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Showing posts with label Iraq. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Iraq. Show all posts

Five steps toward achieving Middle East peace






Donald Trump’s decision to visit Saudi Arabia during his first overseas trip as president creates the perfect opportunity for his administration to take positive steps toward addressing five key needs in the region.

With these five, he can do a lot to reverse the unconstructive actions taken over the past eight years by the previous administration and make a start negotiating genuine peace and security for the region.

These policy ideas represent something of a consensus by Middle East experts, especially in Washington. Some of the steps are diplomatic, but others require military action by the United States. Americans have an understandable reluctance to re-engage militarily in the Arab world, but they have to understand that serious actions are required to prevent conflicts in the region from getting worse.

1) Correct the mistakes of the Obama administration: The previous presidency turned a blind eye to Iran’s regional menace, including Tehran’s support for terrorism and its escalation of sectarian violence. Attempts to rehabilitate the Iranian revolutionary regime into a normal state have failed. Release of the regime’s frozen funds, via the nuclear-weapons agreement, have allowed Iran to use that money to support militias and mercenaries in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, Bahrain and Lebanon. This must stop.

2) Fight all types of terror: Fighting one type of terrorism and neglecting others creates more conflicts and new armed groups. It is pointless to fight al Qaeda- and ISIS-backed terror without also pushing back on terror supported by Tehran. The fight against terror should be conducted by the international coalition against ISIS and, more importantly, by the 41-country Islamic Military Coalition, which is led by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Saudis have the necessary experience in the region to carry out this important and multifaceted task.

3) Move the Iraq issue to center stage: The U.S. government policy apparatus should concentrate on Iraq. This will diminish the importance of Iran in the estimation of U.S. policymakers. After all, Iraq is a U.S. ally. After taking down Saddam Hussein’s regime, U.S. mistakes turned Iraq into a killing field and a chaotic country. But Iraq is the geographic and strategic center of regional conflicts. For the sake of the region and the Iraqi people, the United States must focus on its healing, leaving Iran as a second-tier concern.

4) Find constructive solutions for the Palestinian people: The United States should try to revive the peace process between the Arabs and Israel by exerting pressure on Israel to accept the Arabian initiative for peace. Such a strong U.S. move can take the issue out of the hands of disruptive regional players that exploit the Arab-Israeli conflict as an emotional recruiting tool among Muslims. Too many of these other players are less interested in solving the Palestinian problem and more interested in achieving their expansionist ambitions, establishing militias and standing in the way of peace.

5) Support the legitimate government of Yemen: This will prevent Yemen from becoming an utterly failed state and a permanent launching pad for terrorism and sectarian hostilities. The United States should provide intelligence and logistical support to the Arab Coalition to help restore legitimacy to the government. In addition to risking the security of its neighbors, the Yemeni civil war threatens international navigation and the flow of energy to world markets through the Bab Al-Mandeb and Hormuz Strait shipping lanes. If these routes are not protected, oil prices in the West will soar.

These five steps are difficult, but not impossible, especially if they have the weight of the American president behind them. President Trump’s choice of the Middle East for his first overseas trip telegraphs the region’s importance to his administration. He has a rare chance to initiate history-changing statecraft during his trip, which could bring long-lasting benefits to a region sorely in need of them.
By Mohammed Alsulami, washingtontimes.com
ANALYSIS/OPINION: Mohammed Alsulami, a researcher at Umm Al-Qura University in Saudi Arabia, specializes in Iranian studies.


Wilayat-e-Faqih doctrine, a fifth column strategy, has propagated sectarianism in the Muslim world >>>>


خلافت اور امامت کے نام پر فتنہ و فساد Terrorism for Khilafat or Imamat: Daesh/ISIS Khilafat and Iranian ideology of WilyatFiqh (Guardian Council) Rule are tow sides of same coin >>>

Export of Iran's revolution enters 'new chapter': Iran's top general said  his country has reached "a new chapter" towards its declared aim of exporting revolution, in reference to Tehran's growing regional influence. The comments by Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari, commander of the nation's powerful Revolutionary Guards Corps, come amid concern among some of Shiite Iran's neighbours about Tehran's role. "The Islamic revolution is advancing with good speed, its example being the ever-increasing export of the revolution," he said, according to the ISNA news agency. "Today, not only Palestine and Lebanon acknowledge the influential role of the Islamic republic but so do the people of Iraq and Syria. They appreciate the nation of Iran." He made references to military action against Islamic State (IS) jihadists in Iraq and Syria, where the Guards have deployed advisers in support of Baghdad and Damascus.  "The phase of the export of the revolution has entered a new chapter," he added, referring to an aim of Iran's 1979 Islamic revolution.>> http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-2990005/Export-Irans-revolution-enters-new-chapter-general.html --- http://peace-forum.blogspot.com/2016/03/exporting-iranian-revolution-to-arabs.html

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Iraq war: after Blair and Bush met, the tempo changed

  
Tuesday 2 April 2002 was a warm spring day, the first after the Easter weekend. The country was coming to terms with the death of the Queen Mother, a young singer called Gareth Gates had shot to No 1 and Admiral Lord Boyce, chief of the defence staff, was heading to Buckinghamshire for a meeting with the prime minister at Chequers.

A submariner in his early career, colleagues thought Boyce rather prickly, a trait cabinet minister Clare Short attributed to the long periods he had spent underwater.

Certainly, his summons to see Tony Blair seemed to have left him a little nonplussed. British forces were already deployed in Afghanistan, which was his priority. And though he had heard talk in the press and around Whitehall about a shift in interest towards Iraq, he wasn’t one for gossip or small talk.
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Blair, however, wanted to chat about Saddam Hussein. “I guess my presence at Chequers on that particular occasion was simply … if there were questions coming up about what could be done militarily; what was our capability should we be asked to do something,” Boyce explained to the Chilcot inquiry.

If there had been a significant hardening of thinking in Downing Street, Boyce appeared to have left Chequers none the wiser. As far as he was concerned, attacking Iraq just wasn’t on the cards.

“There was no discussion on the detail of military action or military options,” he said. “Of course, Iraq wasn’t off our plot entirely. It was something which the MoD was keeping a watching eye on, if you like.

“At the meeting … no particular preparations were made. It was a scoping opportunity … we were certainly not doing any thinking about any sort of military adventure.”

The meeting was rather casual – and very Blairish. Others in the room included Sir Richard Dearlove, the head of MI6, and Sir John Scarlett, head of the joint intelligence committee (JIC).

But the cabinet secretary, Lord Wilson, hadn’t known it had taken place; the foreign and defence secretaries weren’t there either – and no minutes were taken. The discussion, it seemed, had been organised to help Blair prepare his thoughts for an important trip to the US at the end of the week.

President Bush and first lady Laura Bush greet British Prime Minister Tony Blair on his arrival at the Bush ranch in Crawford, Texas, Saturday, April 5, 2002. Photograph: Susan Walsh/AP
What exactly happened on 6 and 7 April in Crawford, Texas, between the US president, George W Bush, and the man who was determined to be his best friend, not even Chilcot’s 2.6m-word report has been able to entirely unravel.

