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Showing posts with label Extremism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Extremism. Show all posts

Saudi promise of ‘moderate Islam’ shifts power سعودی عرب میں تبدیلی




The man who may soon be king of Saudi Arabia is charting a new, more modern course for a country so conservative that for decades there were no concerts or film screenings and women who attempted to drive were arrested.

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FOLLOWING the rapid ascent of Mohammed bin Salman to the second-most powerful position in Saudi Arabia, a series of unprecedented changes have occurred in the desert kingdom. The young crown prince — seen as the actual power behind the throne — had earlier announced that resort islands off the Red Sea coast would be developed, where the strict religious laws of the kingdom would not apply. He had also recently said that the ban on women drivers would soon be phased out. And the latest in this series of declarations came on Oct 24, when the prince announced the launch of NEOM, a $500bn mega project on Saudi Arabia’s north-western tip. Bin Salman has dubbed this bizarre dream “the first capitalist city in the world. ...” where Saudi law will, again, not be applicable. Along with these futuristic visions, the crown prince has talked of returning his country to ‘moderate Islam’.

From these pronouncements, it appears that bin Salman is embarking on a nation-building project, using a mix of social engineering and authoritarianism to fashion a new, ‘liberal’ Saudi Arabia. However, some things must be considered if the Saudi establishment is serious about changing direction. Firstly, opening nightclubs, beach resorts and allowing concerts, yet at the same time smothering all dissent and criticism, does not translate to a liberal setup. While the prince has announced these ambitious projects, his government has also intensified repression of critics, real and imagined. Over the past few months, clerics, activists and members of civil society have been rounded up by the security apparatus. Even some dissenting members of the royal family have reportedly been detained. For a truly pluralistic sociopolitical setup, people must be allowed to criticise their government, assemble peacefully and discuss ideas openly without fear. Secondly, it is a fact that at its core Saudi Arabia remains a tribal, conservative society. Therefore, any attempts at change must be incremental and, most importantly, should take the population on board. It should be remembered that the 1979 seizure of Makkah’s Masjid al-Haram by religious zealots was triggered by their apprehensions that the House of Saud was not ‘pious’ enough. Much of Saudi society — mainly because of the royal family’s patronage of hard-line clerics and their influence on the education system — may resist high-speed changes that threaten to undo social and religious structures. Therefore, for the sake of stability, the Saudi rulers need to progress steadily but carefully. [Editorial Dawn ]
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Since catapulting to power with the support of his father, the king, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has pushed forth changes that could usher in a new era for one of the United States’ most important allies and swing the kingdom away from decades of ultraconservative dogma and restrictions. He’s introduced musical concerts and movies again and is seen as the force behind the king’s decision to grant women the right to drive as of next year.

Opposition to the changes has so far been muted, but some critics of the prince have been detained. When social openings in the kingdom were taking place four decades ago, Sunni extremists opposed to the monarchy laid siege to Islam’s holiest site in Makkah.

Prince Mohammed’s agenda is upending the ruling Al Saud’s long-standing alliance with the kingdom’s clerical establishment in favour of synchronising with a more cosmopolitan, global capitalism that appeals to international investors and maybe even non-Muslim tourists.

The prince grabbed headlines in recent days by vowing a return to “moderate Islam”. He also suggested that his father’s generation had steered the country down a problematic path and that it was time to “get rid of it”.

In his sweeping “Vision 2030” plan to wean Saudi Arabia off of its near total dependence on petrodollars, Prince Mohammed laid out a vision for “a tolerant country with Islam as its constitution and moderation as its method”.

Prince Mohammed, or MBS as he is widely known, used a rare public appearance on stage at a major investor conference in the capital, Riyadh, this week to drive home that message to a global audience.

“We only want to go back to what we were: moderate Islam that is open to the world, open to all religions,” he said in the ornate grand hall of the Ritz-Carlton. “We will not waste 30 years of our lives in dealing with extremist ideas. We will destroy them today.”

His remarks were met with applause and a front-page article in the Britain’s Guardian newspaper. In expanded remarks to the paper, the 32-year-old prince said that successive Saudi monarchs “didn’t know how to deal with” Iran’s 1979 revolution that brought to power a clerical Shia leadership still in place today.

