of the Muslim world, Ramadan downplays the potential threat of radical and militant Islam or the ongoing ‘war on terror’ that is warping relations with the West. He might be correct that the style and substance of the Arab uprisings signal an end to earlier confrontational paradigms, but that assertion still merits some more careful examination. Similarly, he assumes the continuing salience of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the new paradigm rather than demonstrating it. This slim volume was written even as the events it describes were still unfolding, and serves primarily to clarify the religious and political positions that the author has been a passionate proponent of. It is full of exhortations for its readers and frequently becomes repetitive and tendentious. The careful middle ground that Ramadan tries to chart might still, however, appear too bold or controversial to some within his Western or Muslim/Arab audiences who will no doubt find something here to be offended by.

Charting a middle ground, Reviewed by Faiza Mushtaq: The reviewer holds a PhD in Sociology and is affiliated with the Collective for Social Science Research, Karachi

The Arab Awakening: Islam and the New Middle East, (Religion/Politics) By Tariq Ramadan. Allen Lane, UK, ISBN 184614650X, 288pp.
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