But if there was one event that changed the conversation about Iraq, it was this. Because while Blair insisted no deal was done and no hands shaken on military action, Chilcot’s report describes how the mood changed thereafter and how the Whitehall machine, at different speeds in different departments, reacting to different voices, began to hum; the tempo changed.

And little wonder.

We now know that Boyce was not fully in the loop. He had not been told that months earlier, in December 2001, there had been “quite substantive exchanges between No 10 and the White House” about the possibility of military action against Iraq. 

“They weren’t ones which we were apprised of,” Boyce told Chilcot. Nor would he have known that in the days before Crawford, Colin Powell, the US secretary of state, had sent a secret memo to Bush saying that “Blair will be with us should military operations be necessary” in Iraq. “He is convinced the threat is real … and success against Saddam will yield more regional success.”

In the weeks after Crawford, there were more obvious indications that Iraq was about to become Britain’s problem. Richard Armitage, the US deputy secretary of state, told Sir David Manning, Blair’s foreign policy adviser, that the US and the UK were already discussing the idea of Britain sending a 20,000-strong armoured division to Iraq. This was news to Manning – and he was miffed.

In a terse letter sent on 21 May, the Ministry of Defence was ordered to find out who was saying what to whom, seeing as “no options have yet been presented to ministers”.

Ten days later the MoD had got nowhere. In a return letter, a senior officer concluded the talk was just speculation and the Americans must have “misinterpreted” what they had been told.

It did not matter. Whether through accident or design, Chilcot noted that “by mid–May, the perception the UK might provide an armoured division for military operations had already gained currency in the US”. The idea “had got into the American bloodstream”.

Though Boyce doesn’t appear to have been privy to Blair’s thinking, the military had reason to be getting twitchy. We now know that shortly after Crawford, the MoD set up a small informal working group under Lt Gen Sir Anthony Pigott to “brainstorm” the possible options for and repercussions of British involvement in a military effort.

Pigott told Chilcot that he was trying to prevent the UK setting off on an “off the cuff … let’s go and do that” campaign. “We need to do some scoping work … What could we be dealing with here? What might be the big issues?”

But as work began, it became abundantly clear to senior military officials that the Americans had already decided to pursue regime change and that the push could come before the end of the year.

The Americans, it seemed, were determined to remove Saddam. And they had also assumed, for reasons that were not entirely clear to military chiefs, that Britain would be alongside them.

Geoff Hoon, the defence secretary, was worried about what he was hearing from his officials, and in early June sought guidance from Blair ahead of a meeting with his opposite number, Donald Rumsfeld.

Defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld and defence secretary Geoff Hoon, attend an informal NATO ministers meeting in Poiana Brasov, Romania in 2004. Photograph: Vadim Ghirda/AP
The UK appeared to be in a tricky situation. In his note to the prime minister, Hoon said: “If we discuss the detail and timescales of a potential UK military contribution to a US‑led coalition, it could send a misleading signal that we have decided to support a specific line of military action.

“Equally, if we are not clear with the US at this stage about our military constraints, we face the danger of our not being able to bring anything meaningful to the table at the right time and the consequent loss of influence that would bring.”

Hoon wanted the Americans to know that the British needed “plenty of warning in order to be able to contribute to military action”. But Blair wasn’t happy. “That will send a wobbly message,” he wrote.

As the military tried to reconcile the mixed signals from Whitehall and Washington, the US formally invited the British to join a military planning team based at Central Command in Tampa, Florida.

Boyce said this early military planning was taking place in a “political void” and he says he stressed to the Americans that joining the team should not imply “a political commitment to contribute to an actual operation”.

But while he said he kept reiterating this to his American counterparts – “I can’t remember how many times I must have said … that our policy was not regime change” – they seemed to know better. “The reaction of the Americans was always: ‘Yes, I hear what you say but come the day, we know you will be there’,” he told Chilcot.

Elsewhere in Whitehall, there were others attempting to read the runes from Downing Street over exactly what was going on, and what Britain was being drawn into. The attorney general, Peter Goldsmith, was one. He had been watching events unfold and didn’t like what he was seeing. It irritated him when he heard ministers talking loosely about whether there was a clear basis for military action against Iraq, and he wanted the Americans to know that whatever conclusions they had drawn about the use of force, he did not share them.

He had steeled himself to report this to William Taft IV, legal adviser to the Department of State, at a meeting on 22 May. But in the end the two men somehow avoided the subject and just chatted.

Lord Goldsmith evidently thought it was more important to inform the prime minister of his misgivings, even though his advice was unsolicited and not “terribly welcome” by Downing Street.

Knowing that Blair was due to meet Bush again at the end of July, Goldsmith set about drawing up legal advice, which he presented to the prime minister on 23 July. He told Blair that, to his mind, the Americans were plain wrong to think they could take military action against Iraq to remove Saddam without going back to the UN.

“I had looked at whether there was a self-defence argument and didn’t believe there was. That was because I didn’t see any evidence of an imminent threat, and you need an imminent threat,” he told Chilcot. “I didn’t want there to be any doubt.”

The legalities, however, were not going to upset the special, increasingly intimate relationship between Blair and Bush. As the Chilcot report has now shown, any concerns about the legality of a conflict had not prevented Blair from offering unwavering support to the president, as set out in that now notorious memo, dated 28 July. “I will be with you, whatever,” Blair wrote.

Goldsmith did not see the prime minister again for three months, but in the meantime, he decided he needed to know more about the threat posed by Saddam, in case this changed his thinking. He asked for a briefing from the man who would know – Scarlett.

Sir John Scarlett, chairman of the joint intelligence committee. Photograph: Martin Godwin for the Guardian
Scarlett, though, was a busy man, who was having difficulties of his own. The JIC had already compiled one report on Iraq in May 2001 and had undertaken another assessment in March 2002, which had been drawn up ahead of Blair’s trip to Crawford. It had reached many of the same conclusions.

Iraq was assessed to retain some stocks of chemical weapons, but there were no details on locations or quantities; it was stated that there was clear evidence of continuing biological warfare activity – and intelligence about the likelihood of mobile production laboratories was being taken seriously.

But the Chilcot inquiry heard that intelligence gathered on Iraq was far from an exact science. It needed to be treated with great care, as Sir Mark Allen, former head of MI6’s counter-intelligence branch and one of its more maverick voices, was keen to stress. “Actually our knowledge of Iraq was very, very superficial,” he told Chilcot. “We were small animals in a dark wood with the wind getting up and changing direction the whole time. These were very, very difficult days.”

Scarlett knew this all too well and had been working on the basis that the March analysis could be filleted for publication. Instead, this dossier was put in cold storage until the autumn, when things suddenly gathered pace.

“I suppose the person who opened the freezer was the prime minister,” Scarlett told Chilcot. “He made a public announcement that the government assessment of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction capabilities would be published in the coming weeks.”

The pressure was on. But MI6, known formally as the Secret Intelligence Service, appeared to have new and potentially important information that was passed to the prime minister on 12 September. A new source had provided intelligence that appeared to support claims that Iraq had “continued to produce chemical and biological agents” and had “military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons”.