That same year Saudi rulers weathered a stunning blow: Sunni extremists laid siege to Islam’s holiest site in Makkah for 15 days. The attack was carried out by militants opposed to social openings taking place at the time, seeing them as Western and un-Islamic.

Indeed, Sunni extremists have used the intolerant views propagated by the ideology known as Wahhabism to justify violence against others. Wahhabism has governed life in Saudi Arabia since its foundation 85 years ago.

The ruling Al Saud responded to the events of 1979 by empowering the state’s ultraconservatives. To hedge the international appeal of Iran’s Shia revolution, the government backed efforts to export the kingdom’s foundational Wahhabi ideology abroad.

To appease a sizeable conservative segment of the population at home, cinemas were shuttered, women were banned from appearing on state television and the religious police were emboldened.

Much is now changing under the crown prince as he consolidates greater powers and prepares to inherit the throne.

There are plans to build a Six Flags theme park and a semi-autonomous Red Sea tourist destination where the strict rules on women’s dress will likely not apply. Females have greater access to sports, the powers of the once-feared religious police have been curtailed and restrictions on gender segregation are being eased.

Unlike previous Saudi monarchs, such as King Abdullah who backed gradual and cautious openings, Prince Mohammed is moving quickly.

More than half of Saudi Arabia’s 20 million citizens are below the age of 25, meaning millions of young Saudis will be entering the workforce in the coming decade. The government is urgently trying to create more jobs and ward off the kinds of grievances that sparked uprisings in other Arab countries where unemployment is rampant and citizens have little say in government.

The prince has to find solutions now for the problems he is set to inherit as monarch.

“What MBS is doing is a must requirement for any kind of economic reform. Economic reform requires a new Protestant ethic if you will, a new brand of Islam,” said Maamoun Fandy, director of the London Global Strategy Institute.

This new Saudi version of “moderate Islam” can be understood as one that is amenable to economic reforms; it does not close shops at prayer time or banish women from public life, Fandy said.

In other words, Saudi Arabia’s economic reforms require social reforms to succeed.

Buzz words like “reform”, “transparency” and “accountability” all used by the prince in his promotion of Vision 2030 do not, however, mean that Saudi Arabia is moving toward greater liberalism, democracy, pluralism or freedom of speech.

The government does not grant licences to non-Muslim houses of worship, and limits those of its Shia Muslim citizens.

The prince has also made no mention of human rights concerns. If anything, dozens of the prince’s perceived critics have been detained in a warning to others who dare to speak out.

Some of those arrested were seen as critics of his foreign policies, which include severing ties with Qatar, increasing tensions with Iran and overseeing air strikes in Yemen that have killed scores of civilians and drawn sharp condemnation from rights groups and some in Washington.

Meanwhile, Prince Mohammed faces a Saudi public that remains religiously conservative. That means he still needs public support from the state’s top clerics in order to position his reforms as Islamic and religiously permissible.

These clerics, many of whom had spoken out in the past against women working and driving, appear unwilling or unable to publicly criticise the moves. In this absolute monarchy, the king holds final say on most matters and the public has shown it is welcoming the changes.—AP
Read .. Wahabism 
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wahhabism By Aya Batrawy, www.dawn.com
https://www.dawn.com/news/1366867/saudi-promise-of-moderate-islam-shifts-power