This was used by Scarlett to help underpin key judgments in the government’s dossier on Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which was published to much fanfare, and a fair degree of ridicule, on 24 September.

Though too late to be included in the document, MI6 privately disseminated a second report from the same sourcing chain, which stated VX, Sarin and Soman toxic chemicals had been produced by Iraq and had been loaded into a variety of containers, including “linked hollow glass spheres”. The source said there had been “accelerated production of substances for several years”.

But within weeks, senior officers at MI6’s HQ in Vauxhall, central London, were beginning to sweat; doubts had begun to emerge about the reliability of this information.

To the layman, the details the source had provided sounded like something from a Hollywood movie. And that’s because they were. More precisely, they had come from a film called The Rock, starring Nicolas Cage and Sean Connery.

As Chilcot noted: “In early October, questions were raised with SIS about the mention of glass containers. It was pointed out that: glass containers were not typically used in chemical munitions; and that a popular movie (The Rock) had inaccurately depicted nerve agents being carried in glass beads or spheres.” SIS began to realise it had been duped and eventually concluded the source had been lying. But, remarkably, it decided not to tell anyone who might need to know – such as the prime minister.

Another intelligence source that had been heavily relied upon by the JIC was codenamed Curve Ball, but this information also had health warnings. For a start, it had not come to British intelligence directly – it had been channelled through the German spy agencies.

And as Chilcot reported, SIS didn’t get to meet Curve Ball until much later, and when it did, agents didn’t like the look of him. They were forced to conclude the information he provided – specifically that Iraq had developed mobile facilities for the production of biological agent – was wholly unreliable.

Asked by Chilcot to summarise the unpalatable and chastening lessons that MI6 had had to learn, a senior officer told him: “It’s not so much a lesson. It’s an observation that we based a lot on not enough.”

While MI6 kept quiet about the doubts over the authenticity of some of the intelligence, the military and Goldsmith were simultaneously grappling with different, if intertwined, problems of their own. Having had a personal briefing from Scarlett, the attorney general remained unconvinced about the threat posed by Saddam, and hadn’t changed his mind about needing to go back to the UN to seek authority for military action.

But a new resolution that was being proposed did not go far enough, as far as he was concerned. Goldsmith met Blair on 22 October to outline his concerns that resolution 1441 – which stated that Iraq was in material breach of its UN obligations – still did not provide a sound basis for military action.

He gave the same gloomy prognosis to the foreign secretary, Jack Straw, on 7 November, the day before the resolution was passed.

“My provisional view was that there wasn’t enough there,” Goldsmith told Chilcot. “As I have consistently said, from the legal point of view it would have been safer to have had a second resolution because it would have put the matter beyond doubt. Nobody could have then challenged the legality.”

Goldsmith was also angered by “Chinese whispers” across Whitehall that appeared to be putting a much more positive gloss on his advice. As far as he was concerned, even with resolution 1441, everything “would not be all right on the night”.

He told Chilcot that the gossip appeared to be coming from the “undergrowth, if I can say, beneath ministers. Sometimes people who are least involved in issues pick up things and they then come out. That is just the way government seems to work.

Lord Goldsmith arrives at Number 10. Photograph: Martin Argles for the Guardian
As Goldsmith told Downing Street what it didn’t want to hear, so the MoD was still seeking clarity from No 10 about the scale of Britain’s potential military commitment to any US-led invasion.

Declassified papers show Hoon presented the prime minister with a UK military options paper on 15 October – and said that an urgent decision had to be taken. “We need to decide this week,” the paper began. “US military planning for an operation in Iraq is gathering pace.”

Three basic packages were outlined, with the third being the most ambitious: it included more than 300 tanks and armoured vehicles and 28,000 personnel. It would be “a major element of the northern line of attack which the US now judge as essential”.

A memo dated 31 October sets out how Blair offered support for the more expensive and risky third option and concluded that we “should now tell the US … for planning purposes”.

Of all the scenarios, this seemed to be the one favoured by the MoD. If the UK were to attack Iraq, coming in from the north had clear advantages; the area was more stable than the south and contained many of the oil fields that needed to be protected and secured.

But there was a problem: Turkey. Britain needed to use it as a base.

In early discussions with his opposite number in Ankara, Boyce thought the Turks would allow the British to pitch camp. “Certainly when I spoke to the chief of the Turkish general staff, Gen [Hilmi] Ozkuk, in the very early days, there didn’t appear – well, he didn’t seem to think it would be a particular problem.”

Even after the Americans warned the MoD that “we were probably pushing against a closed door”, Boyce held out hope. “I was talking to Ozkuk and he was giving me, sort of, not exactly bright green lights but certainly not saying: ‘Don’t bother to darken my door again.’”

Chief of Defence Staff Admiral Sir Michael Boyce leaves Downing Street February 6, 2003. Photograph: Toby Melville/Reuters
The red light came at the turn of the year, which stopped British planning for an invasion from the north.

So, at the start of 2003, the situation looked bleak; the British military was scrabbling to find a new role, the attorney general was warning there was no basis for the use of force, and some of the intelligence that had been used to support claims of Saddam’s military capabilities was falling apart. Yet within weeks, UK forces would invade.

Never an organisation to shirk a challenge, Boyce and the other chiefs of staff assured Blair in early January that the UK still had enough time to prepare for an invasion from the south, through Kuwait. But with time running out, he conceded there was inevitably going to be “some equipment shortfall … though none which were being advised as showstoppers or of critical importance to mission accomplishment.”

The MoD was also concerned about what was happening with postwar planning and was attempting to seek assurances from the Americans that they had a robust blueprint – because Britain didn’t have one. A memo dated 16 January 2003 said: “The prime minister agrees … that much greater clarity about the US intentions is required.”

Boyce also warned Blair he was still worried about the legalities. “I made it clear to the prime minister in January 2003 that I would require an assurance of the legal base of the conflict. This was reiterated more than once in the following weeks.”

The prime minister, however, was to get a break from an unlikely source. The attorney general had given Blair his draft advice on the legality of any conflict on 14 January – and it was much the same as months before. But over the coming weeks, Goldsmith had an unexpected and quite sudden change of heart.

The process began on 23 January when he had a private meeting with Sir Jeremy Greenstock, Britain’s ambassador to the UN, who had evidently been sent to soften him up. “Sir Jeremy had made some good points and he had made some headway with me, but, frankly, there was still work for me to do and he hadn’t got me there, if you like, yet,” Goldsmith told Chilcot.

On 10 February the attorney general flew to Washington and had a number of meetings with top legal advisers who had all concluded that the use of force did not require a further UN resolution. “The US were convincing,” Goldsmith admitted. They told him that even the French didn’t think a new resolution was required – so why did he?

If it wasn’t quite an epiphany, Goldsmith nonetheless changed tack. He told the inquiry that he had asked himself: “Which side of the argument would you prefer to be on? And I took the view I would prefer to be on the side of the argument that said a second resolution wasn’t necessary.”

When he flew home, he informed Downing Street, though he did not give his advice in writing. It was the green light Blair had doubtless been praying for.

In his evidence to the inquiry, Hans Blix, head of the UN’s weapons inspectors, said that by the end of February, with almost 250,000 coalition forces on the border of Iraq, the momentum for war “was almost unstoppable”. “As I have said, sometimes perhaps a little roughly, the UK remained a prisoner on that train.”

If Downing Street didn’t quite see it that way, Wilson, the cabinet secretary, admitted to Chilcot that “everything was done at a rush … it did make it a tight-run thing.”

Perhaps inevitably, perhaps deliberately, certain things – and certain people – got overlooked. One of them was Clare Short, secretary of state at the Department for International Development. She had expected to be involved in discussions about the aftermath of any conflict, but had been kept out of any conversations until the last moment.

“Suddenly, there is a flurry of correspondence,” she told Chilcot. “There is all of this: ‘Keep Clare and DfID out of it,’ and then, just at the last minute, they are suddenly writing letters saying: ‘We must make preparations.’ And I’m saying to our military: ‘You’re going to have to feed people’, and they suddenly, in the last week, they ordered food. I mean, it was mad. But they did it, and they wanted to get closer to us suddenly at the last minute, and we didn’t sulk. The situation was too serious.”

She added: “But the chaos had its consequences. I think the British military should have said to Blair: ‘We are not ready.’ I think that was their duty and they failed in that duty.”

Chilcot revealed that by the time the war started, nobody in government appeared to have overall responsibility for postwar planning; and nobody in the military was taking responsibility for the shortfalls in vital equipment.

In one of Chilcot’s coldest and most damning conclusions, he said: “When Mr Blair set out the UK’s vision for the future of Iraq in the House of Commons on 18 March 2003, no assessment had been made of whether that vision was achievable, no agreement had been reached with the US on a workable post-conflict plan, UN authorisation had not yet been secured, and there was no decision on the UN’s role in post-conflict Iraq.”

A conflict that began in haste and endures today did not have to start when it did, nor in the way it did, Chilcot said. “The evidence is there for all to see. It is an account of an intervention which went badly wrong with consequences to this day.”
Iraq war: after Blair and Bush met, the tempo changed
by Nick Hopkins, theguardian.com

http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/jul/09/iraq-war-after-blair-and-bush-met-the-tempo-changed
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No need to redraw a New Map of the Middle East


On May 16, 1916, representatives of Great Britain and France signed an agreement that had been negotiated by Mark Sykes and François Georges-Picot to divide up the Middle East into British and French spheres of influence after the end of the Great War and the destruction of the Ottoman Empire. The Sykes-Picot Agreement, now 100 years old, has been denounced ever since for perpetuating a supposedly artificial division of the Middle East into unpopular nation states whose existence only fuels conflicts. Many now suggest that it is time to discard Sykes-Picot in order to solve the region’s myriad problems.

As my Council on Foreign Relations colleagues, Steven A. Cook and Amr T. Leheta, suggest, this attributes rather too much influence to a treaty that was never actually implemented. In practice, Britain never ceded France all of the influence that Sykes-Picot had promised, and the actual boundaries of the modern Middle East were determined in a series of diplomatic conferences between 1920 and 1926. The ultimate result was to create the forerunner of the region we know today, giving birth to Palestine/Israel, Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, among others.

Is this division of the region artificial? Yes and no. The state boundaries were not entirely arbitrary—Iraq, for example, was formed by combining the Ottoman vilayets (provinces) of Mosul, Baghdad, and Basra.

The boundaries of the Middle East are no more arbitrary than the boundaries of any other place. Look at Europe, where the borders between Germany and Poland shifted substantially after both World War I and World War II. Germany itself is just as artificial as Iraq having coming into existence only slightly earlier, in 1871. Indeed countries continue to form and break up all over the world—witness the independence of the former Soviet republics after 1991 or the breakup of Yugoslavia.

Whatever the origins of the modern map of the Middle East, people in the region have lived together in states long enough to be attached to them. Most Iraqis I’ve met, save the Kurds, have been Iraqi nationalists. So too with Syrians. Granted, those states are hardly functional today, but that doesn’t mean that breaking them up will magically solve their problems. Indeed redrawing the map could easily create more problems. In the case of Iraq, Sunnis would be loathe to give up Baghdad—and who would take Mosul, whose population is divided between Arabs and Kurds?

The United States shouldn’t necessarily be committed to preserving the current map of the Middle East, but nor should we be redrawing it from afar. What matters is not the borders but who rules within them. An ISIS state shouldn’t be acceptable no matter its boundaries. Let’s focus on reducing threats and ending civil wars, and then afterward let the peoples of states such as Iraq and Syria figure out their own future peacefully, as happened in the former Czechoslovakia.

Is it Time to Draw a New Map of the Middle East?
by Max Boot, nationalinterest.org
This article originally appeared in the Hoover Institution’s Military History in the News http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/it-time-draw-new-map-the-middle-east-16740

Enemy at the gates: ISIS, Daesh Terror

Renowned American scholar Jessica Stern along with J.M. Berger has tried to understand the evolution of the selfstyled Islamic State (IS, also known as ISIS) in their recently published book, ISIS: The State of Terror. The book provides a comprehensive account of factors which have contributed to the genesis and transformation of the IS. Stern is a leading expert on terrorism and has authored many books on the subject.

Berger has similar credentials, but his focus has largely remained on the US. Their collaborative effort provides an analysis of the emerging threats in Iraq and Syria, where Islamist `jihadists`have not only captured certain territories but are also front runners on the social media. The IS has expanded the war from physical to virtual spaces, which has made the challenge of terrorism more complex.

The Jihadist movements have evolved to a level where establishing a state does not seem like an ambitious goal, at least for some of them. The IS is an advanced-level jihadist movement. The group has crossed all limits of brutality by using the act of beheading as a means of marketing, manipulation, and recruitment.

The initial chapters focus on the circum-stances which provided a favourable environment to jihadists in Iraq to form the terrorist group. The IS was the brainchild of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian thug-turned-terrorist.

The 2003 invasion of Iraq provided him the reason to establish the group. The book provides a background of the events which nurtured the character of Zarqawi and his movement. However, the US and its Western allies, who continued to downplay the role of the upstart jihadists for months, are also blamed.

According to the authors, this downplay came as most Americans and other Westerners were disillusioned and exhausted by more than 10 years of a costly `war on terror`.

Paul Bremer, the former head of the coalition provisional authority in Iraq, was the man behind the assessment of the Iraqi situation after the eruption of civil war and policy decisions complicated the scenario. The initiatives taken in the name of state-building proved fatal and widened the sectarian divide in Iraq, which was exploited by Zarqawi. The authors believe that Bremer`s decisions of disbanding the military and firing all members of Saddam Hussein`s ruling Ba`ath Party from civil service positions proved counter-productive. More than 100,000 Sunni Ba`athists were removedfrom the government and military, leaving them unemployed, angry, and in the case of military personnel, armed.

These policies triggered sectarian tensions, which were intensely mixed with local and regional politics. Post-war Iraq was a recipe for sectarian conflict and Zarqawi wasted little time in exploiting the situation and intensifying these tensions. Later, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi exploited the same tendencies in Syria.