What are the differences between Ottoman Islam and Arabic Islam?
Ottoman Empire was not a secular state but it was also not a state which was ruled by sharia laws.
Now, “arabic islam” is a loose definition. But if we have to compare it, we can compare it to islam of today’s saudi arabia to highlight the contrast.
In Ottoman Empire, religion was used as a unifying tool, it was very practical. And supposedly local judges (Kadı(s)) followed sharia but again this was mostly nominal; for example, alcohol was legal in Ottoman Empire, kadıs could not punish someone for drinking.
Also, religious hierarchy followed a pattern similar to eastern roman empire. Highest religious authority was Şeyh-ül İslam who was also part of The Imperial Council (Divan-ı Hümayun) but his authority was below Padişah (sultan, emperor, khan whatever you want to call it) just like patriarchs authority being below basileus in Roman Empire. Nominally, Padişah needed decree of Şeyh-ül İslam for certain actions but they always gave permission, in cases they tried to oppose, they would simply be replaced by a new Şeyh-ül İslam.
Moreover Ottomans had lots of secular laws besides Sharia such as Atam-Dedem Kanunları (literally meanins laws of the forefathers) derived from turkish traditions. Non-muslims were not subject to same civil laws as muslims; Ecumenical Patriarch of Konstantiniyye was responsible of orthodox christian subjects concerning civil laws for example.

Also, Janissary Order, world’s first standing army in modern sense, elit troops of the Empire, were members of Sufii Dervish Order which significantly diverges from Sunni Islam. Ottoman Dynasty was Sunni muslim just like Sauds but Saudi Arabia follows wahhabism which is the most strict form of Sunni Islam. On the other hand, Ottoman dynasty’s şehzades (princes) would become a member of Janissary Order once they are of age. The ceremony in which princes enter into the order includes an oath that is obviously non-sunni traditions such as pledging in the name of Ali etc….
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سعودی عرب کے ولی عہد محمد بن سلمان کا کہنا ہے کہ وہ سعودی عرب میں ’معتدل اسلام کی واپسی‘ کے لیے کوشاں ہیں۔
یہ بات انھوں نے منگل کو اقتصادیات امور کی ایک کانفرنس کے دوران کہی جو کہ العریبیہ ٹی وی پر براہِ راست دکھائی گئی۔
محمد بن سلمان کا کہنا تھا کہ ’سعودی عرب 1979 سے پہلے ایسا نہیں تھا۔ سعودی عرب اور پورے خطے میں مختلف وجوہات کے لیے 1979 کے بعد سے الصحوہ (آگاہی) کی ایک تحریک چلائی گئی۔‘
ان کا کہنا تھا کہ ’ہم اپنی زندگیوں کے آئندہ 30 سال ان تباہ کن عناصر کی نذر نہیں ہونے دیں گے۔ ہم انتہا پسندی کو جلد ہی ختم کردیں گے۔‘
شہزادہ محمد بن سلمان کا کہنا تھا کہ ’ہم پہلے ایسے نہیں تھے۔ ہم اس جانب واپس جا رہے ہیں جیسے ہم پہلے تھے، ایسا اسلام جو کہ معتدل ہے، اور جس میں دنیا اور دیگر مذاہب کے لیے جگہ ہو۔‘
یاد رہے کہ حال ہی میں سعودی عرب کے بادشاہ شاہ سلمان نے شاہی فرمان جاری کیا تھا جس میں خواتین کو ملک میں پہلی بار گاڑی چلانے کی اجازت دی گئی ہے۔
شاہی فرمان کے مطابق متعلقہ وزارت اس بارے میں ایک ماہ میں تجاویز دے گی اور یہ حکم 24 جون 2018 تک ہر صورت میں نافذالعمل ہو جائے گا۔
http://www.bbc.com/urdu/world-41745064