The second factor which contributed to the f ormation of the IS was the growing ideological radicalisation in Iraqi prisons. The prisons facilitated radicalisation among the prisoners, many among whom were not jihadists but were unemployed citizens and were either paid or coerced into the resistance movement. The head of the IS, Baghdadi, exploited the situation when he was in Camp Bucca prison. The prison also proved to be a key transformative agent for Zarqawi.

The book also discusses the factors which contributed in developing the ideological perspective of Zarqawi: a Jordanian jihadist scholar, Abu Muhammad al-Magdisi, shaped the mindset of the terrorist. Magdisi was the `bookish fatwah monk, and Zarqawi was the man who tested his theories in real time and a real war`.

Apart from Magdisi, two other jihadist ideologues had contributed in developing the contours of the IS: Abu Bakr Naji and Abu Musab al-Suri.

Na ji`s book T he Management of Savagery: T he Most Critical Stage through Which the Umma Will Pass was a compilation of lessons learned from previous jihadist failures, as well as advancement in thinking about the movement`s future direction. Written in 2004, the book outlined the following stages of the jihadist struggle: `Disruption and exhaustion: in which terrorist attacks damage the economy of the enemy power and demoralise their population; Management of savagery: a phase of violent resistance with an emphasis on carrying out acts of highly visible violence, intended to send a message to both allies and enemies and; Empowerment: the establishment of regions controlled by jihadists that can subsequently grow and unite towards the goal of re-creation of the `Caliphate`.

The IS has adopted the same strategy for the future. Suri`s 1,600-page book The Call to a Global Islamic Resistance was the second book which influenced Zarqawi. In this book, Suri advocates leaderless jihad and strategies such as the use of the so-called lone-wolf attacks.

The book describes the background of the differences between Al Qaeda and Zarqawi, which later caused a permanent division between two camps. Al Qaeda top leaders were never happy with Zarqawi`s `ultra radical` views, but ironically, it was the invasion of Iraq that pushed Zarqawi into an alliance with Osama bin Laden and led to Al Qaeda`s enduring presence in Iraq. The alliance could not be converted into a long-term relationship and cracks appeared again when Zarqawi announced the establishment of the IS.

While describing the cognitive relationship between Al Qaeda and the IS, the authors see Al Qaeda as the intellectual side of the jihadist movement, which was the spark, and the IS provided gasoline to give the flame. The Al Qaeda model is based on a framework of attracting fighters first and radicalising them later, but the IS sought recruits and supporters who are further down the path toward ideological radicalisation or more inclined by personal disposition towards violence. `Al Qaeda`s vision is often explicitly nihilistic. The IS, for all its barbarity, is both more pragmatic and more utopian,` the book says. The authors see differences between the two jihadist movements as the conflict of visions and their assessment is that the winner of the war between Al Qaeda and the IS will wield tremendous influence over the tactics and goals of the next generation of jihadists.

In fact, Al Qaeda itself was the beneficiary of the resistance and separatist movements of Muslim countries and territories, from Philippines to Kashmir and Palestine to Bosnia. These movements were `Islamised` in Afghanistan, and Al Qaeda had absorbed the human resources while connecting them in a brotherhood relationship. The IS has further transformed the jihadist movements and provided a new model, which is broad in ideological and political perspectives and diverse in its war and communication strategies and tactics. The authors argue that the IS`s accomplishments will have longterm ramifications for jihadists and other extremist movements that may learn from its tactics.

The most important part of the book is about the propaganda wars which the IS is fighting in virtual spaces, getting results in physical form. The IS has learned from the ineffective communication struggles of Al Qaeda and other jihadist groups. Al Qaeda chapters and affiliates had very loose and unreliable communication networks and the group was following Suri`s strategy of leaderless resistance.

A few chapters of the book are devoted to analysing the communication and propaganda strategies of the IS. The chapter titled `From Vanguard to Smart Mob` describes how Al Qaeda affiliates were trying to convey their messages to their top leadership; successful attempts nurtured well-crafted communication strategies focused on the use of the social media.The authors say: `Of fline, ISIS followed the model of a functional-if-limited government. Online, it played a different game. It amassed and empowered a `smart mob` of thousands of individuals, which shared its ideology and cheered its success.

Since the war against the Soviets, jihadists have been using video and print media in sophisticated ways, but the IS has successfully managed to enter the burgeoning world of the social media. The writers say that killing civilians and destroying infrastructure are not typically a terrorist organisation`s end goals. Rather, they are a means to provoke a political reaction; the social media, too, help achieve that purpose. In this perspective, the book also refers to a study conducted by Google Ideas which estimated that at least 45,000 pro-IS accounts were online between September and November 2014, along with thousands more pro-IS bot and spam accounts.

A chapter is devoted to psychological warfare.

The authors state: `Terror can make us strike back at the wrong enemy, for the wrong reasons or both`.

The perceptions matter in risk assessments and the IS, through its brutal acts, has expanded the limits of risks. The authors raise the question: `Is ISIS deliberately trying to create a society with an appetite for violent aggression?` And they come up with the answer: `It is impossible to know ISIS`s conscious intentions in this regard, but either way, the result of its rule in Syria and Iraq will no doubt be a deeply traumatised generation and a host of new challenges from within.

There are some solutions and strategies suggested on developing counter-narratives. Most of these suggestions are already known. Different nations are trying to respond in their own way, but what is missing is a collective response. In this context, the book recommends a conference be dedicated to airing IS strategies publically, with participation from both the public and private sector, with an eye towards establishing some consistent, reasonable practices and clearly defined areas that require more study on the resolution of more complicated questions. The Summit on Countering Violent Extremism early this year in the White House was an attempt in this direction, but nothing concrete was achieved. It seems the international community is still underplaying the threat.

Overall the book provides a good narration and explanation of events from 2003 onwards to the inception of the IS. This is an essential read for those who deal with security issues; the book also has a lot to offer to students of religious studies and radical movements.
Review by M.Amir Rana . Dawn.com

Why the ISIL caliphate survives?

One year ago, the Islamic State of Iraq  and the Levant (ISIL) took Mosul, declared a caliphate ruling over an "Islamic State", reshaping the history of an entire region, if not an entire faith.

The ISIL offensive into Mosul in June 2014 and the resulting collapse of the Iraqi military took both Iraqi and international leaders by surprise and has bewildered media and government analysts alike. While the establishment of the so called Islamic State was sudden, and has survived its first year, the emergence of ISIL took a decade in the making.

A year ago, the blame that led to the rise of ISIL, in polemical diatribes in the media, was attributed to the policies of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, yet the organisation's origins can be traced back to the fragile political process that emerged under the US Coalition Provisional Authority, which was then inherited by Iraq's subsequent leaders.

Furthermore, it was the Syrian civil war that served as the vacuum that allowed ISIL to regroup and distinguish itself from al-Qaeda, emerging as the most tenacious armed Islamist group in the region.

Regardless of the future fate of ISIL, the events of the summer of 2014 serve as a pivotal shift in both the history of the Middle East and the Islamic faith.

An Islamist non-state actor

The emergence of ISIL and its declaration of an Islamic State, and the failure of the Iraqi and Syrian state to deal with this threat, has been unprecedented in the history of the Arab state system that came into formation after the 1919 Paris Peace Conference.

For the first time, an Islamist non-state actor, which is now simultaneously national and transnational, carved out a new state in the Arab world, a system of states whose borders have remained relatively unchanged over the last century.

While the formation of Israel in 1948 altered borders within this system, the difference in the case of the Islamic State is that it is ruled under a self-proclaimed caliph, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who claims both religious and temporal authority among believers within his state and globally.

ISIL portrayed its offensive as a corrective measure to two traumatic events that resulted from the Great War.

The events in the summer of 2014 also serve as a testimony to another historical precedent in the region, albeit one that began in 2003. The invasion of Iraq was the first time the US invaded, occupied, and administered an Arab state. It also led to the decade-long rule of Iraq's first Twelver Shia-led government, the first state led by this sect in the entire Arab world.

Furthermore, ISIL became reinvigorated as a result of a revolt against an Alawi Shia-led state in Syria, one of the most durable regimes since the rise of Hafez al-Assad in 1970.

While ISIL emerged as a result of weak political institutions emerging in Iraq after 2003 and collapsing political institutions in Syria after 2011, it is also a reaction against these two states by a group whose anti-Shiism is one of its core tenets. 

Corrective measure?

While centenary commemorations of World War I have served as reflections of what the Great War means for Europe, the rise of ISIL, while sudden, represents a shift in the Middle East's post-war century.

ISIL portrayed its offensive as a corrective measure to two traumatic events that resulted from the Great War. When its forces took control over the Syrian-Iraqi border post on the way to Mosul last year, it crafted a well-publicised spectacle erasing what it deemed as the "Sykes-Picot" border.

This spectacle sought to situate ISIL's action beyond the Syrian and Iraq conflicts as a rectification of the secret Allied treaty that was the precursor to the Mandate system. This action sought to reverse the treaty, which in the views of ISIL and other Islamists carved up the organic, Arab core of the Islamic world.

Second, in 1924, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, as the post-WWI leader of a secular Republic of Turkey that emerged from the remaining territory of the defeated Ottomans, dissolved the caliphate, a centuries-old institution of the empire. ISIL's declaration of a new caliphate represented the first attempt to resuscitate this institution within the borders of a new state.

Over one summer, ISIL achieved both a secular and religious victory that actors in the Middle East and the Islamic world have so far failed to accomplish throughout this post-war century.

Arab nationalists, like Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser, the Baath Party of Michel Aflaq in Syria, to Muammar Gaddafi of Libya, have all sought the erasure of borders established by British, French, or Italian colonial policy in the region.

Nasser succeeded in unifying Egypt and Syria for three years before the project collapsed, and Gaddafi's vision of a union of Libya and Tunisia, or the union of Baathist Iraq and Syria never advanced beyond the discussion stage. The Islamic State can claim its project succeeded while past attempts by secular actors to erase boundaries established by European powers have failed.

Ironically, the 21st century caliph threatens to appeal to British Muslims, many of whom descend from the Indian subcontinent.

Religious victory

Along the same lines, ISIL scored a religious victory that other regional and Islamic actors have failed to achieve: the restoration of a caliphate. The Liberation Party (Hizb ut-Tahrir), a global movement founded in Jerusalem in 1953, and Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda had also declared their vision of a caliphate.

ISIL has claimed to make both groups irrelevant by achieving this goal within a relatively small piece of territory, but appealing to a global Islamic imaginary. While Muslims leaders around the world have declared this new caliphate illegitimate, there exists a fear in both Muslim and Western states that a "caliphate foreign policy" poses a danger to domestic stability.

This concern had not existed since the 1880s, when the British Empire had to counter the pan-Islamist foreign policy of the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid, which threatened to cause unrest among the large Muslim population in India. Ironically, the 21st century caliph threatens to appeal to British Muslims, many of whom descend from the Indian subcontinent. ISIL has successfully resuscitated and reinvented an Islamic source of authority, even though it might be among a relatively small, but motivated number of followers.

Acknowledging the Iraqi and Syrian states' instability and ISIL's success a year later provides insight into the future of this organisation, regardless of the success or failure of the US-initiated international air campaign and coordinated Iraqi and Syrian ground campaign declared in September 2014.

The ability of ISIL to appeal to an Islamic imaginary across borders and its restoration of the caliphate represents this organisation's crystallisation of a jihadist ideology which has developed over the last 30 years. Despite the future viability of its proto-state in Iraq and Syria against the military might of the US and its coalition, the ability to deliver on a promise of restoring an idealised Islamic state within territory ruled by two Shia governments will continue to inspire followers.

Whether it is an ISIL ensconced in the urban centres of Mosul and Raqqa or an ISIL scattered into the periphery, it will still be able to launch attacks within Iraqi and Syrian cities, particularly through the use of car bombs and suicide attacks and take their fight to the US or Europe directly.
"Why the caliphate survives" by Migrants, aljazeera.com
Ibrahim al-Marashi is an assistant professor at the Department of History, California State University, San Marcos. He is the co-author of "Iraq's Armed Forces: An Analytical History."

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.

Source: Al Jazeera

Pakistan’s Lessons for Turkey NY Times

Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, declared that Turkey is ready “for any cooperation in the fight against terrorism.” Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu argued that Islamic State militants pose a greater threat to Turkey and the Muslim world than to the West.

But Turkey’s dilemma is far more grave than its leaders realize. Indeed, Turkey’s current situation resembles the early years of Pakistan’s sponsorship of the Taliban. The Islamic State is recruiting militants in Turkey. And failure to clean its own house now could lead Turkey down the path of “Pakistanization,” whereby a resident jihadist infrastructure causes Sunni extremism to ingrain itself deeply within the fabric of society.

Although Turkey now recognizes the threat — the Turkish government voted to authorize military force in Iraq and Syria on Thursday — it has yet to come to terms with its own responsibility for helping to create it.

Turkey claims that radical groups grew stronger because moderates seeking the overthrow of President Bashar al-Assad of Syria were not given adequate aid. But that is not the whole picture. As Francis J. Ricciardone Jr., the former American ambassador to Turkey, has pointed out, Ankara supported radical groups, including the Nusra Front. Indeed, during the early days of Syria’s civil war, jihadist groups funneled fighters and resources through Turkey into Syria.

Turkey’s intervention in the Syrian civil war parallels Pakistan’s support of the Taliban to affect the course of the Afghan civil war. But the jihadism abetted by Pakistan did not remain across the Afghan border. Turkey may now be witnessing the beginnings of a similar blowback.

While the magnitude of Turkey’s recent engagement of jihadist proxies isn’t comparable to Pakistan’s long history of jihadist sponsorship, the late Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto’s ill-fated relationship with the Sunni extremists of Pakistan’s Deobandi movement is still instructive for Turkey. Pakistan’s Deobandis dedicated themselves to implementing “the system of the Caliphate of the Rightly Guided,” a Sunni sectarian state to serve as a South Asian stepping stone to a worldwide Islamic caliphate.