کیا سعودی عرب میں تبدیلی آ رہی ہے؟

اگر آپ کسی سے سعودی عرب میں تبدیلی کے بارے میں پوچھیں تو وہ کہیں گے: تبدیلی آئے گی، لیکن اپنے وقت پر۔
اس کا مطلب یہ ہے کہ اس کام میں سالہاسال لگ سکتے ہیں تاہم خود سعودیوں کو مہینوں میں تبدیلیوں کی امید ہے۔
ریاض میں ایک کامیاب سعودی تاجر خاتون نے مجھ سے کہا: 'میں نے ایک مرد شریکِ کار سے شرط لگائی تھی کہ عورتوں کی ڈرائیونگ پر پابندی اس سال کے پہلے چھ ماہ میں اٹھ جائے گی، اور انھوں نے کہا کہ دوسرے ششماہی میں۔
'لیکن اب میرا خیال ہے کہ یہ پابندی اگلے سال کے شروع میں ہٹے گی، اور اس کا اطلاق صرف 40 سال سے زیادہ عمر کی خواتین پر ہو گا۔'
ریاض کے شاہی حلقوں میں بھی ایسی ہی پیشنگوئیاں گردش کر رہی ہیں۔ بعض یہ بھی کہتے ہیں کہ نوجوان خواتین کو بھی جلد ہی اجازت مل جائے گی۔
سعودی عرب جیسے کٹر قدامت پسند معاشرے کے ہر شعبے میں تبدیلی سست رفتاری سے آتی ہے جہاں مذہبی حکام انتہائی اثر و رسوخ کے حامل ہوتے ہیں اور بہت سے سعودی اپنے موجودہ طرزِ زندگی سے چمٹے رہنا چاہتے ہیں۔
لیکن اس کے باوجود تبدیلی آ رہی ہے اور اس کا اثر حکمرانوں اور معاشرے دونوں پر ہو رہا ہے۔
ریاض میں گلف ریسرچ سینٹر کے جان سفاکیاناکس کہتے ہیں: 'وقت بہت کم رہ گیا ہے۔'
چند سال قبل سیاہ سونا کہلانے والے سعودی تیل کی فروخت سے آنے والا منافع آدھا ہو کر رہ گیا ہے، جس کا اثر زندگی کے مختلف شعبوں پر پڑ رہا ہے۔
تیل کا کارخانہ

سعودی عرب کی 90 فیصد آمدن تیل سے ہوتی ہے
سفاکیاناکس کہتے ہیں: 'یہ تیل عشروں سے انجن کا کام کر رہا تھا۔ لیکن اب بہت سے انجنوں کی ضرورت ہے۔'
اس مقصد کے حصول کے لیے سعودی حکومت نے گذشتہ برس وژن 2030 نامی منصوبہ تیار کیا تھا۔
اس کی باگ ڈور 31 سالہ نائب ولی عہد شہزادہ محمد بن سلمان کو سونپی گئی ہے، جنھوں نے دنیا کی بہترین ایجنسیوں سے کہا ہے کہ وہ منصوبے اور تصورات پیش کریں۔
ملک کے بااثر وزیر برائے تیل خالد الفالح کہتے ہیں کہ 'وژن 2030 انتہائی اہم ہے۔'
سرکاری نوکریوں میں بھاری تنخواہیں اور پرتعیش مراعات ختم کر دی گئی ہیں۔ نجی شعبے سے توقع ہے کہ معیشت کی نمو میں وہ بڑا کردار ادا کرے۔ لیکن ابھی اس کی رفتار سست ہے۔
ایک سعودی نے نام ظاہر کیے بغیر بتایا: 'بہت مشکل نظر آ رہا ہے کہ وژن 2030 اپنی منزل تک 2030 میں پہنچ جائے۔ تاہم کم از کم کوئی وژن ہے تو سہی۔'

وژن 2030 کا ایک مقصد نجی شعبے کو تقویت دینا ہے
نوجوان شہزادے کو معلوم ہے کہ ایک اور گھڑی بھی چل رہی ہے جو تبدیلی لانے کے لیے دباؤ بڑھا رہی ہے۔
دو تہائی سعودی ان کی عمر کے یا ان سے چھوٹے ہیں۔
شاہ عبداللہ کے تعلیمی وظائف کے پروگرام کے تحت لاکھوں نوجوان سعودی مغربی تعلیمی اداروں سے فارغ التحصیل ہو کر ملک واپس لوٹ رہے ہیں۔
ایک طرف تو وہ نوکریوں کی تلاش میں ہیں، دوسری طرف انھیں ایک ایسے معاشرے کا سامنا ہے جہاں سینماؤں پر پابندی ہے اور ریستورانوں میں مردوں اور عورتوں کے لیے الگ حصے ہیں۔
تاہم تبدیلی کی سمت میں قدم اٹھائے جا رہے ہیں۔
اب گلیوں میں بدنامِ زمانہ مطوع نامی مذہبی پولیس نظر نہیں آتی جن کا مشن 'برائی کو روکنا اور نیکی کو فروغ دینا' تھا اور جو اکثر اوقات اپنی حد سے تجاوز کرتی تھی۔ ان کے خاتمے کا سہرا ولی عہد کے سر باندھا جا رہا ہے۔
ریاض کے امیر شہری کہتے ہیں کہ شہر میں کچھ ایسے ریستوران کھل گئے ہیں جہاں زنانہ مردانہ شعبوں کا زیادہ سختی سے خیال نہیں رکھا جاتا اور وہاں تیز موسیقی بجتی رہتی ہے۔
میں ولید السعدان سے ایک صحرائی ریس کے موقعے پر ملی۔ وہ کہتے ہیں: 'ہم چاہتے ہیں کہ عورتیں گاڑیاں چلائیں اور سینیما کھلیں۔'
صحرا میں گاڑیوں کی ریس ایک ایسی سنسنی ہے جس سے سعودی قانونی طور پر لطف اندوز ہو سکتے ہیں۔