Pakistan’s experience with blowback began prior to Ms. Bhutto’s tenure, when General Zia ul-Haq’s regime backed mujahedeen militias as proxies to combat Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Organized by Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence directorate with assistance from the United States and Saudi Arabia, the recruitment networks within Pakistan started a radicalization process among segments of Pakistan’s population. The most susceptible group was the more than three million Afghan refugees. (The I.S.I. in particular backed Hekmatyar Gulbuddin’s Hezb-i-Islami, which was part of a rival to movement to the Deobandis.)

Afghan refugee boys began attending Deobandi madrassas, and small numbers of teachers and students began joining militant groups to fight the Soviets. Upon the Soviet withdrawal and the fall of the Afghan Communist government, the mujahedeen turned on one another, prolonging Afghanistan’s civil war, and the presence of millions of Afghan refugees in Pakistan.

In 1994, Ms. Bhutto began to abet militancy to secure Pakistani objectives in Afghanistan. The Bhutto government facilitated a paramilitary force of thousands of madrassa students to cross the border and take control of Afghanistan’s Kandahar Province. With Pakistan’s help, this militia of “Taliban,” literally “students,” conquered large swaths of Afghan territory and declared its commander, Mullah Omar, to be caliph. Like the Taliban before them, the Islamic State has designated its commander, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, as caliph and calls the territories under its control a caliphate.

Their militancy soon crossed the border. After the initial stage of mobilizing volunteers and weapons for jihad in Afghanistan, a second phase developed in which Pakistan witnessed a wave of anti-Shiite violence, including bombings of Karachi’s major Shiite mosques by the Taliban’s sister organization in Pakistan, Sipah-e Sahaba.

The Turkish government’s decision to turn a blind eye to Islamic State activity within its borders has similarly led to the extremists’ increasing influence in certain areas of Turkey’s major cities. The recent and unprecedented arson attacks on Shiite mosques in Istanbul may indicate that Turkey is entering this second phase. Turkey is home to only a small Shiite community; but Turkey’s Alevis, a heterodox Muslim sect often regarded as heretical by Sunnis, constitute about 20 percent of Turkey’s population.

A campaign by Sunni extremists against the Alevi community could lead Turkey into a Pakistan-like vortex of sectarian violence and radicalization. The present government’s own politics of polarization, illustrated by Mr. Erdogan’s baiting of the opposition leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu due to his Alevi background during Turkey’s recent presidential election campaign, may further inflame sectarian tensions. And Islamic State militants will not hesitate to exploit the Sunni-Alevi fault line in Turkish society.

Pakistan’s final and most dangerous stage of extremism occurred when the flow of militants and resources was reversed. As the Taliban conquered most of Afghanistan, it provided training camps and other logistical support to its allies, making it harder for Pakistan to control militant organizations inside its borders. After 9/11, Gen. Pervez Musharraf attempted to crack down on militants inside Pakistan. His efforts culminated in the 2007 Red Mosque battle in Islamabad and the subsequent coalescing of militants into the movement known as the Pakistani Taliban.

Turkey has not experienced this stage yet. But the Islamic State may find fertile recruiting ground among Turkey’s 1.3 million Syrian refugees. And Turkish citizens may be drawn into the orbit of militancy just as segments of Pakistan’s population have been. If the Islamic State’s Turkish networks remain intact, Turkey runs the risk that homegrown militants will be empowered by the return of fighters from Islamic State territory in Syria and Iraq.

Ms. Bhutto’s strategy of employing militant proxies to create a client state in Afghanistan succeeded — but at a high price for Pakistan. That is a warning for Turkey, which must recognize that it cannot shield itself from Sunni militancy while pursuing a Sunni sectarian foreign policy in the Middle East.
Pakistan’s Lessons for Turkey
by MICHAEL M. TANCHUM and HALIL M. KARAVELI, mobile.nytimes.com

Kissinger's lessons for today's policymakers

Kissinger is not wicked, but a realist par excellence, writes Oskanian
As US President Barack Obama was outlining his strategy to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), I was finishing reading Henry Kissinger's new book "World Order".

It's a Kissinger book. It's insightful and to the point. He takes a grand view of how we got here. He is dispassionate about understanding and explaining the foreign policy decisions that have been taken and that continue to miss the mark of the all-important equilibrium among great powers. This has been the focus of his writings and speeches for four decades, beginning with his first book, "A World Restored", describing such efforts in the 19th century.

The bear knows seven songs and they are all about honey - I don't know if that's an Armenian saying or a Russian one, but it's true for Kissinger as well. All of his songs are about understanding Europe's path to a balance of power and the ways to apply the lessons of those experiences to contemporary conflicts. It is remarkable how consistent he has remained over the decades.

Kissinger's fascination with this period lies in his hope to find insights on the exercise of power by statesmen such as Castlereagh and Metternich for the development of an international structure that contributed to peace in the century between the Congress of Vienna and the outbreak of World War I.

Fundamental problem

"The most fundamental problem of politics," wrote Kissinger, "is not the control of wickedness but the limitation of righteousness".

This is how Kissinger summed up the essence of the "idealism versus realism" debate in his earliest work - his dissertation.

Obama is an idealist, a righteous man. Kissinger is not wicked, but a realist par excellence. His early academic convictions and on-the-job experience as national security adviser to President Richard Nixon and later secretary of state under Presidents Nixon and Gerald Ford, makes him the quintessential realist and the exemplary practitioner of balance of power plays in our time.

At the infancy of the Syrian conflict three years ago, when Obama rushed to declare that Bashar al-Assad must go, Kissinger was quick to call the pronouncement premature and a mistake for not knowing who will fill the vacuum created by Assad's departure.

At 91, his "World Order" may be his last appeal for pragmatism and realism in the face of an increasingly interdependent world with a disintegrating world order.

Today, that realism is more than necessary in the Middle East where the nation-state system is shattered by those who, under the guise of religion, wish to take and wield power in ways that are incongruous with a 21st century world. This dangerous chaos is at least partly the outcome of strategically uncertain, albeit morally laudable, US policy in the larger Middle East.

Kissinger looks at the world, in whole or in parts, from the perspective of a desirable balance of power and the US role in securing it. This policy tool provides the anchor for his realism and allows him to see world events not purely from the point of view of ideology, but rather from a more pragmatic, result-driven perspective.

When in 1973 it became clear that the Vietnam War is not winnable, Kissinger looked for a graceful way out. He forged a detente with the Soviet Union and an opening to China, and then played off both to create a triangular balance of power that preserved US influence after its retreat from Vietnam.

More recently, when the US Senate ratified NATO's expansion to Eastern Europe in May 1998, Kissinger knowingly wrote: "Russia is bound to have a special concern for security around its vast periphery and the West needs to be careful not to extend its integrated military system too close to Russia's borders."

And at the infancy of the Syrian conflict three years ago, when Obama rushed to declare that Bashar al-Assad must go, Kissinger was quick to call the pronouncement premature and a mistake for not knowing who will fill the vacuum created by Assad's departure.

Obama lacks this mastery. Obama's equivalent move to Kissinger's Vietnam balance of power play could be the triangulation between Shia Iran, the Sunni-dominant Gulf region and, Syria and Iraq. This requires a transcending of previously drawn lines and an ability to artfully skew the line between ideology and values.

Broad reconciliation

First, a broader region-wide process of Sunni-Shia reconciliation must begin and it must involve Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. For the common good, this requires understanding and compromise from all involved on issues from territorial disputes, nuclear proliferation and support to different group on both sides of the Sunni-Shia divide.

Second, the West and Iran must redouble their efforts to overcome the last hurdles to reach a sustainable deal on Iran's nuclear issue. Iran has consistently said that it wants to develop uranium enrichment technology for industrial use. Everyone agrees that Iran has the right to do so. The Iranians have also said that they will continue to honour their commitments and open their doors to observation as members of the non-proliferation community. The West must be more respectful of Iran's current industrial aims if it wants Iranian cooperation. That cooperation is critical not just to eliminate ISIL's threat, but for crucial longer term peace and stability in the region.

Third, just as an inclusive government in Baghdad is necessary so is a stable government in Damascus. The United States must recognise that its half-hearted support of the moderate opposition has been a failure and has made things worse for everyone, except ISIL. To train and arm the illusive Syrian moderate opposition to fight ISIL in Syria is too little and is a recipe for prolonging the Syrian civil war by continuing to breed extremist groups. The Syrian conflict and its possible resolution need to be framed differently and need to transcend Assad's person.

An opening to China, too, seemed unreal. But it happened and it worked. It was not a policy driven by morals, yet did no evil, was pragmatic and despite the earlier policy errors, brought stability to an unstable part of the world.

Kissinger's lessons for today's policymakers
by Vartan Oskanian, aljazeera.com
Vartan Oskanian is a member of Armenia's National Assembly, a former foreign minister and the founder of Yerevan's Civilitas Foundation.

The views expressed in this article are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera's editorial policy.

Confronting the IS — preventing more Frankensteins

The forces of revenge, phobia and senseless bloodletting unleashed by the preposterous invasion of Iraq in 2003 continue to ravage the region and its people. An equilibrium, howsoever unjust, once knocked out, produces a whirlpool of cycles of violence that are not amenable to any quick resolution. This is especially true in a situation where the rationale for military intervention was a fabricated lie — a deception. The alleged existence of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) was the sole basis for launching the attack on a sovereign country and that too without any UN authorisation. Paradoxically, both George W Bush and Tony Blair, having said lies about the alleged existence of weapons of mass destruction in the ‘deadly’ arsenal of Saddam, not only survived but were re-elected by supposedly the most ‘enlightened’ electorates of the world.
The US occupation of Iraq although camouflaged under the perceived existence of WMDs was intended to destroy the biggest military machine in the Middle East — one that could pose a danger to the state of Israel. The destruction of the country’s infrastructure was also accompanied by an irretrievable shift in its political and sectarian landscape.
This void, left behind by the removal of a regime, the systems which held the country together, was filled by the emergence of groups, mafias that were on rampage — plundering, attacking and looting with no fear of retribution. The regime of Nouri al Maliki began to advance a ‘sectarian’ agenda. This is the worst thing that could happen to a country already under foreign occupation. Polarisation followed and soon there was a collapse of order on a gigantic scale. A many-dimensional conflict ensued that would not only sap the vitality and strength of a country and its populace but also generate a whole series of ethnic and sectarian battles plunging the country and the region into a war with no goals and no strategies.
A somewhat similar catastrophe was being enacted in Syria. The Western countries, principally the US, had this paranoid mindset that the toppling of the Assad regime would help resolve most of the regional security issues besides, of course, making Israel safe from the assaults of Hezbollah, whose patrons and financiers are Iran and Syria. It was not realised that the very forces that were sponsoring would sow the seeds of discord and spread mayhem and anarchy that could pose a potential threat to their ‘vital’ interests in the region.
The IS phenomenon was almost a natural consequence of the vacuum, the atrocities of the factional militias inflicted upon one another under the watch of the diabolical Nouri al Maliki regime, the destruction of villages, towns, the displacement of millions from their ancestral homes. In the milieu in which the IS (formerly ISIS) was born, there was no room for concepts like tolerance, accommodation and understanding. The group soon challenged and swept away the vestiges of a broken order in parts of Syria and Iraq.
The group comprised frustrated and deeply-troubled Sunni extremists who were on the margins of a socio-economic and sectarian order that did not hold any promise for the majority of the people in the region. They soon began to espouse a philosophy of hatred based on the exclusion of those who did not share their ideals and goals. As they embarked upon a policy of challenging and confronting the state authority in both Syria and Iraq, they found whole bands of new adherents to their purported cause of ‘restoring the ethnic and sectarian balance that has been shattered by the upheavals of the last 11 years’. Muslims from different parts of the world began to flock to the region to enlist in what they thought a noble cause. They thought justice would soon prevail and the injustice would end.
The IS took control of banks, industries, oil wells and refineries, weapons, transport and military hardware, etc. That made them independent as far as resources are concerned. It declared one of its leaders ‘Amirul Momineen’ — the commander of the faithful. This was done to convey the message that a new Islamic State is born which would demand allegiance from all Muslims. Owing to the rallying cry of faith, many began to support this movement.
But soon there were many disappointments. The beheading of opponents and journalists caused a stir in the ranks of the movement for Islam does not permit such killings. Then the Kurds were targeted and there were huge displacements of people. This further alienated many well wishers of the movement. The destruction of property was without any valid reason. But more importantly, the supporters began to worry about the ultimate goal and objective of the movement. Because how could a movement that kills journalists, female professionals and causes the expulsion of innocent Muslims from their homes, claim to be heading towards the establishment of an egalitarian, welfare Islamic state? People soon began to break ranks with the movement.
The IS first generated hope, then disappointment. The Sunni Arab monarchies saw a threat to their fiefdoms. They rallied to oppose and confront the IS. They poured resources, mobilised their militaries, sought alliances in a bid to defeat the movement. That was understandable and natural. But people in distant lands were ‘alarmed’ — the United States began to see ‘mortal dangers’ from IS volunteers and decided to intervene to ‘save’ America from it.
The US and French bombing missions are obliterating whatever little is left of the infrastructure of the region. True, the bombs inflict damage on the movement’s arsenal and its treasure. That is one facet of the ‘second invasion’. But a deeper malaise is being caused yet again to the already tumbling political order. More zealots, more frustrated youth, more victims of the holocaust, would begin to emerge from the ashes of a collapsing IS, causing more violence, more instability and more chaos.
The regional countries which have a stake in the situation could have promoted a more harmonious response to the challenge the IS poses. With the West intervening in the crisis, suspicions are bound to be raised in Iran — a key ally of Bashar al-Assad. The West certainly does not want to give respite to the Syrian regime and yet that regime is also fighting the IS. Iran is supporting the Shia majority regime in Iraq which is also fighting the IS. The Sunni Arab monarchies are fighting against both IS as well as the Assad regime. Such a complex conflict would inevitably cause a stupendous and destructive reaction that will be immeasurably difficult to handle or contain .
The Middle East is in the grip of another fatal cycle of violence. The region and its people would bear the scars for generations. The only beneficiaries are Israel and the factories producing weapons in the West.
Published in The Express Tribune, September 29th, 2014.
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