دو تہائی سعودیوں کی عمر 30 برس سے کم ہے
لیکن یہاں بھی صرف مرد ہی اپنی فور وہیل اور ایس یو وی گاڑیوں میں دیکھے جا سکتے ہیں۔
'عمومی تفریحی محکمہ' نامی ایک اور محکمہ یہاں سرگرمِ عمل ہے۔ لیکن اپنے نام کے باوجود اس محکمے کی کوشش ہے سعودی چند حدود کے اندر زندگیوں سے لطف اندوز ہوں۔
محکمے کے چیئرمین احمد الخطیب کہتے ہیں: 'میرا مشن لوگوں کو خوش و خرم دیکھنا ہے۔'
انھوں نے بڑی محنت سے سال بھر میں 80 کے قریب میلے، آتش بازی کے ایونٹ، موسیقی کے شو اور دوسرے مواقع ڈھونڈے ہیں جہاں لوگوں کو تفریح فراہم کی جا سکتی ہے اور جن پر تنقید بھی نہ ہو سکے۔
انھوں نے بڑے محتاط انداز میں مجھے بتایا: 'ہم زیادہ لوگوں کو زیادہ مواقع فراہم کرنا چاہتے ہیں، ہم قدامت پسند لوگوں کو بھی سرگرمیوں سے متعارف کروانا چاہتے ہیں۔'

بہت سے سعودی نوجوان مغربی اداروں میں پڑھ کر لوٹے ہیں
ایک سعودی ٹور آپریٹر گلہ کرتے ہیں کہ 'سعودی ہر سال 70 ارب ریال باہر کے ملکوں میں چھٹیاں منا کر خرچ کر ڈالتے ہیں۔' ان کی کوشش ہے کہ وہ سعودی عرب میں بھی دبئی یا لندن کی طرح سہولتیں فراہم کریں تاکہ لوگ باہر نہ جائیں۔
عورتوں کو گاڑیاں چلانے کی اجازت دینا سماجی کے ساتھ ساتھ معاشی مسئلہ بھی ہے۔ مطالعہ جات سے معلوم ہوا ہے کہ اگر عورتیں گاڑیاں چلانے لگیں تو اس سے معیشت کو خاصی تقویت ملے گی۔
تاہم سیاسی اصلاحات، انسانی حقوق کا ریکارڈ اور عورتوں کی زندگیوں پر پابندیاں ایسے معاملات ہیں جن پر کوئی بات نہیں کر رہا۔
یہ ایک ایسا ملک ہے جہاں ہمیشہ سے لوگ سستے پیٹرول، بغیر ٹیکس دیے اور مفت پانی اور بجلی کے عادی رہے ہیں۔
تاہم اب ٹیکس عائد کیے جا رہے ہیں، جس کی وجہ سے اب سعودیوں کو اپنی آمدن پر نظر رکھنا پڑ رہی ہے۔

صحرا میں گاڑیوں کی ریس ایک ایسی سنسنی ہے جس سے سعودی قانونی طور پر لطف اندوز ہو سکتے ہیں
نادیہ الہذی انجینیئر ہیں جو پہلے تیل کی صنعت میں کام کرتی تھیں اور اب وژن 2030 سے وابستہ ہیں۔
وہ کہتی ہیں: 'سعودی بہت عرصے تک ہر چیز کو بہت آسان لیتے رہے ہیں۔'
وہ امریکی صدر کینیڈی کا قول دہراتی ہیں: 'یہ مت پوچھو کہ تمھارا ملک تمھارے لیے کیا کر سکتا ہے۔ یہ کہو کہ تم ملک کے لیے کیا کر سکتے ہو۔'
سو اب سعودیوں سے زیادہ کچھ کرنے کا مطالبہ کیا جا رہا ہے۔
سیاسی مبصر حسن یاسین کہتے ہیں: 'ہماری مثال ایسے کچھوؤں کی طرح ہے جن کے نیچے پہیے لگ گئے ہوں۔ ہم مقامی مطالبے اور21ویں صدی کے تقاضے پورے کرنے کے لیے تیزی سے حرکت کر رہے ہیں۔'
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Brothers in arms: Rise and Fall of Muslim Brotherhood (اخوان المسلمین )

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They were waiting for some divine intervention to save their reputation, which they had earned over the past eight decades. They waited for 40 days and were finally shaken. They were Brothers and believed they had acquired the rule in Egypt as a divine reward for their long struggle. In 2013, they had staged a sit-in across the country to provide political and moral support to the Muslim Brotherhood’s first president, Mohamed Morsi. It was an incredible event in Egyptian history which was broadcast live by local and international media, including Al-Jazeera.

Political scientists usually see the rise and fall of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in historical, ideological and contemporary political contexts. But Hazem Kandil, an Egyptian political sociologist at the University of Cambridge, has brought in another perspective to understand the Islamist movement, which is the spiritual element that glues the Brotherhood with its members. In his book, Inside the Brotherhood, Kandil mainly attempts to explore the sociology of the Islamist movement, which defines its ideological and political spectrum as well. But the most interesting part of the book is an explanation of the relationship of the Brotherhood members with the divine.

The Brotherhood members were confident that some divine help would come to rescue their government, but after 40 days, Kandil notes, they were visibly shaken by the absence of any such intervention. This is an important question for a political scientist to understand: why do ideological tendencies undermine the political discourse of a movement? In the Brotherhood’s case it is a structural issue. The movement is a unique case study because it nurtured a specific mindset over eight decades and kept its members in an environment that was conducive to transforming certain perceptions into beliefs.

Hazem Kandil’s book offers an analysis of the various facets of the Muslim Brotherhood movement
The initial chapters of the book deal with the organisational structure of the Brotherhood, including how it evolved its systems and created a close community. Many other Islamist movements across the world learned from the Brotherhood’s practices. The following sentence, which is used to welcome a new member into the Brotherhood movement, may sound familiar to Pakistan’s Islamist organisations: “One cannot choose to join the Muslim Brotherhood; one has to be chosen.”

This verdict is a foundation for the character building of a new member. Pakistan’s Jamaat-i-Islami, for example, constitutes five ranks of members. The first rank is muhibin or sympathisers. After initial learning, a sympathiser member can be promoted to the rank of brother, which has its own sub-ranks, and eventually becomes a member of the nucleus group usra, or the family. These ranks are stages of the ideological, religious and sanctimonious growth of an individual.

The founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Hassan al-Banna, had evolved these stages gradually. Before this, the Brothers had to attend a cultivating school, which was opened in 1928 with 70 students. As members multiplied, al-Banna organised them into small study groups. The members of the core group met every week, shared personal and professional concerns and lived like a family. The core group also ran the affairs of the movement. The members of the Brotherhood movement believe that this brilliant organisational method is itself a divine blessing bestowed upon al-Banna and the Brothers.
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The Brotherhood considers everything fair to achieve its ultimate goal. In the third chapter of his book, Kandil writes: “In the name of necessity, therefore, Brothers allow themselves considerable latitude.” He notes that the Brotherhood’s most frequent violation had always been disinformation and the irony is that they believe it is all religiously sanctioned.

The fourth chapter deals with the rise and fall of the Brotherhood movement in Egypt. In explaining the factors behind the slow rise and rapid fall of the Brothers, Kandil argues that historically, Muslim scholars and rulers coexisted in separate spheres. They sometimes negotiated, sometimes clashed, but mostly worked around each other with minimum friction. However, al-Banna and Sayyid Qutb, whom he calls the Marx and Engels of Islamism, had come up with the approach to bridge the gap.

He also explains how al-Banna’s and Qutb’s different backgrounds contributed to shaping the movement. Though they were born in the same year (1906) in small villages and graduated from the same college, al-Banna had a religious zeal since childhood, and Qutb grew up as a Westernised secularist, and both operated in very different political contexts. Al-Banna started his work under the liberal monarchy of the 1920s, and Qutb in contrast converted to Islamism on the eve of the 1952 coup that led to the authoritarian regime of Mohamed Naguib.

When Egypt’s last monarch first dissolved the organisation in December 1948 — after documents were found about the movement’s militant wing and that resulted in the killing of al-Banna — Qutb revised the whole strategy of the movement. The Brothers responded to the ban and killing of their founder by supporting the coup of 1952. The new Nasser regime had lifted the ban and Qutb was hired as a cultural advisor. This was the time “when [the] Brothers decided to combine the doctrine of al-Banna and Qutb to adapt to their new environment: they would capitalise on the space made available to them by the rulers to garner popular support, while continuing to nurture their pious vanguard to take power when chance allowed (as it did in 2011)”.


Kandil also touches upon the Salafis-Brothers gap and claims that Wahabi thoughts influenced Egypt after the oil boom. The immediate response of the Brothers was “how to absorb the fundamentalist (Salafi) youth that had been active in universities under the rubric of a new organisation: The Islamic Group (Al-Jamaa Al-Islamiya)”. Interestingly, the Islamic Group’s religious and political views were quite different from those espoused by the Brotherhood movement. Kandil elaborates that Islamic Group activists “had no elaborate theories about the comprehensiveness of Islam or the laws of history; they simply wanted to put pressure on rulers — as fundamentalists had done throughout Islamic history — to implement a few legal injunctions: prohibiting alcohol, outlawing usury, segregating genders, etc.” And when the Brothers failed to absorb them, they came up with quite an opposite approach. “Yet [the] Brothers realised that if they did not co-opt them, they would have to compete with them (as they did with their progeny in 2013),” Kandil notes. The Salafis and Brothers divide also helps readers understand how ‘pious’ Egyptians could turn against the Brothers in 2013 without feeling that they had turned against religion as such.

However, the major reasons behind the electoral success of the Brotherhood were its organised political and organisational structures. Apart from other reasons which contributed to the downfall of the movement, two factors were crucial. First was their strict political position: they failed to deliver because of their ineptitude at political bargaining — a skill they had never developed. Second, they attempted to keep relations smooth with the military establishment. Kandil describes how the Brothers dutifully avoided any hint of challenging the autonomy and privileges of the armed forces and even the president buried a fact-finding commission report detailing security abuses during the 18-day uprising. One can justify their accommodative approach giving the reason that the Brothers had earned the right to rule after eight-and-a-half decades of spiritual purification and socio-political toil. They adopted the appeasement policy with the armed forces, but at the same time their major focus was to regulate public morality, foil global conspiracies against Islam, and eventually secure worldwide hegemony. For this purpose they needed an army, which they did not have, and counted instead on divine support to boost their ranks.

The last chapter of the book focuses on Islamism in Egypt and beyond, and provides a comparative analysis of Islamist movements in different regions. Overall this is a comprehensive study of a contemporary Islamist movement, which could also help in understanding the violent expressions of other Islamist movements.

The reviewer is a security analyst and director of the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies (PIPS), Islamabad.

Inside the Brotherhood: (SOCIO-POLITICS) By Hazem Kandil, Polity Press, UK, ISBN: 978-0745682914, 240pp. Published in Dawn, Books & Authors, November 20th, 2016
Source: http://www.dawn.com/news/1297506/brothers-in-arms

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